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My study addresses the nationalization of science in the nation-building era of China through the
establishment of Academia Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan),  China’s  national  academy  of
sciences. In 1929, through its engagement with a Sino-Japanese biological expedition along the
Yangzi River, Academia Sinica, as a governmental department, for the first time implemented
regulations on foreign biological expeditions in China. The engagement thus paved the way for
China’s first policy on the matter. By terminating international researchers’ unlimited access to
Chinese natural resources, this policy established national control over all the scientific activities
in China. With such institutional protection, Academia Sinica essentially established biological
resources as China’s national property, and scientific research as a national enterprise. Through
the process, Academia Sinica not only became the place where science and nationalistic politics
could mutually empower each other, but also established itself as a monopolist in the Chinese
science community. This paper examines the driving forces behind Academia Sinica’s
nationalizing efforts—namely, China’s political instability and its troubled relations with Japan
in  the  late  1920s,  the  necessity  of  the  Nationalist  government  to  assert  its  legitimacy  and
authority in its founding years, and the utility of Academia Sinica in connecting science and
nationalistic politics. Based on this examination, the thesis explores the application of science as
a nationalistic tool and its effect on China's scientific community, when science became a
collectivist interest of Nationalist China.
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1. INTRODUCTION
My study addresses the nationalization of science in Republican China through the establishment
of Academia Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan), China’s first national academy of sciences. I argue
that this nationalizing process was initiated by Academia Sinica’s engagement with a Japanese
biological expedition along the Yangzi River in 1929. This encounter paved the way for
Academia Sinica’s future policy on international biological expeditions in China in the 1930s.
By terminating international researchers’ unlimited accesses to Chinese natural resources, this
policy established national control over all the scientific activities in China. It accordingly
incorporated biological resources as China’s national property, and science as a national
enterprise. This paper examines the driving forces behind Academia Sinica’s nationalizing
efforts—namely, China’s political instability and its troubled relations with Japan in the late
1920s, the necessity of the Nationalist government to assert its legitimacy and authority in its
founding years, and the utility of Academia Sinica in connecting science and nationalistic
politics. Based on this examination, this thesis will look into the changing understanding of
Chinese elites towards nation, science, and modernity.
Moreover, through the process of nationalizing science, Academia Sinica not only
became the place where science and nationalistic politics could mutually empower each other,
but also established itself as a monopolist in the Chinese science community. This thesis intends
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to shed light on the Nationalization’s effects on China's scientific community, when science
became a collectivist interest of Nationalist China.
In October 1929, a Japanese ichthyologist, Dr. Kishinouye Kamakichi (1867-1929),
launched a biological expedition along the Yangzi River. The trip was hosted by Shanghai
Science Institute (Shanghai ziran kexue yanjiusuo,  est.  1931),  a  scientific  research  institute
funded by a Sino-Japanese cultural project. In a team composed of Japanese and Chinese
graduate students at the Tokyo Imperial University, the expedition planned to study freshwater
fish in the Three Gorges area of the Yangzi River. As they sought to conduct a typical biological
expedition, the team expected to study the natural habitat of the freshwater fish and collect fish
specimens for further study.
When the team was halfway to their destination, the leader of Academia Sinica, Cai
Yuanpei (1868-1940), sent an order to local governors along the Yangzi River to prohibit the
team from further proceeding unless the team fulfilled Academia Sinica’s requirements. The
central point of Academia Sinica’s intervention was to establish and stress the point that any
foreign researcher shall not conduct scientific expeditions and collect biological specimens in
China’s territory without the Chinese authority’s permission and participation. After rounds of
negotiation, the event was settled according to Academia Sinica’s will in that the team received
two participants from Academia Sinica and sent a set of fish specimens collected to Academia
Sinica.
Based on the terms settled with Dr. Kishinouye’s team, Academia Sinica in the early
1930s promulgated a set of policies on regulating foreign research expeditions in China.
According to the policies, any foreign researchers who planned to conduct scientific expedition
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in China must obtain an academic passport, which would be exclusively issued by Academia
Sinica. Otherwise, their activities, as well as their host intuitions’ activities, in China would be
subjected to official intervention. To acquire the passport, a research party had to sign a contract
with Academia Sinica, which signifies the conditions under which foreigners may collect
biological specimens in China.
With the policies, Academia Sinica established itself not only as the national research
center of China,  but also as the administrative center of science for the nation. Thus,  it  was no
longer an institution exclusively engaged with the studies of science and arts. It was a political
sector capable of solving practical problems that the Nationalist government faced.
The history of Academia Sinica during its mainland period (1927-1949) has been closely
examined by Chen Shiwen.1 Chen’s emphasis is on the dual-identity of the institute, both as the
national academy of China and a department of the Nationalist government. To start with, Chen
traces Academia Sinica’s dual-identity from the tradition of China’s central academic system,
through which the combination of academic research and government service has been gradually
institutionalized in China’s central academies. Though having similar dual-identity to its
predecessors, Academia Sinica was different in that it was the first national academy that did not
center on the study of the Chinese classics, but rather regarded scientific research as a priority.
The emphasis on scientific research, Chen argues, was influenced by the emergence of modern
scientific academies in the West from the 17th century onwards.2
1 Shiwen Chen. Government and Academy in Republican China: History of Academia Sinica, 1927-1949. Dissertation, Cambridge: Harvard
University, 1998.
2 Ibid., pp. 11-25.
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Further,  Chen’s  work  focuses  on  the  institute’s  attempts  to  maintain  a  balance  between
the two-fold mission led by its dual-identity: serving the nation-building agenda of the
Nationalist government and pursuing the impartial truth of nature. This involved three issues that
concerned Academia Sinica: [1] To what degree should the institute have autonomy from the
government; [2] Whether the institute should give priority to pure science or applied science; and
[3] How the faculties of the institute should place themselves between professional scientists and
bureaucracies.3 Regarding the issues, Chen argues that facing Japan’s increasing encroachment
in North China and the leading members’ preference for Soviet industrial development aided by
the Soviet Science Academy, Academia Sinica found its place in fulfilling the two-fold mission
by serving the nation-building agenda with the professionalism of science through the
establishments of the National Resources Commission (Ziyuan weiyuanhui, est. 1932) and the
National Research Council of Academia Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan pingyihui, est. 1935) in
the mid-1930s. The former was a technocratic organization for which Academia Sinica
cooperated with other government departments in order to serve China’s industrial and military
developments with science and technology.
The National Research Council of Academia Sinica, as Chen puts it, was an institutional
center within Academia Sinica and an innovation in its history “to coordinate the whole nation’s
scientists and to discuss China’s scientific policy.”4 As it is revealed in my study, however,
Academia Sinica already formulated scientific policies for the Nationalist government regarding
foreign expeditions in China before the establishment of the National Research Council in 1935.
3 Ibid., pp. 54-128.
4 Ibid., 141.
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Hence, it was not until 1935 when Academia Sinica assumed the role of the administrative center
of science, but rather at the beginning of its establishment when its leaders incorporated the role
of the administrative center into the core of the institute’s identity.
Moreover, though Chen briefly mentions the scientific laws Academia Sinica
promulgated on behalf of the Nationalist government, their formation and contents are not
examined in detail. Neither the policy on foreign expeditions nor the institute’s engagement with
the Japanese expedition is covered in his monograph. Thus, my study attempts to start with
Academia Sinica’s capacity building through its intervention in the expedition and the formation
of its foreign expedition policies since the late 1920s. The process, which has not been examined
in the existing literature, will be closely explored in the context of the commencement of the
Nationalist Government. The examination will bring new perspectives on the nature of
Academia Sinica and the institutionalization of science in the Republic of China.
As for another major institution involved in Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition, Saeki Osamu
has pioneered work in recording the history of Shanghai Science Institute.5 Established in 1931
in Shanghai, Shanghai Science Institute was a research institution co-founded by the Chinese and
the Japanese governments. The institute was a part of Oriental Cultural Work (???? bunka jigy?),
which  was  funded  with  the  money  remitted  from  the  Boxer  Indemnity  (Gengzi peikuan) that
China paid to Japan after its military defeat in 1900. The biological expedition along the Yangzi
River was one of the institute’s preparatory study projects co-operated by Japanese and Chinese
5 Saeki Osamu. Shanhai Shizen Kagaku Kenky?jo: Kagakushatachi no Nitch? sens? (Shanghai Science Institute: Sino-Japanese War among
Scientists). Tokyo: Takarajimasha, 1995.
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scholars. In Saeki’s account, the Japanese expedition vividly unfolds in two chapters based on
Japanese archives and memoirs.
Nevertheless, Saeki’s work fails to incorporate sufficient primary sources in Chinese to
present the whole picture of the expedition. Focusing on the team’s suffering during the arduous
trip, Saeki tends to reduce the team members to total victims of China’s nationalistic sentiment
and Academia Sinica’s unfair treatment, while their potential roles in Japan’s imperial cultural
agenda were largely overlooked. Moreover, due to a lack of non-Japanese reference in Saeki’s
work,  it  fails  to  contextualize  the  establishment  of  Shanghai  Science  Institute  and  the  Oriental
Cultural Work to which the institute belonged within Chinese society. Therefore, it overlooked
the nature of the two entities in that they were both a part of Japanese cultural policy towards
China and the outcome of the competition between America and Japan for their influences in
China. In this regard, my study will give a comprehensive account of the story which was
insufficiently developed in Saeki’s work, as the team’s suffering was not only the outcome of
China’s nationalistic sentiment, but also was led by the mounting cultural cooperation between
China and America.
The interaction between Academia Sinica and Shanghai Science Institute can be better
understood within China’s cultural relations with Japan and America in the early 20th century. In
1900, China lost the war caused by the Boxer uprising to foreign powers. It thus had to pay the
Boxer Indemnity for at least thirty years to eleven nations, including the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Japan. In the following years, due to increasing foreign presence in China
and the discrimination the Chinese faced abroad, anti-foreign sentiments were escalating in
China, which led to growing boycotts against foreign commodities and regional conflicts
7?
involving foreigners in China’s major port cities. This urged foreign forces like the United States
and Japan to reconsider their policies in order to carry on their enterprises in China with less
resistance. In this regard, America initiated a remission for part of the Boxer Indemnity from
China and established a fund with the remissions for Chinese education improvement.6 With two
American Remissions in 1908 and 1924, America was able to fund over 1,300 Chinese students
to pursue higher education in America and funded various Chinese cultural and academic
enterprises in China.7 Academia  Sinica  was  among  the  beneficiaries  of  the  remissions,  as  the
American Remissions did not only provide it with funds, but also trained the Chinese students
who later became the institute’s faculties.
In the 1920s, the large population of promising Chinese students, who pursued their
studies in America, normally found coveted job placements after their return to China and
constituted the leading force among the pro-American social elites in China. This, in turn,
strengthened the Sino-American relations in various realms, which led to a growing trend in
China, especially among the Chinese intelligentsia, to favor European-American scholarship and
education over that of Japan.8 This trend, together with Japan’s increasing imperialist moves
toward China, gradually terminated the golden era of Sino-Japanese cultural communication in
the 1900s.9
6 Michael H. Hunt. “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal.” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31 (1972): 539-559.
7 By 1929, it is estimated that 1,289 Chinese students studied in America with the American Remission scholarship. See Wang, 1974, 314.
8 Teow, See Heng. Japanese Cultural Policy Toward China, 1918-1931. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999, pp. 16-24.
9 Douglas Reynolds. China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993. One of Reynolds’s central
arguments is that because of China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and a similar cultural tradition shared by the two nations,
there was a growing trend in China to learn after Japan in the realms of politics, economics, culture and education for China’s survival. This trend
led to a burst in the exchange of people and knowledge between the nations in the 1900s. The decade is accordingly deemed the golden age of
Sino-Japanese cultural relations.
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Facing the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations and America’s increasing influence on
Chinese elites, Japan followed the example of America in announcing a cultural project toward
China with the fund remitted from the Boxer Indemnity.10 On  March  30th, 1923, Japan’s 36th
Diet passed the "Special Account Bill on the Cultural Work for China" (Taishi bunka jigy?
tokubetsu kaikei h?)  to  promote  Sino-Japanese  cultural  communication  and  cooperation  (Nishi
bunka teikei).11 The  Japan’s  cultural  project,  later  renamed  as  the  Oriental  Cultural  Work, was
responsible for sponsoring all cultural matters pertaining to China, such as supporting Chinese
students abroad, establishing cultural institutions in China, and funding China-related studies in
Japan and China, among which was the establishment of Shanghai Science Institute and Dr.
Kishinouye’s biological expedition.12
My examination of China’s relationships with Japan and America in terms of cultural
affairs  will  mainly  be  built  upon the  studies  of  Japan’s  Boxer  Remission  to  China  in  the  early
20th century. There are three scholars, Wang Shuhuai, Huang Fuching, and Teow See Heng, who
have done leading work about the Boxer Remission and Japan’s cultural policy towards China.
With the most comprehensive statistical analysis of the Boxer Indemnity and its remissions from
the treaty powers like the United States, Japan, Britain and so forth, Wang lays a sound
foundation for later studies pertaining to the topic. 13  As for Huang’s monograph, it is not
restricted to the Oriental Cultural Work, but extends to the examination of a whole range of
10 Teow, pp. 63-67.
11 The Bill’s microfilm is available at National Archives of Japan-Digital Archives. Call number: 14083100, microfilm number: 003900. URL:
https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/Detail_F0000000000000028293. The Bill’s English translation is available at the Appendix of
Teow’s monograph, Teow, pp. 217-219.
12 Saeki, 1995, 17-34.
13 Shuhuai Wang. Geng zi pei kuan. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1974.
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Japanese cultural enterprises in China in the first half of the 20th century, including educational,
medical, media, and intelligence, which accompanied Japan’s escalated invasion of China from
the first Sino-Japanese War to the end of World War I.14
Teow raises three innovative points about Japan’s cultural policy towards China, with its
center on the Oriental Cultural Work. First, in contrast to Huang’s discussion in which Japan’s
cultural policy towards China was reduced to cultural imperialism aiming to exploit China’s land,
money, and natural resources, Teow, based on Wang’s earlier discussion, places Japan’s cultural
policy  in  a  global  context  by  comparing  it  with  American  and  British  cultural  policies  towards
China at the time. By doing so, Teow highlights the point that against a background of
nationwide anti-foreign movements in China, foreign forces should not be collectively
categorized and studied as a whole, for there were increasing division and competition among
those foreign forces for maximizing their interests in China. Hence, it is necessary to examine
China’s interactions with the foreign forces respectively and consider the influences the
interactions might have on one another. In this regard, Teow adds another layer to Japan’s
cultural policy towards China in that it was not simply designed to exhaust China’s resources but
also to restore the deteriorated Sino-Japanese relations against America’s growing influence on
China, through America’s Boxer Remission Projects since 1908.15
Second, since cultural imperialism has been a relatively vague concept, Teow associates
the term with the cultural enterprises that one party forces upon another without any mutual
agreement. In this regard, the Oriental Cultural Work, which was established upon the official
14 Fuching Huang. Jindai Riben zai hua wenhua ji shehui shi ye zhi yanjiu. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1982.
15 Teow, See Heng. Japanese Cultural Policy Toward China, 1918-1931. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999, Chapter 2 and 4.
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cooperation between the legitimate governments of China and Japan, could only be labeled as a
cultural imperial project after the Chinese Nationalist Government officially withdrew from the
cooperation and announced the project’s illegitimacy in December 1929.16
Third, and more importantly, different from Wang and Huang’s studies which generally
depict China at the passive receiving end and even as victims of the cultural imperialism through
those foreign cultural projects, Teow argues for China’s agency in negotiating with the imperial
forces  upon  the  usage  of  the  Boxer  Remissions  and,  in  some  cases,  appropriating  the  imperial
cultural enterprises for China’s good.17
As  the  three  authors  focus  their  attention  on  exploring  the  cultural  interactions  among
China, Japan, and America on a political level, the cultural projects’ influences on individual
experiences are barely pursued. In this regard, I will look into the divisive impact the cultural
competition between America and Japan had on the Chinese scholars, as it was exemplified by
the members of Academia Sinica and Shanghai Science Institute. The former received American
Remissions as a part of its fund resources and most of them received their professional training
in the United States and Europe. Whereas, the latter was exclusively funded by the Japanese
government and composed of Japanese and Chinese faculties who graduated from Japanese
universities. When Academia Sinica interfered with Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition, which was
composed  of  both  Chinese  and  Japanese  team  members,  it  did  not  only  set  restrictions  on
foreigners’ expeditions, but also restricted the access for the Japanese-trained Chinese scientists
to their own nation’s natural resources. The disenfranchised Chinese scholars in Dr.
16 Ibid., Chapter 5.
17 Ibid., pp. 63-79.
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Kishinouye’s team were not only the exemplification of the divided academic community of the
Nationalist  China  where  pro-American  Chinese  elites,  or  in  general  the  pro-Western,  assumed
dominance, they also represented the individuals who were marginalized in the science
community of China due to the marriage between science and nationalism through the
establishment of Academia Sinica.
Before the establishment of Academia Sinica and its intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s
expedition, China had witnessed constant reshuffling of powers, civil wars, and foreign invasions.
In the midst of the political chaos, nationalism reached its new height during and after the
Northern  Expedition  in  1927,  a  military  campaign  led  by  the  Nationalist  Party  (Guomindang,
hereafter  GMD)  against  the  Beiyang  Warlord  regime  (Beiyang junfa) and the various foreign
forces as its patrons. Under the banner “To defeat the imperialists and to eradicate the warlords
(dadao lieqiang chu junfa),” the military expedition’s central objective was to unify China under
a Republican regime of the GMD and to liberate China from foreign political forces. In the
process, the banner of nationalism and anti-imperialism proved useful for the GMD to
consolidate its position as the leading force in defending and unifying China against its domestic
competitors, as any domestic forces fighting against the GMD could be interpreted as the enemy
of the nation. This was especially true after the Jinan incident in 1927. When the Northern
Expedition was on its way to overthrow the Beiyang government in Beijing, it was involuntarily
involved in military confrontations with Japanese troops in Jinan, which ended up with
thousands of Chinese casualties. Though this provided the Beiyang government with a good
opportunity to attack the GMD army, the Beiyang government chose not to take the advantage.
Since a nationalistic discourse promoted by the GMD stressing that “Chinese should not attack
12
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Chinese (when there is Japanese presence)” (Zhongguoren bu da zhongguoren) was prevailing in
China, an attack on the GMD army at the moment would establish the Beiyang government as an
accomplice of Japan and thus a traitor to China. Though the GMD army suffered severe loss in
the Jinan incident, the nationalistic sentiment triggered by Japan’s military action enhanced the
GMD’s reputation in China and facilitated its victory over the Beiyang government. From then
on, nationalism became a dominant public sentiment through the Republic era and thus an
effective instrument for the GMD.18
Nationalism in 1920s China was a multilayered concept, which included the unity and
sovereignty of China, and the nation’s industrial construction. 19  In this regard, the Nanjing
regime had to maintain a delicate balance when dealing with foreign forces. On the one hand, the
government had to stand assertively against foreign encroachment in order to justify itself as the
legitimate and powerful protector of China. On the other hand, to build up a modern China, it
had to win the foreign forces’ acknowledgements of its position in international politics and to
gain their support for China’s modernization in terms of industrialization, international trade and
modern education. Hence, it was imperative for the Nanjing regime to reduce foreign influence
in the political realm of China while seeking cooperation with the foreign forces in the realms of
commerce, industry, and culture. A failure in dealing with either facet of nationalism—China’s
sovereignty and China’s modernization—would put the government’s legitimacy on ruling China
under question.
18 Luo, Zhitian. “Minzu zhuyi yu minguo zhengzhi.” Kai fang shi dai, 2000.5, pp. 108-113.
19 Ibid., 109.
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The series of political chaos and the two-layered nationalism rising through the process
had significant ramifications on the cultural community of China. Among the ramifications, the
interaction between nationalism and science, which set the conditions for Academia Sinica’s
confrontation  with  Dr.  Kishinouye’s  expedition  and  the  institute’s  capacity  building,  will  be  a
key aspect of my examination. The topic has occupied several scholars’ attention in their
discussion about foreign explorations in China, the circulation of Chinese material objects, the
professionalization  of  the  Chinese  scientific  community,  and  the  rising  authority  of  science
among the Chinese intelligentsia.
Due to a series of unequal treaties dating back to 1840, China was forced to open its
territory to foreign imperial forces. Among the increasing foreign presence in China in the
following years, there were more and more foreign explorers launching expeditions in China in
order to imbue the West with a sense of oriental exotica. In Fan Fati’s account, British naturalists
led the first wave of the foreign explorations in China around the Opium War in the 1840s.20 The
British naturalists, both professional and amateur, collected and classified the unique floral and
fauna of China for Western cultural institutions and global cultural markets. After the Opium
War,  their  explorations  extended  from  their  bases  in  port  cities  like  Canton  and  Macau  to  the
hinterland of China. Following the British, as it is presented in Explorers and Scientists in
China’s Borderlands, 1880-1950, other major and minor players in the colonial game of China,
20 Fati Fan. British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter. Harvard University Press, 2004.
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which included the French, the Americans, and the Swedish, organized their expeditions to the
Southeast and Northeast parts of China around the turn of the 20th century.21
Regardless  of  their  nationalities,  the  foreign  explorers  who  have  been  studied  so  far
shared certain features. They were either from Europe or America, or in general, the West. They
were composed of both professional scientists and amateurs, whereas the latter, which included
merchants, missionaries, and diplomats, accounted for a large proportion. During their
expeditions, most of the foreign explorers had to rely on their Chinese collaborators, like the
indigenous or Chinese dealers, to acquire their intended collections. Since most of the foreign
explorers were working for cultural and academic institutions like Kew Gardens, the Royal
Society of London, the American Museum of Natural  History,  and Harvard University,  each of
their adventures normally carried on multiple missions to collect object materials for more than
one  discipline,  like  collecting  plants,  fossils,  folklores,  and  antiquities  in  one  trip  to  serve  the
studies of biology, geology, ethnography, and even philology together.
Concerning the features shared by the western explorers, the books on the foreign
expeditions in China are reconciled in presenting that though the foreign expeditions in China
were  the  outcomes  generated  by  the  white  privilege  and  the  semi-colonial  system  through  the
unequal treaties, those were less involved with direct conflicts between particular nations. Rather,
the expeditions were more about the projection of the imperialist power that condescended to
discover the varieties of oriental humanity lying outside the unmarked category of Western
21 Glover, Denise M., and McKhann, Charles F., eds. Explorers and Scientists in China’s Borderlands, 1880-1950. Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1997.
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civilization, and to list the regional facts found in China into the universal knowledge of science
through the imperial scholarship.
Though both books on foreign explorations in China briefly mentioned that Japan
followed Britain as the leading force in the foreign explorations in China in the early 20th century
and that China’s rising nationalism reduced the privilege of foreign explorers since the 1930s,
the points remain insufficiently studied so far. In this regard, my examination of Dr.
Kishinouye’s  journey  and  Academia  Sinica’s  policy  on  foreign  expeditions  will  start  from  the
points where the previous studies stopped. Unlike the binary between the enlightened West and
the unenlightened East which renders science in the hierarchy of civilizations, my study will
address a more intense interaction between science and nationalism on the eve of Japan’s full-
fledged invasion of China. In the confrontation regarding Dr. Kishinouye’s biological expedition,
science was deemed as an essential component of national pride by both Japan and China.
Through the Japanese-led biological expedition and the Japanese-founded Shanghai Science
Institute, Japan did not only attempt to help China upgrade to the standard of the international
scientific community, but also attempted to prove its own ability to foster a cultural co-prosperity
sphere led by Japan. On the other hand, by suspending the Japanese-led expedition and by
promulgating regulations on foreign explorations, Academia Sinica essentially exerted its
authority to protect both natural and scientific resources of China and thus defended China’s
sovereignty in the realms of politics and culture.
Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition was not China’s first
assertive objection to foreign explorations. China’s collective reaction towards foreign
expeditions increased along with the formation of Chinese academic associations, among which
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the  Science  Society  of  China  (Zhongguo ke xue she,  est.  1914)  and  the  Geological  Society  of
China (Zhongguo dizhi xuehui, est.1922) were of prime importance. Two scholars, Jia Sheng and
Grace Shen, have comprehensively recorded the history of the associations and their critical roles
in the formation of the scientific community of China in the Republic era.
Founded at Cornell University in 1914, the Science Society of China was an association
of Chinese scholars who received their professional training in the United States, mostly with
natural sciences majors. With Science (Ke xue) as its major journal, the association devoted itself
to the popularization of science in China, the improvement of China’s science education, the
standardization in Chinese translation of scientific terms, and Chinese participation in the
international scientific community. 22  In 1918 it moved its headquarters to Nanjing and
established a biological research laboratory there in 1922. The laboratory had launched several
short-distance biological expeditions around Nanjing and thus had been a potential competitor to
the Japanese expedition over the biological resources along the Yangzi River. 23 Prior to the
establishment of the government-sponsored Academia Sinica, the association was the leading
scientific organization in China. After the establishment of Academia Sinica, the two
organizations cooperated in the scientific enterprise of China by sharing faculties, who usually
trained in American, and financial resources, among which the American Boxer Remissions
accounted for a large proportion.
22 Jia Sheng. The Origins of the Science Society of China, 1914-1937. Cornell University Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1995, 23.
23 Lijing Jiang. “Retouching the past with living things: indigenous species, traditions, and biological research in Republican China, 1918-1937.”
Historical Study in the Natural Science, vol.46 no.2 (2016), 154-206.
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Another  party  related  to  the  issues  of  Dr.  Kishinouye’s  expedition  was  a  group  of
interrelated associations, namely, the Geological Society of China (hereafter GSC), the National
Scientific  Union  of  China  (Zhongguo xueshu tuanti xiehui, est.1927, hereafter NSUC), and the
Central Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities (Zhongyang guwu baoguan weiyuanhui,
est. 1928, hereafter CCPA). After the imperial forces like Britain acquired extraterritoriality from
Qing Empire in the mid 19th century, the Chinese material objects, especially antiquities and
botanical resources, had been continuously subjugated to foreign encroachment. They were
transported outside of China, displayed in foreign museums, or sold on international markets
through foreign merchants and foreign explorers.24 When such foreign explorations reached a
new  height  in  the  first  two  decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  GSC  first  made  their  assertive
reaction towards the crisis by imposing cooperation on a Swedish explorer Sven Hedin (1865-
1952) who planned to conduct an excavation trip in central Asia. Joined by several academic
associations in Beijing, GSC formed the NSUC. With the Beiyang Warlord government’s
backing, NSUC signed a contract with Hedin, according to which the two parties would jointly
launched an excavation trip to Northwestern China in 1927, mainly with Swedish funding and
equipment, whereas a share of the excavated antiquities had to be kept in China. Since then,
Chinese scholars, as they were represented by the Chinese geologists here, were enabled to
maximize any opportunities that came their way by piggybacking on foreign expeditions and
strove to appropriate foreign cultural imperialism.25
24 Fati Fan. British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter. Harvard University Press, 2004.
25 Grace Shen. Unearthing the Nation: Modern Geology and Nationalism in Republican China, 1911-1949. London: University of Chicago Press,
2014, Chapter 4.
18
?
After the transition from the Beiyang Warlord government to the Nationalist government
in 1928, most key members of GSC and NSUC were reappointed in academic institutions around
Nanjing, the capital of the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), and
formed an official committee—CCPA—under the new government’s direction. The committee
helped the new government promulgate the Antiquity Preservation Law (Guwu baocunfa) in
1931. Since then, the measures set up to defend national properties, i.e. fossils and antiquities,
against foreign encroachment were institutionalized with legal authority.
As it will be presented in my study, Academia Sinica’s policy on biological specimens
shared  some  main  points  with  the  NSUC’s  contract  with  foreign  explorers  and  the  antiquities
law.26 However, in contrast to the latter two policies, which emphasized the protection of the
cultural artifacts of China, Academia Sinica’s biological specimens policy, for the first time,
offered official protections for the natural resources of China and thus essentially began to
incorporate natural resources as a part of national properties.
Prior to Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and Academia Sinica’s biological specimens
policies, the discourses of both Chinese nationhood and science were mainly related to Chinese
language, literature, and history, or in general cultural materials that embodied China’s
glamorous past and could accordingly arouse Chinese collective memory. At the turn of the 20th
century, due to the unequal treaties, the increasing foreign presence in China in the realms of
commerce, politics and culture led Chinese intellectuals to reconsider the issues related to
26 Fati Fan."Circulating Material Objects: The International Controversy over Antiquities and Fossils in Twentieth-Century China." The Circulation
of Knowledge Between Britain, India and China : The Early-Modern World to the Twentieth Century, ed. Bernard Lightman, Gordon McQuat, and
Larry Stewart, Brill, 2013, pp. 209-236.
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Chinese nationhood and westernization. Among their various pursuits, two terms successively
constituted influential strands of the discourses of Chinese nationalism: “National Essence” (Guo
cui) and the more neutral term “National Heritage” (Guo gu). Though the two terms addressed
Chinese nationhood in relation to nature and science respectively, they essentially tied the
concepts of nation and science to cultural studies and materials.
The National Essence group claimed that the essential part of Chinese nationhood was
preserved in the pre-Qin learning (zhu zi xue), which flourished in the late Zhou (480 BCE-220
BCE), but perished with the bibliocaust in the Qin (221 BCE-200 BCE) and was suppressed by
the state-sponsored monopoly of Confucianism during the succeeding dynasties. In this regard,
to revive the genuine Chineseness, the scholars attempted to retrieve Chinese language, culture
and history through pre-Qin texts. Fan Fati addresses that the National Essence scholars in the
early years of the 20th century defined and redefined Chinese history, tradition and nationhood in
relation to the transmutations of the concept of nature mainly in two ways.27 First, the scholars’
pursuit of Chinese nationhood was based on an ethno-nationalism. However, the ethnic standards
they used to distinguish the Han from the others were not based on any physical differences or
various biological types, if there were any. Instead, the Chinese nation, in the National Essence
scholars’ terms, was a kinship-based ethnic community, which was demarcated by surnames and
social customs. In other words, it was the common culture rather any natural or physical feature
that shaped the Chinese into a historical nation (lishi minzu).
27 Fan Fati. “Nature and Nation in Chinese Political Thought: the National Essence Circle in Early Twentieth-Century China.” The Moral Authority
of Nature, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, pp. 409-437.
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Moreover, according to Fan, though the National Essence scholars pursued the study of
nature, their scholarship was neither about gaining more knowledge about nature nor discovering
Nature’s laws. For example, the scholars studied plants and natural history of China only to
compare the living creatures with the ones recorded in ancient texts, and thus to recover the lost
ancient knowledge about the living world. Moreover, the study of plants served as a part of their
study  of  local  history  as  plants  were  symbols  of  the  land.  Thus,  the  aim  of  their  research  on
nature was not about gaining knowledge about nature in the present or the future, but to summon
the collective memory of the people, and thus foster a sense of belonging among the Chinese to
their land and their past.
After the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the discourse of Chinese nationhood turned to
a new trend led by the movement to Reorganize National Heritage (zhengli guogu). Similar to
the National Essence scholars, the supporters of the movement also attempted to recover the lost
knowledge of ancient China through rigorous scholarship. However, besides adopting a more
neutral term—National Heritage—to refer to the materials and objects related to Chinese
nationhood, the National Heritage scholars were different from their purist predecessors in that
they regarded the reorganization of National Heritage as an enterprise of science and that they
pursued the knowledge about ancient China with the approach of modern academic disciplines,
like history, philosophy, philology, and archaeology.
Luo Zhitian has addressed the concept of science understood in China in the early 20th
century in relation to the Reorganizing National Heritage movement. One of his main points is
that though science was the slogan of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, which gained
increasing attention and popularity in China at the time, it remained as an abstract and
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fragmentary notion, which was only loosely connected with the natural sciences. Then, in the
1920s, as the National Heritage scholars, who were also prominent public figures in China,
began to advocate the application of scientific ‘spirit’ and ‘methods’ on the cultural studies that
were related to Chinese nationhood. For them, regardless of the object of study, any research
adopting scientific methods, like observation, investigation, and reasoning, could be categorized
as  science.  That  is  to  say,  to  recover  the  ancient  meaning  of  a  Chinese  character  was  no  less
scientific  than  discovering  a  new  planet  in  so  far  as  both  the  research  employed  scientific
methods. The concept of science was more associated with cultural studies than being associated
with the experimentation and numerical calculation in natural sciences.28
In this regard, because of the National Essence and the National Heritage studies, the
concepts of both science and nation in 1920s China were closely tied to cultural studies. As a
consequence, when science and nationalism gained increasing authority in public discourse,
cultural artifacts rather than natural objects received more attention, and thus effective protection
from the academic community and the government. Both the Geological Society of China’s
efforts at the negotiation over the excavated materials in China and the Nanjing government’s
Antiquities Law indicated the growing importance of the cultural items like antiques and fossils,
as they were considered both as the embodiment of Chinese nationhood and valuable sources for
China’s scientific studies.
The professionalization of the Chinese academic community, especially the making of
modern academic disciplines in China in the early 20th century, was a double-edged sword for
28 Luo, Zhitian. Inheritance Within Rupture : Culture and Scholarship in Early Twentieth-Century China. Leiden: BRILL, 2015, Chapter 8 and 9.
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the National Heritage scholars. By adopting the research methods of social sciences and
humanities from the West, the National Heritage scholars distinguished their approach to the
Chinese  classics  from their  National  Essence  predecessors.  Though both  the  National  Heritage
and the National Essence scholars were addressing the ancient knowledge of China, the National
Heritage scholars, with modern scholarship, rendered the Chinese ancient knowledge more
understandable to modern readers, both the Chinese and the non-Chinese.
On the other hand, some of the National Heritage scholars went a little bit further as they
attempted to find their modern approach to Chinese ancient knowledge a place in the modern
academic system by categorizing their studies into an independent discipline, the National
Learning (guo xue). They thus proposed to establish the department of National Learning in
China’s leading universities like Beijing University and Qinghua University. However, in the
late 1920s, there was a continuous debate over whether National Learning should be considered
a subject at all, since it failed to match with any existing western academic discipline.29 In this
regard, the system of modern academic disciplines offered the National Heritage scholars the
authority of science, which allowed them to distinguish themselves from traditional Chinese
studies and rendered the ancient knowledge of China more reachable to modern readers.
Whereas, the system, with its standards and control over the mode of the production of
knowledge, fundamentally disproved the National Learning’s validity as a modern discipline,
and thus essentially debilitated the Reorganizing National Heritage movement.
29 Ibid., pp. 249-255.
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Since the National Heritage scholars failed to fully incorporate their studies into the
system of the western academic disciplines and failed to serve the nation-building agenda of the
newly  established  Nanjing  Regime  with  great  utility,  the  National  Heritage  movement  faced  a
downturn by the late 1920s. At the time, even Hu Shi (1891-1962), the leader of the movement,
refuted his own earlier argument of the equality of the discovery of new stars and the meaning of
ancient words and encouraged young students to pursue the studies of natural science and
technology,  which  were  more  urgent  and  could  better  serve  the  nation.  In  terms  of  research
material, Hu Shi recommended the youth to achieve something in a science lab or on expeditions
to promote sciences that use material objects as their sources and to overthrow sciences that use
literature as their sources.30
In my study, I will contextualize Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and Academia Sinica’s
biological specimens policies within the downturn of the National Heritage movement. By doing
so, I will present that it was a new ideology of science emerging in the late 1920s, in which
science was less associated with cultural studies of literature and more emphasized on its
instrumental value, which set the conditions for the Chinese academic community’s special
attention to natural resources, and thus led to Academia Sinica’s policies on protecting the
resources. The policies marked a new strand of discourse of Chinese nationhood from which was
mainly  tied  to  the  cultural  studies  done  by  the  National  Essence  and  the  National  Heritage
scholars into what also incorporates natural sciences and natural resources. The new strand of
discourse, in turn, extended the connotations of both science and nation from what tied with
30 Ibid., pp. 273-274.
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China’s culture and past to what embraced the nation’s natural environment, its present and a
promising future.
Besides the rising nationalistic sentiment in Chinese society and the professionalization
of the Chinese academic community through its formative years, there was another factor that
accelerated Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s freshwater fish expedition: there
were a series of violent competitions over fishing resources between Japan and China in Chinese
coastal waters in the late 1920s. In Micah S. Muscolino’s account, from the East China Sea to the
Zhoushan Archipelagos (Zhoushan qundao, the delta of the Yangzi River), Japan’s mechanized
trawlers severely depleted the Yellow Croakers in the region. The Japanese incursion into
China’s waters thus acutely reduced the catches of the local Chinese fishermen, who were less
equipped with mechanized fishing technology. As the local fishermen at the time were already
organized into a quasi-guild network—fishing lodges—which was counted as an influential
social force in the coastal areas of China and a major source of local governments’ revenue, their
loss and suffering through the Sino-Japanese confrontation soon caught the government’s and the
public’s attention.31 In this regard, I will present that when Dr. Kishinouye was about to launch
his expedition to study the freshwater fish in the Yangzi River, the trip immediately raised
suspicion among Chinese society in that the expedition was related to the fishing-war Japan
began in China’s waters. The expedition was accordingly interpreted as another Japanese
invasion of China’s fishing resources with the aid of modern science and technology.
31 Micah S. Muscolino. Fishing Wars and Environmental Change in Late Imperial and Modern China. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2010,
Chapter 4.
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In all, focusing on Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and its
policies on foreign explorations in China, my study attempts to look into Academia Sinica’s
capacity building through the process at the commencement of the Nationalist Government in the
late 1920s. Based on Academia Sinica’s capacity building, my study attempts to shed light on
one key feature of the institutionalization of science at the commencement of the Nationalist
regime: the interaction between science and nation. It will be explored in four aspects as follows.
First, in terms of scientific institutions, the dual-identity of Academia Sinica, both as the
national academy and the administrative center of science run by the state, allowed the institute
to be the place where science and nationalistic politics could mutually authorize each other. In
the late 1920s, the newly established Nationalist government sought support from the authority
of science to strengthen its legitimacy by proving its intention and ability to defend and
modernize China. Meanwhile, the Chinese scientific community at its formative stage also
sought protection from the government to secure its access to scientific resources. Academia
Sinica was the intersection to fulfill the two intentions. Hence, the dual-identity of Academia
Sinica allowed the institute to interfere with Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and thus accelerated its
capacity building through the process.
Second,  in  terms  of  the  membership  of  the  Chinese  scientific  community,  as  it  was
exemplified in Academia Sinica, two points are worth exploring. In the case of Academia Sinica,
the institutionalization of science was not led by scientists per se, but rather by a group of
academic-bureaucratic elites. They generally had the experience of studying abroad in leading
Western universities, which was rare in China at the time. They were key figures in China’s
cultural debates and movements, and they shared close ties with China’s major political forces.
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Because of their outstanding educational background and their reputations accumulated in the
movements, they were respected by Chinese intellectuals, including Chinese scientists. Their
reputations and influences among Chinese elites thus could be translated into political capital
when serving the Nationalist government. Therefore, the academic-bureaucratic elites, with their
dual identity, reinforced Academia Sinica’s position on connecting the scientific and political
communities of China. Thus, with their efforts, Academia Sinica was able to institutionalize the
mutual authorization between science and nation.
On the other hand, as we will see in the case of Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition, a group of
Chinese scientists did not benefit from the marriage between science and nation. Though this
unity allowed science to gain support from the government, it escalated the factionalism among
the Chinese academic community. At that time, Chinese students overseas generally formed
associations with regional bases, like the group of Chinese students in America who founded the
Science Society of China at Cornell University in 1914 and the group of Chinese students in
Japan who founded Bingchen Association (Bingchen xueshe) in Tokyo in 1916.32 In this regard,
based on their educational background and social network, there was a division among the
students who were trained in Japan, Europe, and America. As China in the late 1920s saw
growing hostility toward Japan and more cooperation with America in the realms of politics and
culture, the Chinese students who studied in the West gained more dominance over social
discourse and academic resources in China. In contrast, as it was reflected in the membership of
32 Fan, Tiequan. Jin dai Zhongguo ke xue she tuan yan jiu. Beijing: Renming chubanshe. 2011, pp. 41-47.
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Academia Sinica and the confrontation concerning Dr. Kishinouye’s trip, Chinese scholars who
were trained in Japan were largely marginalized in the academic community of China.
Third, in terms of material objects, when Academia Sinica, with its dual-identity,
interfered with the expedition and formulated the policies to protect natural resources (biological
specimens) from unregulated foreign expeditions, it essentially established natural resources as
China’s national property. Prior to Academia Sinica’s biological specimens policies and the
antiquity law, there had been several waves of debate on what should be deemed national
properties of China and how should they be treated. Two groups of scholars—the National
Essence scholars and the National Heritage scholars—successively dominated the center of the
debates. In spite of the differences between their research methods, both of the groups, in general,
regarded Chinese language, literature, and history as the basis of Chinese nationhood and thus
used them as the sources of their studies. Moreover, the National Heritage scholars, categorized
their modern way to approach Chinese literature as a scientific enterprise, before Academia
Sinica’s policies on biological specimens, the concepts of both science and nation were
associated with the cultural studies on ancient texts, artifacts, antiquities, and even fossils. In this
regard, Academia Sinica’s protection and policies on biological specimens extended the
connotations of both science and nation understood in the 1920s from concepts bound to China’s
culture and glamorous past to more tangible terms compressed with China’s natural environment,
its present and a promising future.
Fourth, besides being strengthened by the dual-identities of Academia Sinica and the
academic-bureaucratic elites, the connection between science and nation was rooted in their
authority and utility to serve the nation-building agenda of China in the late 1920s, which
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included the claim to China’s sovereignty and the promise of the nation’s progress, or in general,
China’s modernization. In 1928, for both the Nationalist government in Nanjing and the Chinese
scientific community, which were in their formative years, their legitimacy initially rested upon
the authority of the concepts of nation and science—two foreign terms that were only adopted
from the West within decades—and the utility of the pioneers who promoted the enterprises of
science and nation in China. In this regard, to strengthen themselves, it was imperative for the
two newborn organizations to find collaboration with one another, to resort their enterprises to a
superior cause, like modernization, or to serve in solving China’s urgent crises, which were led
by foreign imperial encroachment and discrimination overseas.
The nationalist discourse and enterprises promoted by the Nationalist government could
effectively serve the agenda, and so did the discourse of science and the Chinese science
community. Through the empowerment of Academia Sinica, the science community reaffirmed
China’s national identity by connecting their biological approach to the nation’s natural
environment with the nation’s past recorded in ancient texts. It protected the nation’s sovereignty
by protecting its natural resources. And it reconstructed China’s national pride in a modern way
by proving the nation’s capability of observing, experimenting, and reasoning, or in general, the
nation’s scientific competence in the international science community. Hence, the empowerment
of Academia Sinica, as an essential part of the institutionalization of science in China, was
fundamentally facilitated by the discourse of science in the late 1920s in which science had the
authority and potential to serve the nation by protecting its sovereignty, reaffirming its identity,
and supporting its modernization.
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I base my account of Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and its engagement with Academia
Sinica on Japanese and Chinese archive materials, newspapers, and one team member’s
travelogue about the trip. Besides the travelogue’s detailed description of the individuals’
experience  through  the  expedition,  Japan’s  Diplomatic  Archives  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign
Affairs keeps comprehensive records of what the Japanese government knew about the event
when it took place, including official documents between the Japanese and the Chinese
governments, telegrams between Japanese diplomats in China and their government concerning
the negotiation over the expedition, and the information collected from China regarding Chinese
opinions about the expedition. On the other hand, the collection of Academia Sinica’s archives,
Guo jia tu shu guang cang guo li zhongyang yan jiu yuan shi liao cong bian, documents the
telegrams among the Chinese officials upon the matter. The academic passport and Academia
Sinica’s policy on foreign expeditions, which were central to Academia Sinica’s capacity
building, are available in the Second Historical Archives of China in the Volume 393 (quan zong
hao). Moreover, for the two major institutions in my discussion, Academia Sinica and Shanghai
Science Institute, their archival materials are respectively compiled into published collections,
which include the institutions’ regulations, journals, publications, and reports.
My thesis consists of five chapters. The second chapter discusses how the transition from
the Beiyang Warlords government to the Nationalist government in Nanjing set the stage for the
occurrence between Dr. Kishinouye and Academia Sinica. First, I will present that the
nationalistic  sentiment,  which  set  the  tone  for  the  story  and  Academia  Sinica’s  empowerment,
escalated along with the Nationalist Party’s Northern Expedition against the Beiyang
government, the troops’ military confrontation with the Japanese army in Jinan, and the political
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discourse promoted by the Nationalist government after its establishment in Nanjing. Second,
since Dr. Kishinouye’s cooperative project with China was based on an official cooperation
between the Japanese government and the Beiyang government, the Nationalist government’s
attitude toward the cultural cooperation, as well as the expedition, depended on how the
government approached its predecessor’s political heritage and established its own legitimacy.
As foreign forces already constituted as essential parts in China’s politics in the early 20th
century, the newly established Nanjing regime had to cautiously consider its diplomatic policies
if it should abolish all the unequal treaties to confirm its position as a nationalistic protector,
continue the cooperation with the foreign forces to build a modern China recognized by the West,
or adopted a mixed policy of the two. In my discussion, when Academia Sinica interfered with
the expedition and the Nanjing regime officially terminated the cultural cooperation with Japan,
the government delicately dealt with the options. It confirmed its nationalist image by abolishing
a plausible cultural “unequal treaty” signed between the Beiyang government and Japan. In this
regard, by jeopardizing the Sino-Japanese relations, which had already hit the bottom, the
Nanjing regime projected a contrast between the Beiyang government, which collaborated with
Japan, and itself, which stood assertively against the foreign force. Third, after the political
transition, besides reconsidering its foreign policies, it was also imperative for the Nanjing
regime to strengthen its political legitimacy as the modern ruler of China. In this regard, the
establishment of Academia Sinica effectively fulfilled the government’s agenda. For one thing, it
projected an image of the government as the legitimate heir of China’s political convention in
that a legitimate regime of China should be the protector of China’s social order and culture, and
thus the supporter of China’s central academy. On the other hand, by emphasizing the scientific
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studies in Academia Sinica, the Nanjing regime were modeling itself after the modern
governments in the West, which sponsored the enlightening knowledge and science academy.
Chapter Three will present the entire process of Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition in 1929,
including its preparation, Academia Sinica’s intervention and settlement, and the public opinions
in  both  Chinese  and  Japanese  societies  towards  the  event.  The  whole  story  will  be  recounted
based on the primary resources mentioned earlier. After Academia Sinica successively settled the
issues regarding Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition, it promulgated the policies on regulating foreign
expeditions and the circulation of biological specimens in the early 1930s, which included
issuing academic passports for foreign researchers and a contract between the institute and the
foreign researcher who attempted to obtain the academic passport. The chapter will present the
contents of the passport and the contract. The two documents will then be closely examined
within the frames of China’s passport policy and the Antiquities Law of the early 1930s. I argue
that, Academia Sinica’s authority to issue the academic passport did not only establish itself as
the administrative center of science in China, but also overrode the Chinese foreign ministry’s
authority  to  regulate  foreigners  in  the  academic  realm.  In  this  regard,  more  than  being  the
national research center of China, which served in improving the Nanjing regime’s legitimate
image, the institute empowered itself as a functional department of the government with practical
value and authority. Moreover, by contextualizing the contract between Academia Sinica and
foreign researchers, I argue that the policy essentially extended the connotations of science and
nation, which were mainly associated with cultural studies and materials in the 1920s, to the
natural sciences and the nation’s natural resources, except that there was still a hierarchy
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between the nation’s emphasis upon which the objects related to Chinese culture were more
valued than the nation’s natural resources.
Chapter Four examines four main factors that accelerated Academia Sinica’s
empowerment. The first two interrelated factors that set the conditions for Academia Sinica’s
moves were the rising nationalistic sentiment in Chinese society and Japan’s increasing presence
in China’s territory in the late 1920s, which jointly rendered Japan as the primary target of
China’s anti-foreign movements and thus mobilized public support for Academia Sinica’s
intervention in the expedition. Moreover, a more necessary cause for Academia Sinica’s capacity
building was the newly established Nationalist regime’s intention to consolidate and prove its
position  as  the  legitimate  government  of  China,  and  the  utility  of  Academia  Sinica’s  dual-
identity on serving the agenda. One the one hand, unlike earlier academic associations, whose
attempts to interfere with foreign expeditions mostly proved futile due to a lack of government
support, Academia Sinica, as an academic institute run by the Nanjing regime, was authorized to
implement coercive measures over the foreign expeditions in China, like directly ordering
provincial governments to detain the expedition team in a port city. On the other hand, Academic
Sinica was different from the other departments of the Nanjing regime in that it was not simply
composed of bureaucrats, but also included scholars who were able to speak the standard
language of science, to effectively communicate with foreign researchers, and to judge whether
one  expedition  was  exclusively  on  academic  mission  as  it  proposed.  Lastly,  though  as  a
department of the Nanjing Regime, Academia Sinica’s establishment and active participation in
defending  China’s  cultural  sovereignty  were  not  solely  because  of  its  official  duty,  but  were
rather propelled by the calling and initiative of the Chinese academic community in its formative
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years. It sought cooperation with and protection from the authorities in order to secure the
resources for its research and further development. In this regard, it was because of their efforts
that natural sciences, rather than the studies of the Chinese ancient knowledge, became more
associated with the concepts of nation, science, and modernity. Hence, the natural resources,
which could be the potential scientific resources, were finally categorized as national property
and thus received effective protection from the government.
Chapter Five examines several features of the institutionalization of science in the
Republican China, as they were exemplified through the process of Academia Sinica’s capacity
building. I will respectively discuss how science served in reconfirming Chinese nationhood,
building China’s national pride, and connecting China to the modern system of academy through
the capacity building of Academia Sinica. First, by comparing modern biological taxonomy with
the Chinese tradition of classifying flora and fauna recorded in Compendium of Materia Medica
(Bencao gangmu), the biologists in Academia Sinica attempted to connect the nation’s tradition
with modern biological study. Second, by establishing the Museum of Natural History,
Academia Sinica aimed to display the richness of the nation’s natural resources and Chinese
scientists’ ability to collect and study the nature of the nation on their own. Third, according to
Academia Sinica’s annual reports, the institute placed it as its priority to have its members
participate in international academic conferences and encourage them to publish in English in
order to justify the nation’s capability and competence in the realm of science. Fourth, the
faculties of the institute were also dedicated to the translation and standardization of the
terminology and the nomenclature of science in Chinese in order to systematically relocate the
western system of modern disciplines in the Republican China. In all, I argue that the
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institutionalization of science in early 20th century China was fundamentally facilitated by the
connotation of science at the time in that science possessed the potential and utility to serve the
nation, the party-state government, and China’s modernization. Though, positive ideas of science
were held by the majority of people in China in that science was meant to serve the collective
interest of an institution, a political party, or a nation, it inevitably generated the marginalized
and even the disenfranchised minority in the Chinese science community, as it was exemplified
by the Japanese-trained Chinese members in Dr. Kishinouye’s team, who were deprived of the
access to their own nations’ natural and research resources.
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2. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE NATIONALIZATION OF SCIENCE: THE
TRANSITION FROM THE BEIYANG GOVERNMENT TO THE NATIONALIST
GOVERNMENT
This chapter discusses how the transition from the Beiyang Warlords government to the
Nationalist government at Nanjing set the stage for Academia Sinica’s intervention in the
biological expedition led by Dr. Kishinouye along the Yangzi River. First, it examines the
inequality, violence, and the constant reshufflings of power that China faced in the 1920s, both
domestically and internationally. In this period, nationalistic sentiment was escalating along with
the  Nationalist  Revolution  and  it  reached  its  peak  in  the  Nationalist  Party’s  military  campaign
against the Beiyang government. It thus rose to be the dominant social discourse of China and an
effective instrument for the Nationalist Party to mobilize massive support. The chapter looks
specifically into the anti-foreign facet of the nationalistic sentiment, which was embodied in
China’s insistent popular demand for the abolition of all “unequal treaties” and the Education
Independence movements. The second section will examine the foreign presence that prevailed
in the cultural community in early twentieth century China through foreign-funded cultural
projects:  the  American  Boxer  Remissions  and  the  Japanese  Oriental  Cultural  Work.  These
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foreign cultural projects allowed external forces to control scientific enterprise in China. To deal
with the uncomfortable fact that science, the best instrument for China’s independence and
modernization, remained under the control of foreigners, the Nationalist government determined
to “nationalize science.” In that effort, the Nationalist government at Nanjing established the
nation’s central academy of sciences, Academia Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiuyuan), in 1928. The
third section will then briefly outline the government’s attempts at the nationalization of science,
and present an introduction of Academia Sinica and its role in the Nationalist government.
2.1. RISING NATIONALISM IN 1920S CHINA
After the Revolution of 1911, the Qing dynasty descended from power. The termination of
China’s last imperial dynasty did not immediately establish the republican regime in China, as
the revolutionists had expected. The Nationalist revolutionary party, later named Guomindang
(GMD), which had led the uprising, was denied the fruits of its labor. Though Dr. Sun Yat-sen
(1866-1925), the leader of the party, was inaugurated as the provisional President of the new
Republic of China on January 1st, 1912, he had to immediately step down in favor of the northern
military autocrat Yuan Shikai (1859-1916). After being elected as the President of the Republic
in 1914, Yuan suppressed the GMD, suspended the national assembly of China, and legalized his
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dictatorial authority through the promulgation of the so-called Constitutional Compact of 1914.33
Headed by Yuan and composed of the senior members in his Beiyang Army (Beiyang jun), the
Beiyang clique dominated the government of the Republic of China at Beijing from 1912 to
1928. The government was also referred as the Beiyang government (Beiyang zhengfu), with
Beijing as its capital. After Yuan’s death in 1916, factionalism split the Beiyang Army. The
military leaders of the major factions of the Army, who consolidated their positions in respective
regional bases, later became regional warlords. They exercised regional autonomy, engaged in
warfare with one another, and formed alliances with foreign forces. Usually, the strongest army
among the warlords would control the Republican government at Beijing. In this regard, the
decades long intermittent wars among the warlords not only continued to reshuffle the structure
of the Beiyang government, but also jeopardized the stability of Chinese society.
At  the  same  time,  after  the  GMD  retreated  to  its  base  in  Canton,  Dr.  Sun  and  his
followers organized series of political movements to challenge Yuan’s dictatorship and to
establish a constitutional republican regime. Most of their attempts proved futile until the GMD
launched the Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s. The GMD, advised by Soviet experts and
aided by the Chinese Communist Party, mobilized the nation in the service of the patriotic
movement, such as labor strikes, student movements, and military expeditions. The programs
were aimed at unifying the country, defeating the Beiyang warlords, overcoming foreign
privilege, and achieving a constitutional republic in China.34 The Nationalist Revolution reached
33 Fishel, Wesley R. The End of Extraterritoriality in China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952, pp. 71-
72.
34 Fairbank, John K edit.. The Cambridge History of China. Volume 12: Republican China 1912-1949. Cambridge: Cambridge
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its peak through the Northern Expedition (beifa) under the GMD’s leadership, a military
campaign against the Beiyang government, the warlords, and the various foreign forces backing
them. The GMD established a regional government in Nanjing in 1927. After its military
expedition conquered the Beiyang government at Beijing, its regional government at Nanjing
nominally became the central government of China.
Before the Nationalist Revolution, the Beiyang government was the legitimate central
regime of China, and it exercised military forces and received recognition internationally. To
overthrow such a central government, it was imperative for the GMD to mobilize massive
support. In this regard, nationalism became an effective tool for the GMD as it could easily
attribute all the inequality and sufferings experienced by the Chinese people to the foreign
presence in China and the Beiyang government’s incompetence to end the situation.35 Hence,
besides setting the Beiyang government as its prime target, the revolutionaries demanded the
abolishment of all unequal treaties and led anti-foreign protests, sometimes violently, against
western  corporations  and  missionary  schools  in  the  port  cities  of  China.  They  referred  the
institutions as “the agents for foreign imperial forces in their colonizing enterprises in China.”36
Consequently, nationalism escalated under the Nationalist Revolution and reached its
height during the Northern Expedition (1926-1928). Under the banner “To defeat imperialism
and to eradicate warlords (dadao lieqiang, chu junfa),” the military expedition’s central objective
was to liberate China from foreign political forces and to unify China under a republican regime
University Press, 1983, 527.
35 Wang, Dong. China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History. Lanham: Lexington, 2005, 10.
36 Saeki, 1995, 20.
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of the GMD. In the process, nationalistic banners proved useful for the GMD to consolidate its
position as the major force in defending and unifying China, in contrast to its potential
competitors,  for  any  domestic  forces  fighting  against  the  GMD  at  the  time  could  thus  be
interpreted as the enemy of the nation. In the case of the Jinan incident in 1928, when the
Northern Expedition was on its way to overthrow the Beiyang government, it was accidently
involved in military confrontations with Japanese troops in Jinan with thousands of Chinese
civilian casualties. Though this provided the Beiyang government with a good opportunity to
attack the GMD army, the government chose not to take the advantage. Since a nationalistic
discourse promoted by the GMD, which stressed that “Chinese should not attack Chinese (when
there is foreign presence) (Zhongguo ren bu da zhongguo ren),” rendered any attack on the GMD
army at the moment an accomplice of Japan and thus a traitor to China. Though the GMD army
suffered a severe loss at the Jinan incident, the nationalistic sentiment triggered by Japan’s
military action enhanced the GMD’s reputation in China and facilitated its victory over the
Beiyang government. From then on, nationalism became a dominant discourse in China through
the Republican era and an effective instrument for the party to mobilize popular support.37
Nationalism in 1920s China was a multi-layered concept, which included both the unity
and sovereignty of China, and the nation’s reconstruction. 38  After replacing the Beiyang
government as the central government of China in 1928, the Nanjing regime had to maintain a
delicate balance when dealing with foreign forces. On one hand, in accordance with the
37 Luo, Zhitian. “Min zu zhu yi yu min guo zheng zhi????????? (Nationalism and Republic China Politics).” Kai fang
shi dai, 2000.5, pp. 108-113.
38 Ibid., 109.
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nationalistic discourse promoted by itself in the Nationalist Revolution, the government had to
stand assertively against foreign encroachment in order to justify itself as the legitimate and
powerful protector of China. On the other hand, to build up a modern China, it had to win the
foreign forces’ acknowledgement of its position in international politics and gain their support
for China’s modernization in terms of industrialization, international trade, and modern
education. Hence, it was imperative for the Nanjing regime to reduce foreign influence in the
political realm of China while seeking cooperation with the foreign forces in the realms of
commerce, industry and culture. A failure in dealing with either facet of nationalism—China’s
sovereignty and China’s modernization—would put the government’s legitimacy in question. In
this regard, among the primary concerns of the newly established Nanjing regime, was the issue
of the unequal treaties.
2.2. THE ISSUE OF UNEQUAL TREATIES
The “Unequal Treaties” refers to the treaties, conventions, and agreements concluded between
China and various foreign states during the 19th and early 20th centuries.  The  Qing  rulers  of
China (1644 CE-1911 CE), under military threat, granted foreign powers unilateral treaty rights
and privileges, while China failed to enjoy equivalent rights and privileges in those countries.
The most important treaty rights ceded to foreign interests in China included low fixed tariffs,
extraterritoriality, concessions and settlements, leased territories, the right of inland navigation,
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and the non-reciprocal most-favored nation clause (pianmian zuihuiguo daiyu). The major
countries enjoying “unequal treaty” relations with China were Great Britain (1842), United
States (1844), France (1844), Sweden/Norway (1847), Russia (1851), Prussia (1861), Portugal
(1862), Denmark (1863), Netherlands (1863), Spain (1864), Belgium (1865), Italy (1866),
Austria (1869), Japan (1871), Brazil (1881), Mexico (1899) and Switzerland (1918).39
The phrase “Unequal Treaties (bupingdeng tiaoyue),”  which  refers  to  the  diplomatic
documents between Qing China and foreign powers, was not invented until 1924. Dr. Sun Yat-
sen  first  used  the  term  in  a  public  speech  calling  for  collective  action  against  warlordism  and
imperialism during the Nationalist Revolution.40 He stated as follows:
All Unequal Treaties (yiqie bupingdeng tiaoyue), including foreign concessions, consular jurisdiction,
foreign management of customs services, and all foreign political rights exercised on China’s soil, are
detrimental to China’s sovereignty. They all to be abolished so as to leave the way open for new treaties
based on the spirit of bilateral equality and mutual respect for sovereignty.41
After the speech, the phrase Unequal Treaties (bupingdeng tiaoyue) has been repeatedly
adopted by influential public figures like Hu Hanming (1879-1936) and Mao Zedong (1893-
1976) in both the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the two leading parties in the
Nationalist Revolution. Though the two parties developed different discourses on the “Unequal
Treaties” in relation to foreign powers and the governance of China, their discourses shared one
major feature: regardless of the differences of the texts, the two parties indiscriminately applied
39 Wang, Dong. China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History. Lanham: Lexington, 2005, 10.
40 Ibid., pp. 64-66.??41?Ibid.,?pp.?64-66.?
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the term “Unequal Treaties” to all the documents signed between the foreign powers and China
without providing any other specific definition of or standard for the phrase. In general, centering
on the “Unequal Treaties,” they promoted a revolutionary discourse: as the stigma of the nation’s
past and the origin of the people’s sufferings, the Unequal Treaties were jointly shaped by
increasing foreign presence and the Beiyang government’s incompetence, which ought to be
immediately and completely terminated by a competent government.
The discourse of “Unequal Treaties” was obviously more about revolutionary propaganda
than  about  historical  reality.  Predating  the  usage  of  the  phrase  “Unequal  Treaties  (bupingdeng
tiaoyue)” in 1924, there was no similar term referring to the documents collectively. Qing literati
described certain agreements in classical Chinese as a “treaty of inequality (bupingdeng zhi
tiaoyue).”42 Qing literati and officials certainly saw variations in the “inequality” of the treaties
between the Qing dynasty and the treaty powers. For instance, there were treaties in which only
certain provisions granting unilateral privileges to treaty powers while the rest of their content
were based on reciprocal terms. In fact, the concepts related to the “Unequal Treaties”, like
bugong (unfairness), zhuquan (sovereignty), gaizheng tiaoyue (treaty revision), gaiding
tongshang tiaoyue (revision  of  commercial  treaties),  and bupingdeng zhi tiaoyue (treaty of
inequality), had already appeared in both official and unofficial texts of Qing literati. This
indicated a determination among the Qing elite to revise or remove the unequal provisions from
the treaties. Nonetheless, the absence of the revolutionary-era term “Unequal Treaties
(bupingdeng tiaoyue)” in pre-republican texts suggests that Qing literati did not indiscriminately
42?Ibid.,?4.?
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categorize all international treaties as unequal, and therefore they did not see a need to demolish
the entire edifice of the treaty system.43
Moreover,  prior  to  the  nationalists  calling  for  the  abrogation  of  all  “Unequal  Treaties,”
the Beiyang government had been engaged in negotiations with the treaty powers on the revision
of the treaties for China’s good.44 Though most of the Beiyang government’s attempts to revise
the diplomatic documents failed, it achieved a few revisions after World War I, in which China
as a member of the victorious side, was allowed to remove the unequal provisions from the
treaties it signed with the treaty powers who were defeated.
Meanwhile, as a Communist regime began to govern Russia during World War I, it
intended to foster new diplomatic relations with China, which led to further division among the
treaty powers’ collective stance towards China. According to the Sino-Russian agreement
between Russia and the Beiyang government, the Russians surrendered certain rights, including
their concessions in China and their extraterritorial jurisdiction, in exchange for de jure
recognition by the Beiyang government. Based on the new Sino-Russian relations, the Soviet
envoy in Beijing, Lev Karakhan, was installed as dean of the diplomatic body in Beijing. That is
to say, the other diplomats in Beijing were forced to act under his leadership despite the fact that
their governments did not recognize the existence of the Soviet government. This essentially
paralyzed the activity of the diplomatic body as an instrument for the expression of the collective
interests of the treaty powers. In fact, after Karakhan took office, the diplomatic body was
divided into groups, such as the extraterritorial powers, the maritime customs signatories, and the
43?Ibid.??pp.?4-5.?44?Li,?Yumin.?Zhongguo?fei?yue?shi??Beijing:?Zhong?hua?shu?ju,?2005,?pp.?233-416.??
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1901 Protocol Powers, who each protected its own prime interest in China and took up matters
with China’s Foreign Office without consulting the rest of their colleagues.45
Ultimately, the phrase “Unequal Treaties” was invented by Chinese nationalists as a
revolutionary slogan to foster a collective denial of the nation’s past, attribute all of China’s
painful experiences in that past to the foreign powers and the Beiyang government, and thus
mobilize popular support for the Nationalist regime which was about to put all the sufferings and
inequality to an end.
2.3. THE AMERICAN BOXER INDEMNITY AND THE JAPANESE ORIENTAL
CULTURAL WORK
Due to escalating nationalism in China and division among the foreign powers regarding China’s
treaty revision, the treaty powers had to reconsider their diplomatic relations with China in order
to maintain their interests. The United States played a leading role in fostering an amicable
relation with China by remitting China’s Boxer Indemnity in the 1900s. Other treaty powers, like
Britain and Japan, eventually followed America’s example in supporting China’s educational
development with the Boxer Indemnity they received from China. 46  This led to a major
45?Fishel,?Wesley?R.,?1952,?pp.?80-84.?
46 Michael H. Hunt. “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal.” The Journal of Asian
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competition between America and Japan, as both of the nations intended to extend their
influences on the promising students and potential leaders of China through their cultural
projects.
In 1901, China lost the war caused by the Boxer uprising to foreign powers. It thus had to
pay the Boxer Indemnity (Geng zi pei kuan) for at least thirty years to eleven nations, including
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The extension of America’s Chinese
Exclusion Acts in 1902 led to furious protests and the boycott of U. S. goods in China for the
following two years. In this regard, America in 1908 initiated to remit part of the Boxer
Indemnity and apply the money solely to the improvement of China’s education system in order
to ease tensions between America and China.47 With two remissions in 1908 and 1924, America
was able to fund over 1,300 Chinese students to pursue higher education in America and
establish Tsing-hua College as a preparatory college for the Chinese students who planned to
study in America. 48  The American Remissions also funded Chinese cultural and academic
enterprises through the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (Zhong
hua jiao yu wen hua ji jin hui, hereafter China Foundation), a board of trustees made up by a
Sino-American committee that was independent from both the Chinese and the American
governments.  Among  the  major  beneficiaries  of  the  remissions,  were  some  of  China’s  leading
academic associations, which mainly consisted of western-trained Chinese scholars such as the
Science Society of China (Zhongguo ke xue she, est. 1914), the Geological Society of China
Studies 31, no.3 (1972): 539-559.
47 Ibid.
48 By 1929, it is estimated that 1,289 Chinese students studied in America with the American Remission scholarship.
See Wang, 1974, 314.?
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(Zhongguo di zhi xue hui, est.1922), and Academia Sinica (Zhong yang yan jiu yuan, est.
1928).49
Due to the amicable relations between America and China in the 1920s and the American
Remissions, a large population of promising Chinese students pursued their studies in America
and found coveted job placements after their return. These pro-American social elites in turn
strengthened Sino-American relations in various realms, which led to a growing trend in China,
especially among the Chinese intelligentsia, to favor European-American scholarship and
education over that of Japan.50 This trend, together with Japan’s increasing imperialist moves
inside China, gradually terminated the golden era of Sino-Japanese cultural communication,
which had its peak in the first decade of the 20th century.51
Considering mounting anti-Japanese sentiment and America’s increasing influence,
Japan, following the example of the United States, announced a propaganda project in China--
the  “Oriental  Cultural  Work  (???? bunka jigy?).”52 On March 30th, 1923, Japan’s 36th Diet
49?Wang,?1974,?pp.?308-335.?50?Teow,?1999,?pp.?16-24.?51?Douglas?Reynolds.?China,?1898-1912:?The?Xinzheng?Revolution?and?Japan??Cambridge:?Harvard?University,?1993.?One?of?Reynolds’s?central?arguments?is?that?because?of?China’s?defeat?in?the?first?Sino-Japanese?War?in?1895?and???similar?cultural?tradition?shared?by?the?two?nations,?there?was???growing?trend?in?China?to?learn?after?Japan?in?the?realms?of?politics,?economics,?culture?and?education?for?China’s?survival.?This?trend?led?to???burst?in?the?exchange?of?people?and?knowledge?between?the?nations?in?the?1900s.?The?decade?is?accordingly?deemed?the?golden?age?of?Sino-Japanese?cultural?relations.?52The?initial?title?that?Japan?proposed?for?the?program?was?“China?Cultural?Work?(Taishi?bunka?jigy?),”?since?activities?would?be?overseen?by?the?China?Cultural?Affairs?Bureau?(Taishi?bunka?jimukyoku).?At?the?first?meeting?of?the?General?Committee,?Chinese?members?proposed???new?title?for?the?project,?“Sino-Japanese?Cultural?Work?(Zhong-ri?wenhua?shiye)”?to?suggest?that?the?project?was?based?on?an?equal?cooperation?between?China?and?Japan.?Japanese?members,?on?the?other?hand,?suggested?the?more?encompassing?title?“Oriental?Cultural?Work?(?????bunka?jigy?)”?to?indicate?that?Japan?and?China?were?part?of???“family”?rooted?in?the?culture?of?the?East?and?thus?having?same?interests?of?“mutual?survival?and?mutual?prosperity.”?See?Teow,?40-41,?63-67.?For?official?translation?of? ????bunka?jigy???as?“Oriental?Cultural?Work”?in?English,?refer?to?the?bilingual?handbook?published?by?Shanghai?Science?Institute?in?both?Japanese?and?English.?As???part?of?the?cultural?project,?Shanghai?Science?Institute?stated?the?name,?purpose?and?framework?of?the?project?in?English?in?the?handbook?as?“Oriental?Cultural?Work.”?See?Shanhai?Shizen?Kagaku?Kenky?jo???ran?????????????Shanhai??
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passed the "Special Account Bill on China Cultural Work" (Taishi bunka jigy? tokubetsu kaikei
??).53 According to the bill, the China Cultural Affairs Bureau (Taishi bunka jimukyoku) was
established to promote Sino-Japanese cultural exchange and cooperation (Nishi bunka teikei).
With the fund Japan received from China’s Boxer Indemnity, Oriental Cultural Work activities
were planned to support Chinese students and residents in Japan, establish cultural institutions in
China, and sponsor China-related studies.54
According to two official documents signed between the Japanese government and the
Beiyang government, “Informal Memorandum on China Cultural Work” (Taishi bunka jigy?
hiseishiki bib?roku, 1924.2.6) and “Exchange of Notes on Oriental Cultural Work” (???? bunka
jigy? k?kan k?bun, 1925.5.4), the project’s outline is listed as follows:
1) In Beijing, a library and a humanities research institute will be established.
2) In Shanghai, a natural sciences research institute will be established.
3) If any surplus remains after fulfilling the programs mentioned above, the remission should be used for
the following purposes:
a. To establish a museum at a selected city in China.
b. To establish a medical school attached to a hospital in Jinan.
c. To establish a medical school attached to a hospital in Canton.
4) To undertake further planning of items mentioned above, a general committee comprising twenty
members, ten Japanese and ten Chinese, headed by a Chinese will be formed. Meanwhile, subordinate
committees will be built in Beijing and Shanghai respectively to oversee the establishment and
administration of the institutions in their sections.55
Shanhai?Shizen?Kagaku?Kenkyu? jo??1936.?pp.?1-7.?The?document?is?available?at?Japan’s?National?Diet?Library?Digital?Collections.?http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1149119.?53?The?Bill’s?microfilm?is?available?at?National?Archives?of?Japan-Digital?Archives ?????????????????Call?number:?14083100,?microfilm?number:?003900.?URL:?https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/Detail_F0000000000000028293.?The?Bill’s?English?translation?is?available?at?the?Appendix?of?Teow’s?monograph,?Teow,?pp.?217-219.?54?Saeki,?1995,?pp.?17-34.?55?Ibid??pp.?23-25.?
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Unlike the American Remission project, which yielded productive results and received a
positive response from China, Japan’s Oriental Cultural Work activities were under severe
suspicion and criticism as a symbol of Japan’s cultural imperialism towards China from the
start.56 Three factors rendered Japan’s Oriental Cultural Work as an unwelcome project in China
for both the Beiyang and the Nationalist governments. The first and primary factor was the
growing hostility between Japan and China due to Japan’s expansion on China’s territory in
Shandong peninsular and Manchuria (1928-1932). Due to the Jinan Incident in 1928, Chinese
committee members in the Oriental Cultural Work announced their resignation from the project
in protest.57 However, since the committee was established based on official agreements between
the Beiyang government and the Japanese government, Japan insisted that those Chinese
members could not resign from the project unless the Beiyang government officially terminated
their appointments.58 Though the Chinese members’ appeal was dismissed, their attempts vividly
portrayed the damaging effect of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations upon the Cultural Work
activities.
Second, as the embodiment of China’s rising nationalism, two anti-foreign movements in
China—the movement for abolishing Unequal Treaties and the movement for the independence
of China’s education—viewed Japan’s Cultural Work as a target. On one hand, since “abolishing
all unequal treaties” was one of the GMD’s major revolutionary slogans since 1924, it became
the  first  priority  of  the  newly-established  Nationalist  government  to  fulfill  that  promise.  As
56?Saeki,?4.90?57????? Bunka Jigy?. Call?number: B05015167100.?58 ???? Bunka Jigy?. Call?number:?B05015181200.?
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mentioned, the GMD did not provide a specific definition or standard for Unequal Treaties,
except that the term was generally associated with the diplomatic documents signed between
China and foreign forces. In this regard, as a project based on official notes between the Beiyang
government and Japan, the Oriental Cultural Work was deemed as a part of the unequal treaties
and therefore should be terminated by the Nationalist government. In fact, as the Oriental
Cultural  Work  treaty  allowed  Japanese  organizations  to  own  the  land  where  they  built  the
institutions of the project. It was denounced as a disguised form of the Twenty-One Demands, a
treaty Japan forced upon the Beiyang government in 1915 with blatant colonial ambitions.59
On the other hand, a nationalistic trend in the 1920s, which called for the independence
of China’s educational system, also played a role in fostering an environment hostile towards the
Oriental Cultural Work. The trend was a part of a nationwide anti-Christian movement in China,
which was started by young students and intellectuals in 1919, and was then precipitated by the
GMD  and  the  CCP  in  the  Nationalist  Revolution.60  The critics of Christianity opposed the
function of religion and the practices of the church in China. The religion and its church were
criticized for being the agents of foreign imperialists and capitalists, who alienated the Chinese
from their own culture through western preaching, and who, as non-producers, encouraged
Chinese  workers  to  submit  to  the  wishes  of  the  West. 61  Moreover, it was denounced as
59?Saeki,?pp.?27-29;?Zhonghua?Minguoshi?dangan?ziliao?huibian,?Di???ji,?di???bian,?Wenhua,?Vol.1 ?????????????
???????? ??????Nanjing:?Jiangsu?gu?ji?chu?ban?she,?2000,?44-45.?According?to?the?Sino-Japanese?agreements,?the?Oriental?Cultural?Work,?which?planned?to?establish?schools,?hospitals?and?museums?in?China,?allowed?Japan?to?own?the?land?of?these?buildings?in?China.?This?was?the?general?idea?contained?in?the?Group???of?the?Twenty-One?Demands.?Due?to?severe?nationalistic?protests,?the?Beiyang?government?did?not?accept?Japan’s?Twenty-One?Demands.?Chinese?elite?thus?regarded?the?Oriental?Cultural?Work?as?Japan’s?another?attempt?to?enforce?its?demand?on?China.?60?Hodous,?Lewis.?“The?Anti-Christian?movement?in?China.”?The?Journal?of?Religion??1930,?10?(4):?487.?61?Ibid.??pp.?491-493.?
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superstition for its belief system and its ritual of worship was deemed inconsistent with science.
Hence, the anti-Christians regarded religion as hinderance to the nation’s progress and should be
replaced by an education of science and arts.62
As this nationalistic sentiment permeated the educational arena of China, the intellectual
and educator Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940) seized the chance to call for the independence of China’s
education from religion and foreign control.63 The claim was supported and legalized by both the
Beiyang and the Nationalist governments successively. In 1925, the Beiyang government
promulgated stringent regulations on the schools established by foreigners. In 1926, the
Nationalist government at Canton issued even more drastic regulations that prescribed that
schools founded by foreigners or by churches should be under the supervision and guidance of
the Chinese government’s educational administration, directors of private schools should not be
foreigners, and no religious teaching should be compulsory in any school.64 The regulations
marked a turn in the anti-Christian movement towards a trend calling for the independence of
China’s educational system. The target of the movement was then extended from Christian
church and mission schools to all foreign educational institutions in China. Behind the shift, were
Chinese intellectual leaders, especially those in the GMD and in the CCP, who intended to
nationalize China’s education and believed that only the academic results yielded by the
nationalized  education  through science  and  arts  could  truly  and  effectively  serve  the  nation  for
independence and progress. In this regard, the Oriental Cultural Work, which obeyed no law but
62?Ibid.??488.?63?Tatsuro,?Yamamoto?S.?“The?Anti-Christian?Movement?in?China,?1922-1927.”?Far?Eastern?Quarterly??1953,?12(2),?140.?64?Ibid.,?142.?
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Japan’s “Special Account Bill on the Cultural Work for China” and thus could not be fully
managed by China, once again became a major target of nationalistic movements.65
Ultimately, regardless of the rise of Japanese imperialism and China’s mounting
nationalist movements in the first two decades of the twentieth century, China’s distrust of
Japan’s Oriental Cultural Work was also rooted in the structure and practices of the project,
especially when it was compared with the project funded with America’s Boxer Indemnity
(Table A.1). Although America was also a major imperialist force in China and its educational
policies towards China, to a certain degree, served to defend its own interests in China, its
projects received far less objection and attention.
TABLE A.1. Remissions of the United States, Britain, and Japan (silver taels)66
Country Original
Indemnity
China’s Actual
Payments
Scheduled
Remissions
Paid Remissions
United States 71,897,770 14,527,915 57,369,855 45,971,008
Japan 75,944,689 24,697,505 51,274,184 35,408,207
First, the administrative body that oversaw the American remission activities, the China
Foundation’s joint committee, was led by a Chinese leader who was responsible for all funding
decisions. It remained independent from both the Chinese and the American governments. In
contrast, although there was also a joint committee overseeing the Japanese efforts, its
65?Huang,?Fuching.?Jindai?Riben?zai?hua?wenhua?ji?shehui?shi?ye?zhi?yanjiu? ????????????????(Japanese?Social?and?Cultural?Enterprises?in?China?1891-1945).?Taipei:?Academia?Sinica,?1982,?pp.?119-120.?66?The?table?is?regenerated?based?on?Teow’s?work.?See?Teow,?1999,?204.?
52
?
administration was fundamentally under the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s command and received
its funding from Japan’s Ministry of Finance as a part of the nation’s annual budget.67 Moreover,
unlike the American project, which solely funded educational enterprises in China, the Oriental
Cultural Work, which funded all China-related studies and organizations in both Japan and
China, only distributed around 20% of its funds to Chinese students and educational
organizations (Table A.2). As the totality of Japan’s remission was smaller than that of America,
it  largely  diminished  the  achievements  of  the  funds.  As  one  secretary  in  the  Japanese  Foreign
Ministry pointed it out in 1926, the accommodations and equipment of the American-funded
hospitals and schools in China, like Peking Union Medical College Hospital (Xiehe yiyuan) and
Tsinghua College, were beyond the compare of institutions funded by Japan’s Oriental Cultural
Work.68
TABLE A.2. Programs in Terms of Percentage of the Total Budget for the Oriental Cultural Work69
Program Percentage of Total Budget
Sino-Japanese Academic Institution in China
Beijing Humanities Institute 6.65%
Oriental Cultural Academy 5.52%
Shanghai Science Institute 24.42%
SUBTOTAL 36.59%
Chinese Student and Organization
Chinese students in Japan 18.16%
67?Teow,?pp.?166-169.??68?Kimura,?Atsush ?????“Nichibei?ry?koku no taishi bunka jigy?????????????(Japanese?and?American?Cultural?Projects?towards?China).???Taiy?????1926,?32(7),?pp.?23-27.?69?The?table?is?regenerated?from?Teow’s?work,?see?Teow,?1999,?195.?
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Nikka gakkai70 2.96%
SUBTOTAL 21.12%
Japanese Organization with China-related Study
??jinkai71 17.30%
Japanese cultural organizations in Qingdao 6.64%
??-A d?bunkai72 14.02%
SUBTOTAL 37.96
Other Cultural exchanges 4.51%
Total 100%
Furthermore, as the phrase “[funding] the undertakings to be carried out in China for the
encouragement of education, arts and science, sanitation, relief, and other cultural purposes” in
the  Special  Account  Bill  was  vague,  the  projects  could  either  serve  an  academic  purpose  or  a
military one for Japan.73 In other words, the Oriental Cultural Work was not prohibited from
providing financial resources for studies related to intelligence activities in China. For example,
70?Nikka gakkai????, literally means the Japanese-Chinese Academic Association. Established by a group of Japanese
businessmen in 1918, Nikka gakkai aimed at improving the living conditions of Chinese students in Japan. Teow, 1999, pp. 191-
192.?71 Established in 1902, D?jinkai??? was a private association to promote medicine and public health in Asian countries,
primarily in the cities with Japanese settlements. From 1914, it opened four hospitals in four Chinese cities, including Beijing,
Hankou, Jinan and Qingdao. In the 1920s, the four Japanese hospitals treated more Chinese patients than Japanese patients. See
Teow, 1999, 185; Huang, 1982, pp. 69-91.?72?Established?in?1898,???-A d?bunkai????? was a Japanese semi-official organization. It did not attached to the
Japanese government, but most of its founding members were prominent officers in the government. It received annual subsidy
from the Japanese Foreign Ministry and carried out its activities on political missions. Its primary aim was to investigate China in
order to better serve Japanese interests through a sound understanding of contemporary China. It launched T?-A d?bun shoin?
????? in Shanghai in 1901, which was an educational institution for training Japanese students in Chinese matters, and the
Tokyo d?bun shoin?????? in Japan to prepare Chinese students for admission into Japanese schools, except that the
latter was closed in 1922. Teow, 1999,189.?73?Tazaki,?Masayoshi ??????“Taishi?bunka?jigy? to gojin no kore ni taisuru jakkan no kib??????????????
???????.”?Sy?gy? to keizai???????1925,?5(2),?174.?
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efforts by East Asian Common Culture Association (??-A d?bunkai), established in 1898, began
to receive funding from the Oriental Cultural Work project in 1924.74 This  Association  was  a
Japanese semi-official organization whose main objectives included: (1) The Preservation of
China (Shina hozen); (2) Promoting social improvements in China and Korea; (3) Promoting
research on contemporary issues of China and Korea in order to have its results implemented.75
The organization’s objectives suggest a condescending tone by the Japanese government: since
Western culture had reached a stage of bankruptcy after World War I, as the most modern nation
in the East, it was Japan’s duty to preserve China and Korea from Western colonization and
influences. It would foster a pan-Asia by assimilating China and Korea into a prosperous
community of “same writings and same race (??bun d?shu).”76  Hence, though the Oriental
Cultural Work provided support for Chinese students and organizations in Japan, due to its
engagement in the intelligence activities and condescending gestures, the project was denounced
as an agent of Japanese imperialism in China.77
Within the overall budget for the Oriental Cultural Work project, the largest proportion of
funds was allocated to the Shanghai Science Institute (Shanghai ziran kexue yanjiusuo in
Chinese or Shanhai shizen kagaku kenky?jyo in Japanese). With an annual budget of more than
400,000 yen, the Institute’s funding was even greater than any laboratory or classroom in Japan
74?For instance, T?-A d?bunkai had launched expeditions into Manchuria (the Northeastern part of China colonized by Japan in
the 1930s), the inner land of China, and along the Yangzi River in order to collect information about China’s economic
geography, transportation system, and currency markets. See Huang,?1982,?pp.?16-27.?75?Huang,?1982,?13.?76?Teow,?1999,?pp.?168-171.?77?Saeki,?28.?
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proper. 78  As  the  most  significant  measure  by  Japan  to  promote  its  achievements  in
modernization, the Shanghai Science Institute claimed to contribute to advanced research in the
study of the natural sciences within China. The idea to utilize Japanese Boxer remission funds to
establish a museum and a research institute for natural sciences in China was first proposed by
the Chinese in 1923, when two Japanese Foreign officers Irisawa Tatsukichi (1865-1938) and
Okabe Nagakage (1884-1970) were dispatched to consult the Chinese about the application of
the Japanese funds.79 After the Japanese government formally endorsed the idea in the Special
Account Bill, the Oriental Cultural Work’s Shanghai Committee announced the blueprint for the
Shanghai Science Institute in December 1926.80 Its main points are summarized as follows:
1) The  Institute  is  created  to  promote  the  progress  of  natural  sciences  in  China  by  carrying  on,  first  of  all,
purely scientific research on urgent questions especially vital to the interests in China.
2) The Shanghai Committee stressed the necessity of endeavoring to raise the scientific ability of Chinese
scholars.
3) The Institute will be including seven Departments: Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Geology, Pathology,
Bacteriology, and Pharmaceutical Research.
4) The chairman should be selected among Chinese members. Each Department consists of Researchers,
Assistant-Researchers, Assistants, and Research Probationers. The Research Probationers will be chosen
among Chinese candidates by exams.
5) Preliminary Studies will be carried out by Japanese and Chinese researchers together as preparation without
waiting for the completion of the construction of the Institute. The seven preliminary studies and their
researchers were:
a. Keimatu Katuzaemon and Yu Yan: A Study on Chinese Herbal Medicine.
b. Shinjo Shinzo and Wen Yuanmo: A Study on Terrestrial Gravitation and Magnetism in China.
c. Kishinoue Kamakichi and Yan Zhizhong: A Biological Study of Fish in the Yangzi River.
d. Yamazaki Momoji and Zhang Hongzhao: Geological Studies in the South of the Yangtze River.
78?Hiromi?Mizuno.?Science?for?the?Empire:?Scientific?Nationalism?in?Modern?Japan??Stanford?University?Press,?2008,?47.?79?Saeki,?23.?80?Shanhai?Shizen?Kagaku?Kenky?jo???ran?????????????Shanhai??Shanhai?Shizen?Kagaku?Kenkyu? jo??pp.?1-7.??
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e. Katayama Masao and Zheng Zhenwen: Synthetic Study of Natural Inorganic Compounds.
f. Katayama Masao and Zheng Zhenwen: A Study on Fermentation Fungi and its Products in China.
g. Hayashi Horuo and Xie Yingrui: An Investigation of Epidemics and Endemics in China.
6) The Institute will be located at No. 320 Route Ghisi, in the southwestern section of the French Concession
of Shanghai.
Even before the Institute officially opened in April 1931, the blueprint encountered
problems. Due to the Jinan Incident in 1928, most Chinese members in General Committee and
Shanghai Committee attempted to resign from the Oriental Cultural Work project.81 Though their
appeal did not officially terminate the Sino-Japanese cooperation, their actions did lead to a
reshuffle of the faculty members in the Institute. After the Jinan Incident, most of Chinese
Committee members who also bore administrative titles in other Chinese institutes, such as the
President’s secretary, university presidents, and the former Financial Minister of China, resigned
from the project without official permission from either the Chinese or the Japanese
governments. As for the Chinese researchers in the Institute, most of whom received their higher
education in Japan and had been maintaining cooperative relationships with Japanese researchers
during the cultural project, remained in their positions and participated in some of the
preliminary studies of the Institute as assistants.82 After the events in 1928, no Chinese academic
ever assumed the post of director of the Institute as was originally planned. As a consequence,
Yokote Chiyonosuke (1871-1941), a Japanese professor of medicine at Tokyo Imperial
University, was appointed Acting Director of the Institute. Moreover, regardless of the number
81?Call?number: B05015167100?82?Saeki,?44.?
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of remaining Chinese members, the lack of Chinese participation required the Institute to appoint
larger numbers of Japanese researchers to fill positions in the departments and to undertake the
preliminary studies.
Though  it  was  not  Japan’s  original  plan  to  establish  Shanghai  Science  Institute  as  an
academic center dominated by the Japanese, research conducted during many preliminary studies
provides insight into the motive behind the Institute’s establishment. Billed as an organization
that was “[promoting] the progress of natural sciences in China…[and] carrying on purely
scientific research on urgent questions especially vital to the interests in China,” In reality, with
the exception of the work on epidemics in China, it was rather difficult to associate the other six
preliminary studies with the most urgent questions of China.83 On  the  contrary,  the  studies  on
freshwater fish and fermentation fungi had greater potential to serve Japan with its greater
demand for aquatic resources and bean products like miso, soy sauce and Natt?. However,
regardless of the potential of the preliminary studies to serve Japan’s imperial agenda, Shanghai
Science Institute, as a part of the official cooperation between Japan and China, was also
launched to counteract the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment, compete against America’s increasing
influence over Chinese intellectuals, and justify Japan’s scientific competitiveness in shaping a
modern Asia.
83?Mark?Elvin,?“The?Environmental?Impasse?in?Late?Imperial?China.”?In?Brantly?Womack,?ed.,?China's?Rise?in?Historical?
Perspective??Rowman?and?Littlefield:?Lanham?MD,?2010,?pp.?151-169. ?
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2.4. FOREIGNERS, FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS, AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES
Japan was not the only state to blame for exercising treaty powers’ privilege to facilitate its
scientists’ research in China. By the 1920s, most treaty powers had also engaged in scientific
activities like the studies funded by Shanghai Science Institute that utilized Chinese resources for
foreign commercial and academic interests. Due to a series of treaties between China and foreign
forces dating back to 1842, China was forced to open its territory to the latter. There were
foreign explorers launching expeditions across China in order to imbue the West with a sense of
oriental exotica. British naturalists led the first wave of the foreign explorations in China around
the Opium War in the 1840s.84 The British naturalists collected and classified the unique flora
and fauna of China for Western cultural institutions and global cultural markets through its base
in Canton. After the Opium War, their explorations extended from their bases in port cities like
Canton and Macau to the hinterland of China. Following the British, other major and minor
players in the colonial game of China, including the French, the Americans, and the Swedish,
organized their expeditions to the Southeast and Northeast parts of China around the turn of the
20th century.85 They transported both natural resources and cultural objects outside of China,
displayed the items in foreign museums, or sold them on international markets.86
The first wave of foreign exploration in China was mainly led by the West. The explorers
were composed of both professional scientists and amateurs. The amateurs included merchants,
84?Fati?Fan.?British?Naturalists?in?Qing?China:?Science,?Empire,?and?Cultural?Encounter.?Harvard?University?Press,?2004.?85?Glover,?Denise?M.,?and?McKhann,?Charles?F.,?eds.?Explorers?and?Scientists?in?China’s?Borderlands,?1880-1950.?Seattle:?University?of?Washington?Press,?1997.?86?Fati?Fan.?British?Naturalists?in?Qing?China:?Science,?Empire,?and?Cultural?Encounter.?Harvard?University?Press,?2004.?
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missionaries, and diplomats, and they accounted for a larger proportion. During their
expeditions, most of the foreign explorers had to rely on their Chinese collaborators to acquire
their intended collections. Since most of the foreign explorers were working for cultural and
academic institutions like Kew Gardens, the Royal Society of London, the American Museum of
Natural History, and Harvard University.  Each of their excursions carried on multiple missions
to collect objects for more than one discipline, like collecting plants, fossils, folklores, and
antiquities in one trip to serve the studies of biology, geology, ethnography, and even philology
at the same time.
After the turn of the twentieth century, foreign explorations in China reached another new
height, which was marked by features different from earlier events. On the one hand, after
exercising foreign privileges granted by the unequal treaties for nearly half-century, major treaty
powers like America, Great Britain, and Japan, gradually established their cultural institutions in
China’s port cities. Some of them, like America, fostered direct cooperation with the Chinese
cultural community through the Boxer Indemnity Remissions and the Rockefeller Foundation.
Hence, activities serving academic purposes accounted for a larger proportion of foreign
exploration in the early 20th century than in the late 19th century. This led to changing relations
between the foreign explorers and their Chinese collaborators from one based on employment
and commission to a fellowship of researchers with similar academic interests.
On the other hand, due to Japan’s incursion into China after its victory in the first Sino-
Japanese war in 1895 and Europe's’ decreasing presence in China during World War I, Japan
replaced Britain as the leading force in foreign exploration in China in the early 20th century.
Before the start of the Oriental Cultural Work project, the Japanese government already
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supported three major institutions in China to conduct exploratory expeditions. The first of the
institutions established by the semi-government organization, the East Asia Common Culture
Association (??-A d?bunkai), through its five locations in Chinese major cities and the East
Asian Common Culture Academy (??-A d?bun shoin,  est.  1901)  in  Shanghai.  Prior  to  the
establishment in China, the East Asia Common Culture Association, with its headquarters in
Tokyo, had already launched expeditions to both North and Northeast China to collect
information for Japan’s military interests during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).87 Around the turn of the twentieth century, the Association set
up five sections in Chinese major cities, (Shanghai, Hankou, Beijing, Fuzhou, and Guangdong).
Outside of supporting regional expeditions, the five sections also published regional newspapers,
maintained social networks for local Japanese communities, and connected Japanese
businessmen with Chinese commercial resources.88  As  for  the  East  Asian  Common  Culture
Academy in Shanghai, it was an educational institution for training Japanese students in Chinese
Studies. Based on their regular field trips in China, the Japanese students’ research papers
provided first hand information on geography, transportation system, and currency markets.89
The other two major institutions funding expeditions in China were the research sections
affiliated with Taiwan colonial government (Taiwan Sh?tokufu, est. 1895) and the Southern
Manchuria Railway Company (Minamimansh? tetsud? kaisha, est. 1906, hereafter Mantetsu).
Both research sections were housing numerous social and natural scientists to study natural
87?Huang,?1982,?pp.?12-17.?88?Huang,?1982,?pp.?16-23.?89?Huang,?1982,?pp.?16-27.??
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resources, land-distribution systems, and local customs around their locations to aid Japanese
colonial rule.90  The two research sections played a critical role in demarcating the colonial
landscape for Japanese technocracy. Ambitious scientists in Japan’s civil service dedicated
themselves to creating a “heaven of truly mutual prosperity in Manchuria and Taiwan” by having
Japan provide China with ‘organization’ and ‘technology’.91
Unlike the Japanese government-funded research projects in China, western researchers
in China in the twentieth century were mainly supported by foreign academic institutions and
private foundations. One the one hand, there were individuals from the West came to China to
collect information and objects related to their fields of study. For instance, the Swedish
geographer, Sven Anders Hedin (1865-1952), launched four expeditions inside western China
from 1893 to 1935 in order to complete his map of Central Asia. Inspired by Hedin’s work, a
Hungarian-British archaeologist, Marc Aurel Stein (1862-1943), organized his archaeological
trips  to  western  China  in  the  first  three  decades  of  the  twentieth  century  during  which  he
discovered a printed copy of the Diamond Sutra, the world's oldest printed text dating to 868 CE,
and transported part of the manuscripts abroad.
Besides individual researchers, western forces also gained access to China’s natural
resources through academic and research institutions they founded in China, like mission
schools,  private  schools,  research  laboratories,  and  hospitals.  Among  them,  two  well-endowed
institutions, with financial supports from America, made major contributions. One was the China
Foundation mentioned earlier that administered the application of American Boxer Remissions
90?Hiromi?Mizuno.?Science?for?the?Empire:?Scientific?Nationalism?in?Modern?Japan??Stanford?University?Press,?2008,?47.?91?Ibid.??44-46.?
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in China. The other one was the Rockefeller Foundation’s China Medical Board (est. 1914),
which had overlapping boards of directors with the China Foundation. Started in 1914 as the
second major program of the Rockefeller Foundation, China Medical Board’s initial commitment
was to establish and operate the Peking Union Medical College (est.1921) in Beijing, which it
carried out from 1914 through 1950, in order to provide China with western medical care and
research, and to provide an institutional model and leaders for the reconstruction of Chinese
education.92
Between 1925-1949, the two foundations spent about $15 million USD on the
development of natural sciences in China.93 Among the over 100 institutions funded by the two
foundations, four major organizations played a profound role in transferring modern science to
China, shaping the development of the Chinese science community, and securing accesses for
western researchers. They included the National Southeast University (Guoli dongnan daxue),
the first Chinese university with a biology department in 192194; Yanjing University (Yanjing
daxue), an American missionary school linked to the Rockefeller Foundation’s Peking Union
Medical College; Nanjing University, an American missionary school that developed a superior
agricultural science program closely tied to Cornell University95;  and  the  Science  Society  of
China, whose biological laboratory led pioneering work on discovering China’s indigenous flora
and fauna and ordering them into the universal knowledge of modern science.96
92?Fosdick?RB.?The?Story?of?the?Rockefeller?Foundation??New?York:?Harper,?1952,?xi-xv.?93?Schneider?LA.?Biology?and?Revolution?in?Twentieth-century?China??Lanham,?Md:?Rowman? ?Littlefield,?2003,?42.?94?Ibid.,?33.?95?Ibid.,?21.?96?Lijing?Jiang.?“Retouching?the?past?with?living?things:?indigenous?species,?traditions,?and?biological?research?in?
63
?
Most of the foreign institutions, both western and Japanese, were situated within
concessions in China’s port cities or leased territories. In the early years of their establishment,
the institutions were a symbol of foreignness in China: they were filled with foreign faculty
members who did not pay hedince to China’s jurisdiction, who used textbooks in any language
but Chinese, and who lectured on new scientific subjects. 97  This foreign presence, which
reminded the GMD of the limitation of its authority and its capacity to unify and control China,
was one of the Nationalist government’s primary concerns upon its commencement. However,
since the government appreciated the power of science in China’s modernization and was
perennially short of funds to carry out its ambitious science programs, it was never inclined—on
nationalistic or anti-foreign grounds—to prohibit the foreign foundations’ largesse to support
scientific enterprises.98 Hence,  the  strategy  developed  by  the  Nationalist  government  was  to
nationalize science by gradually eliminating foreign controls over the scientific activities in
China.
2.5. NATIONALIZING SCIENCE THROUGH ACADEMIA SINICA
After replacing the Beiyang government in 1928, the GMD was publically devoted to the rapid
Republican?China,?1918-1937.”?Historical?Study?in?the?Natural?Science??Vol.46?(2),?pp.?154-206.?97?Henry,?Eric?S..?“Lending?Words:?Foreign?Language?Education?and?Teachers?in?Republican?Peking.”?Brady?A,?Brown?D.?edit.,?Foreigners?and?foreign?institutions?in?Republican?China??New?York;?London:?Routledge,?2013,?pp.?52-71.?98?Schneider?LA.?Biology?and?Revolution?in?Twentieth-century?China??Lanham,?Md:?Rowman? ?Littlefield,?2003,?8.?
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expansion of national science in order to serve the regime’s nation-building agenda. By the
1920s, Chinese reformers and revolutionaries alike were convinced of the utility of science in
supporting progress. They openly advocated the adoption of “scientific culture” as a means for
China to energize its lagging social evolution and thereby to survive the challenges of foreign
incursion and competition. 99  To deal with the uncomfortable fact that science, the best
instrument for China’s independence and modernization, remained under the control of
foreigners, the Nationalist government attempted to nationalize science by assuming
government’s control over all scientific enterprises in China. The government intended to ensure
that China could, more or less, benefit from the foreigners’ scientific activities conducted on its
territory, and then to gradually replace the foreign scientists with Chinese foreign-trained
scientists and, ultimately, Chinese-trained scientists.
In this regard, the Nationalist government implemented a national education system in
which new or restructured public colleges and universities were brought under the Nationalist
government’s control. The government systematically expanded courses on science and
technology in national higher education, gradually replacing foreign faculty members there with
Chinese academics, and effectively adopted Chinese textbooks.
Sitting atop this national education system was the establishment of Academia Sinica
(Zhongyang yanjiuyuan).  As  a  part  of  the  Nanjing  regime,  it  played  a  central  role  in  the
nationalization of science in China. Both as the nation’s central academy of sciences and as an
administrative center for scientific research, Academia Sinica was founded to formulate
99?Ibid.??pp.?6-7.?
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scientific policies for the government and coordinate the government’s efforts with the economic
development. After its establishment, it was also dedicated to translating and standardizing
scientific terminology and nomenclature in Chinese, and presenting the nation’s scientific
achievements to the international community. Above all, the organization was meant to be a
symbol of China’s cultural independence and modernization.
The idea of a central  academy was not new in China.  From the Qin dynasty (221 BCE-
206 BCE) to the Qing dynasty (1644 CE-1911 CE), imperial governments established central
academic institutions for recruiting talent and training civil servants. 100  It  was  a  political
convention that the legitimate central government of China should have a research body that
renders the government as the sponsor and protector of culture. In fact, when Yuan Shikai ruled
the Beiyang government in Beijing, he passed a new law—the Law of the Central Learning
Society (Zhongyang xuehuifa)—on  the  foundation  of  the  central  academy  in  order  to  promote
academic research and education, and legitimize his rulership in China. Though the project was
not implemented, the attempt reflected the Beiyang government’s desire to promote academic
research in China and its belief in the conventional connection between the legitimacy of a
central government and the existence of a central academy.101 In this regard, the Nationalist party
had  similar  concerns  with  its  predecessors  for  establishing  a  similar  body  to  justify  its
legitimacy.
The establishment of Academia Sinica not only served the needs of the GMD, but also
reinforced the Nanjing clique in the factional conflicts of the GMD. In the GMD, it was Dr. Sun,
100?Ibid.,?pp.?11-13.?101?Ibid.??pp.?18-23.?
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the founding father and leader of the Party that first proposed to establish an academy of sciences
for the nation’s independence and reconstruction. In The General Plan for State-building he
stated as follows:
Today the civilization entered the age of science. Any [national] construction has to be carried out after
seeking and [scientific] knowledge. In order to make our country prosperous and powerful, we have to
popularize education and make science universal to the people throughout the country.102
At the end of 1924, when Dr. Sun visited Beijing to negotiate China’ unification with the
Beiyang government, he formally raised a proposal to establish a central academy as the highest
research organization of the country in order to serve the nation’s reconstruction.103 After the
death of Dr. Sun, Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) rapidly rose to power through the Nationalist
Revolution. On April 17, 1927, the Nanjing clique held a Central Political Council meeting to
prepare for the establishment of the new government at Nanjing. At the meeting, the proposal to
establish a central academy as a part of the new regime was unanimously passed. Academia
Sinica thus became the first department affiliated with the new government.104 After a nearly
year-long preparation, Academia Sinica held its first inaugural meeting on June 9th, 1928, which
ushered in the new nation’s central academy of sciences.
Unlike previous central academies in ancient China, Academia Sinica was different in
that it was the first national academy that did not center on the study of the Chinese classics, but
102?Sun?Yatsen.?Jianguo?fanglue? ???(The?General?Plan?for?State-Building).?Shanghai:?Qiuguzhai?shuju,?1928,?45.?The?English?translation?here?refers?to?Chen’s?dissertation,?see?Chen,?1998,?35.?103?Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan.?Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan?shijiu?niandu?zongbaogao????????????????Nanjing:?guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan.?1930,?41.?104?Chen,?1998,?44.?
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rather regarded scientific research as a priority. In its founding years, nine of its eleven research
institutions were dedicated to the studies of natural sciences (Fig. A.1).105
?
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Fig. A.  1. The Structure of Academia Sinica in 1930106
The emphasis on scientific research was influenced by the emergence of modern
scientific academies in the West from the 17th century onwards. In preparing for Academia
Sinica’s  establishment,  three  models  of  academy  in  the  West  were  considered  as  options.  The
first one was an Anglo-American model, a combination of American research universities and
the British Royal Society. Supported by most scientists who were trained in America, this model
was expected to shape Academia Sinica into a completely autonomous academic community
105?Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan.?Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan?shijiu?niandu?zongbaogao????????????????Nanjing:?guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan.?1930,?48.?106?The?Chart?is???simplified?structure?of?Academia?Sinica?in?1930,?regenerated?from?Ibid.??48;?The?National?Research?Council?was?proposed?to?be?established?by?1930,?but?it?was?not?installed?until?1935.?
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with loosely connected professional researchers and laboratory-centered research approach.107
The second option was the French model, which was favored by the founding members of
Academia Sinica who spent years in France in study and participating in social movements. It
allowed, to a certain degree, hierarchical administration in Academia Sinica and the Institute’s
party affiliation, in order to improve the efficiency of the Institute’s scientific studies in serving
the nation’s needs of industrialization.108 The final and successful choice was the Soviet National
Academy of Sciences. For the leaders of the Nationalist government, the Soviet model could
shape Academia Sinica into a completely state-sponsored institution which could both conduct
its own research on pure science and support the projects on applied science for the nation’s
military and industrial interests. In this regard, the model chosen for Academia Sinica enabled
the Institute to effectively boost the nation’s industrial development with the government’s
control and support. Thus, it, to a certain degree, rendered the Institute as an agent for the
government to tie the Chinese science community to the party rulership, industrial planning
strategy, and national defense polity.109
107?Chen,?1998,?64.?108?Ibid.,?pp.?66-75.?109?Ibid.,?pp.?77-85.?
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2.6. CONCLUSION
China in the 1920s witnessed constant reshuffling of power, civil wars, and social unrest until the
establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928. From a revolutionary force to a ruling
power, one of the greatest concerns of the Nationalist Party was its relations with the foreign
states in China, which had played a central part in China’s politics for decades. On one hand, the
anti-foreign discourse promoted by the Nationalist Party through its Nationalist Revolution, such
as “abolishing all unequal treaties” and “the independence of China’s education”, which
increased the Party’s capacity to overthrow the Beiyang government, became an unstoppable
forces with life for its own. On the other hand, as a newly founded regime aimed at the nation’s
reconstruction, it was almost impossible for the Nationalist government to immediately free
China from all the foreign forces, especially when the government was perennially short of
funds, resources, and, most importantly, scientific knowledge to launch the nation’s
modernization.
As  a  solution  reached  in  the  dilemma,  the  Nationalist  government  attempted  to  attain
“independence through dependency.” 110  In the realm of politics, the government actively
engaged in the negotiation of abolishing unequal treaties while continuing to grant certain de
facto privileges to the foreigners that might be conducive to China’s nation-building.
As for science, which was believed to be the passport of a nation towards
industrialization, independence, and modernization in the early 20th century, it could hardly be
110?Schneider?LA.,?2003,?23.?
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transferred to China without any foreign assistance. These programs, however,, sought rewards
for their participation, financially, intellectually, or both. In this regard, the Nationalist
government determined to control and support the scientific enterprises in China through
nationalization. First, in the case of foreign-funded cultural projects like the American Boxer
Remissions and the Japanese Oriental Cultural Work, which had entrenched in the Chinese
society, rather than entirely cutting off their accesses to China, the Party sought to continue the
presence of selected foreign forces in China with proper government’s control. In this way, the
government  was  allowed  to  benefit  from  the  scientific  achievements,  which  it  was  yet  able  to
produce on its own. Then, the government could gradually replace the foreign forces in China’s
science community with Chinese professionals so that the nation’s progress could be trusted in
the hands of its own people.
Among the government’s major steps in nationalizing science, was the establishment of
Academia Sinica, both as the nation’s supreme research institute of sciences and the
administrative center of science for the government. As a state-sponsored institute, which
modeled after the Soviet National Academy of Sciences, Academia Sinica, with its western-
trained faculty members, was expected to channel modern science into China, especially towards
the fields favored by the Nationalist government for its nation-building agenda. In 1929, the first
year in its trail, Academia Sinica seized a good opportunity to prove its authority and utility to
serve the government’s interests in nationalizing science.
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3. THE BIRTH OF CHINA’S POLICY ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL EXPEDITIONS
3.1. ACADEMIA SINICA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH DR. KISHINOUYE’S
BIOLOGICAL EXPEDITION
3.1.1. Dr. Kishinouye’s Third Biological Expedition Along the Yangzi River
At the end of 1926, it was announced that the Shanghai Science Institute would launch seven
preliminary studies before the official opening of the institute in 1931. Included among the
preliminary studies was “A Biological Study of Fishes in the Yangzi River (??suk? gyorui no
seibutsugakuteki kenky?).”111 The Institute planned for this study to be jointly carried out by a
Chinese bacteriologist, Yan Zhizhong, and a Japanese ichthyologist, Kishinouye Kamakichi
(1867-1929).112 From 1927 to 1929, the Sino-Japanese research team launched three expeditions
along the Yangzi River in order to collect fish specimens and explore their habitat along the
river. Yan did not participate in any of the expeditions and Kishinouye led all three of the
111 Saeki, 44112 The life of Yan Zhizhong is hard to trace. After receiving his doctorate degree at the Tokyo Imperial University on
bacteriology in 1917, he practiced medicine in Beijing and became a senior officer in the Ministry of Healthy in the Nationalist
government at Nanjing. After 1949, he moved to Taiwan with the Nationalist government and became the second president of the
college of Medicine at the National Taiwan University.
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expeditions with assistance from both Japanese and Chinese team members. The first expedition
was launched towards the lower Yangzi region from 20th December 1927 to 18th January 1928.
After a fruitful expedition from Shanghai to Hankou, the team brought fish specimens back to
Shanghai Science Institute and then to Tokyo for further analysis.113 The second trip, which was
planned for May 1928, was suspended due to the outbreak of fighting between China and Japan
in Jinan.114 In September 1929, after a yearlong suspension, the team was ready to undertake
their third journey towards the upper region of the Yangzi River.
The third expedition took place in a very different political environment. By 1929, China
had witnessed the transition from the Beiyang government to the new Nationalist government at
Nanjing. The prime concern of the newly established government was to implement its nation-
building projects, which demanded both China’s independence and its modernization. In this
regard, the government was dedicated to terminating the foreign control over China’s politics
through the renegotiation of the Unequal Treaties, while it had to maintain proper governmental
control over Sino-foreign interaction in the fields in which China could not yet fully sustain
itself, such as the realm of science. Among the government’s efforts to expand its control was the
establishment  of  Academia  Sinica,  the  nation’s  central  academy  of  sciences  and  the
administrative center for science within the government. On the Japanese side, a change in
leadership from Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929) to Shidehara Kij??? (1872-1951) in 1929 led to a
temporary shift in Japan’s policy towards China. In contrast to his predecessor, Shidehara Kij???
attempted to restore good relations with the Nationalist government at Nanjing with a non-
113 H-0117, pp. 68-69.114 Ibid., pp. 70-72.
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interventionist policy towards China. The changing circumstances in both China and Japan in
1929 foreshadowed the vicissitude of the team’s third expedition along the Yangzi River.
The third expedition was launched on September 10, 1929, when five team members
arrived  in  Shanghai.  The  team  set  Kangding  as  its  planned  destination.  The  object  of  the
expedition, according to the Japanese members, was to study freshwater fish and their habitat
along the Yangzi River with a regional emphasis on the Three Gorges area. As the area
connected the high-altitude Tibet plateau and the low- altitude Sichuan basin, the team expected
the Three Gorges region to contain a high-level of freshwater fish biodiversity, which was
unparalleled in Asia.115
The instructor of the preliminary study, Kishinouye Kamakichi, was already an Emeritus
Professor of Agriculture at the Tokyo Imperial University when he joined Shanghai Science
Institute. As a founding member of the study of marine biology in Japan, he dedicated his work
to the research and education of ichthyology. His voluminous academic publications and
textbooks led to having a new subspecies named after him, such as Birulia kishinouyei and
Lepidotrigla kishinouyei.116 As a technocrat who supplied his nation with knowledge of marine
biology, he was passionately committed to enhancing the aquaculture industry around the Tokyo
Bay area when he served in the Aquaculture Bureau in the Ministry of Agriculture and
Commerce of Japan. With his academic and governmental achievements, Kishinouye was
elected as the honorary member in numerous communities, including the Imperial Academy of
Japan and the American Fisheries Society. After the Meiji Emperor and the Taisho Emperor
115 Saeki, pp. 52-3; Kimura, pp. 1-5.116 Kimura, 1948, pp. 1-4.
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rewarded him with the Order of the Sacred Treasure of Japan in 1906 and 1912 respectively, he
was not only respected as an intellectual leader on Marine Biology but also admired as a symbol
of Japan’s advancement in science and technology. 117
Joining Dr. Kishinouye in third expedition, were his assistants from both Japan and
China, namely, Kimura Shigeru (1902-1977), Wei Hongmo, Dong Yumao (1897-1990), and Jin
Zhaohua (1901-1979). Dr. Kimura finished his doctoral study on Aquaculture at the Tokyo
Imperial University as Dr. Kishinouye’s graduate student. He later became Dr. Kishinouye’s
assistant in Aquaculture Bureau and accompanied him to Shanghai Science Institute as a
researcher. Dr. Wei also studied in the Agriculture Department at the Tokyo Imperial University
and held a position at the Peking University when he participated in the expedition. Dr. Dong
was completing his Ph.D. in Biology at the Kyoto Imperial University with a focus on
crustaceology when he joined the expedition. He was later employed as the Curator of Zhejiang
Provincial Museum from the 1930s to the 1950s. Dr. Jin received his doctorate in Aquaculture at
the Hokkaido Imperial University and was a research member of Agriculture Department at the
Tokyo Imperial University when he participated the expedition. He then served in Aquaculture
Bureau of Zhejiang Provincial Government. In general, all the team members received their
higher education on Marine Biology in Japan and thus shared social interactions with one
another either as colleague or as friends.
The expedition had been placed under public attention from the start. It was described in
contrasting ways through the Japanese and the Chinese newspapers. According to two influential
117 On this point, it is suggested that Dr. Kishinoue may also fulfill a request from Emperor Hirohito, a marine biology
enthusiast, for collecting samples of freshwater jellyfish. See Saeki, 53.
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Japanese Newspapers—Tokyo Nichi Nichi Newspaper and Osaka Mainichi Newspaper—Dr.
Kishinouye was depicted as a fearless scientist marching towards the remote area of inner China
for  the  supreme  knowledge  of  pure  science  regardless  of  his  own  safety  and  comfort.118 In
contrast, in a Chinese weekly journal Xinghua,  the  expedition  was  presented  as  the  herald  of
Japan’s colonization towards the Yangzi River for China’s the aquatic resources.119 Responding
to the suspicion from China, Dr. Kishinouye clarified the object of the expedition in an interview
of Tokyo Nichinichi Newspaper as follows:
The primary goal of the expedition is to investigate the geographical distribution of freshwater fishes
among the Yangtze River…[Due to the huge difference in altitudes between its upper region and its lower
region], the flow velocity in the Three Gorges area changes dramatically. Hence, we want to look into the
differences in fish species and their habitation between the upriver and the downriver areas of the Three
Gorges. Moreover, since there are marine fishes, such as shark, stingray, blowfish and sole, which
temporarily return to fresh water environment in the Yangzi River, we want to know how far those marine
fishes could travel upward from the sea. At last, if there is a chance, we may head to the watershed area
between the Yangtze River and Indian Rivers for a comparative study on the fish species between the two
water systems. In general, our destination would be to the west of Sichuan Province, Kangting for
instance, and then head to the inner area of Qinghai and Tibet if circumstances permit.120
On September 10, 1929, the team started their journey from Shanghai. They arrived in
Nanjing, the capital of the Nationalist Government, on the next day. While the team was
procuring fish specimens through local fish markets in Nanjing, Dr. Kishinouye paid a visit to
Academia Sinica, the highest research institute in China founded by the Nationalist government
118 Saeki, 53.119 “International News: Japan’s exploration on the Fishery Industry of the Yangzi River?????????????
(Guoji xinxu: Riren diaocha changjiao yuye).” Xinghua???Shanghai: Huamei shuju, 26(37), 40-41.120 Saeki, pp. 52-53.
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in 1928, and had a delightful conversation with Chinese intellectuals there, including Cai
Yuanpei, the founder and president of Academia Sinica. Dr. Kishinouye was also invited to give
lectures at the National Central University and several other local higher educational
institutions.121 In general, during Dr. Kishinouye’s stay in Nanjing, though there were public
suspicions upon the motivation behind his expedition in China, he maintained friendly
communication with the cultural community of China at Nanjing.
Fig. B. 1. Planned Traveling Route of the Third Fishing Expedition.122
According to the unequal treaties, foreign travellers like Dr. Kishinouye, who held a valid
passport, were allowed to travel between and conduct activities within the port cities of China.
The team planned its travelling route accordingly by making major stops in China’s port cities,
such as Nanchang, Hankou, and Shashi, along the mainstream or the tributaries of Yangtze River
121 Kimura Shigeru???. Sengyo Fudoki????? (Travel Note about Fishes in Sichuan). Sapporo: Hopp? Shuppansha,
1948, 3.122 Regenerated from Kimura, 1948,4.
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(Fig. B.1). As it was recalled by Dr. Kimura in his travel log, they had an arduous yet productive
time through the journey along the Yangzi River. 123  They  purchased  fresh  fish  from  local
markets in the dim light of the early dawn. They worked with local fishermen to catch the fish
less seen in the markets whose indigenous names they barely knew. They processed the fish into
specimen, one after another, together with the record of its name, indigenous name, folklore, and
even culinary methods. They wrote down the habitations of the fish, as well as the history of the
local people who tied their past, present and future to the tiny aquatic creatures. They were
invited by local communities, both Chinese and Japanese residents, to share knowledge. On
steamships, while Chinese sailors played mahjong, the team members painted the rustic beauty
of China and mourned for the death of some scientists who were killed by local bandits during
their expeditions. The team members talked about their further studies upon the specimens after
their return to Shanghai and Tokyo. They longed for a cozy Onsen at Hakone while preparing to
sail against the flow of the Yangzi River towards further discoveries at the next destination.
None of them could have possibly foreseen the turning point of their expedition which was about
to take place in Chongqing.
123 This paragraph is mainly based on Kimura’s recollection in his travel log and Saeki’s interview with Dr. Kishinouye’s son.
See Kimura, 1948, chapter 7, 8 and 25; Saeki, pp. 52-78.
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Fig. B. 2. A sketch of Chinese high-fin banded shark drawn by Dr. Kimura during the expedition, with its Latin
name in Linnaeus system, myxocyprinus asiaticus, and its indigenous name in Chinese, Yanque yu.124
Fig. B. 3. A distant view of Chongqing painted by Dr. Kishinouye when he proceed towards the city in a steamship
124 Kimura, 1948, 35.
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during the expedition.125
3.1.2. A Restraining Order from Academia Sinica
On October 2, the team arrived in Chongqing, another port city in Southwest China. They were
welcomed with a warm reception held by local Japanese diplomats and Chinese elites in the
evening. All of a sudden, on the next day of the warm reception, the team received a restraining
order from Cai Yuanpei, the president of Academia Sinica whom the team met in Nanjing just a
month ago. According to the order, the team had to be detained within Chongqing by local
Nationalist governors and could not pursue its expedition any further. The team was totally
surprised and confused about the unexpected order. As Kimura recalled in his travel log:
Sudden! All of a sudden! What’s wrong? There was a restraining order from China’s Ministry of
Education126 that forbade the expedition to proceed any further. Since Chongqing was a port city, [our
team’s activities had to be restricted within the city, or] we would be arrested even if we left the city for
only one step. [Meanwhile,] the Chinese newspapers, who just reported the warm reception for us at the
last night, [suddenly changed their tone as easily] as turning over their hands. They denounced Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition as an intelligence activity led by an exiled Japanese general who served the
military interest of Japan. All of these seem so ridiculous when I recall the occurrence nowadays.127
In the following days, while the local Chinese governors cautiously dealt with their
125 Ibid., 5126 According to Kimura’s original account, he though the order was from the Education Ministry of China, since Cai Yuanpei
used to be the head of the Ministry. But the order was sent after Cai Yuanpei resigned from the minister position. Thus, the order
was actually from Cai, as the president of Academia Sinica.127 Kimura, 1948, 5.
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Japanese guests and waited for further instruction from Nanjing, the Japanese diplomats in
Chongqing attempted to reach related authorities to settle the problem. Based on the telegrams
archived in Academia Sinica and Japan’s Foreign Ministry, I regenerate the timeline of the
occurrences between Academia Sinica and Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition as follows.
–9.19 Academia Sinica sent telegrams to China’s Educational Ministry and Foreign Ministry with
requests for Dr. Kishinouye’s trip128:
1. Suspend the expedition by confiscating the Japanese’ passports.
2. Request the Japanese to submit their research plan and traveling route to China’s
Educational Ministry and Academia Sinica for approval and further instructions.
3. Academia Sinica will send its faculty members to participate in the trip to ensure the
expedition is carried out as the research plan it submitted.
4. One complete duplicate set of the biological specimens collected through the
expedition shall be deposited in the Academia Sinica as gifts
5. Prior to shipment abroad, all biological specimens collected through the expedition
shall be examined by Academia Sinica.
–9.20 Japanese Consul at Nanjing, Kamimura Shinichi ????(1896-1983), saw the Academia
Sinica’s requests in a Chinese newspaper, Central Daily ????(Zhongyang ribao), and
reported it to Japan’s Foreign Minister Shidehara Kij???, saying he will come to China’s
Foreign Ministry for a solution.129
–9.21 Kamimura visited China’ Foreign Ministry and submitted the expedition’s research plan and
traveling route. China’s foreign officer, Zhou Longguang???, encouraged Kamimura to
directly communicate with Academia Sininca for the solution of the problem.130
–9.23 Kamimura dispatched his assistant Shimada?? to Academia Sinica to submit the required
documents. As Cai Yuanpei was on a business trip to Shanghai, secretary-general Xu
128 “Zhi waijiaobu han: Wei Riben duizhiwenhuaju qianyuan laihua diaocha changjiang shuichandongwu qingxiang
rifang jiaoshe you?????????????????????????????????.” Guoli
zhongyangyanjiuyuan yuanwu yuebao???????????. 1929, 1(3): 38-39.129 H-0117, pp. 87-88.130 H-0117, pp. 90-91.
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Shoushang???(1883-1948) received the documents on Cai’s behalf and restated some of
Cai’s main points concerning the expedition131:
? We understand that this is an academic expedition which will have its contribution
to the academies of both Japan and China. But as the central research institution
of China, it is necessary for us to obtain basic information about the expeditions
conducted in China, like yours, especially when Academia Sinica has also been
conducting biological expedition along the Yangzi River. We have done our
research at the lower region of the River and prepare to launch our trip towards
the Upper region as well. Hence, it would be helpful if we could have our
members participate in your expedition towards the upper region and have some
specimens collected for further study. We are looking forward to your decision
on the proposals.
–9.26 Kamimura telegraphed the summary of Secretary Xu’s points to Shidehara and Japanese
consul in Chongqing for Dr. Kishinouye’s opinion. But due to unknown reason, the telegram
was delayed. The Japanese consul in Chongqing claimed that it was until 5th October when
he received the telegram sent on 26th September.132
–9.27 Since Academia Sinica had not heard from the Japanese for four days after the conversation
between Secretary Xu and the Japanese officer, it sent another telegram to China’s Foreign
Ministry and Education Ministry urgently repeating its earlier requests.133
–10.1 Since neither the Japanese nor the two Chinese ministries replied to Academia Sinica’s
requests, Cai Yuanpei, the president of Academia Sinica issued a restraining order to all the
Nationalist governors along the Yangzi River. In the order telegraphed to the Nationalist
governor in Chongqing, Liu Xiang, he stated134:
? Japan has dispatched five people, namely, Kishinoue Kamakichi, Kimura Shigeru,
Wei Hongmo, Dong Yumao and Jin Zhaohua, to investigate and collect aquatic
animals in Chinese river, without consulting Academia Sinica and the Ministry
131 Ibid.132 H-0117, pp. 102-105.133 “Zhi waijiaobu han: Wei hanqing qiedian Chongqing Chengdu difangzhangguan zuzhi Anshangshi deng qianjin
bingqing jixu yanli jiaoshe you????????????????????????????????????.”
Guoli zhongyangyanjiuyuan yuanwu yuebao???????????. 1929, 1(3): 41-44.134 “Dian Chengdu Liu Zhiqian zhuxi Chongqing Liu Pucheng zongzhihui: Wei dianqing kouliu riren Anshangshi deng
huzhao you???????????????????????????????.” Guoli zhongyangyanjiuyuan yuanwu
yuebao???????????. 1929, 1(4): 36-37.
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of Education of China for permission. According to the earlier contacts between
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and the Japanese, it is imperative for the
trip to include participants from Academia Sinica and have all collected
specimens examined by [Chinese] experts. I have been waiting for the Japanese
reply  on  these  terms for  days.  Now they probably  have  already left  Chongqing
and march further west toward the inner land of China. For this matter, I request
to have their passports temporarily confiscated, restrict their activities within port
city and prohibit them from any investigation.
–10.2 The team arrived in Chongqing and was welcomed with a warm reception by local Japanese
and Chinese elites.135
–10.3 The Nationalist governor at Chongqing received the telegram and executed Cai’s order.136
–10.5 Japanese consul at Chongqing received the telegram Kamimura sent on 26th September
about Cai’s requests on sending representatives to join the team and having a share of
specimens collected through the trip. Dr. Kishinouye showed no objection to the requests.
He hoped that Academia Sinica send no more than two representatives and they can join the
team at its next stop in Hechuan, since the team was already way behind its schedule and did
not want to spend another two weeks in Chongqing for the new participants.137
–10.10 Academia Sinica informed Japan’s foreign office that it is glad to form an academic
cooperation with Dr. Kishinouye and will withdraw its restraining order soon.138
–10.14 Academia Sinica telegraphed to the governor in Chongqing to withdraw the order.139
–10.17 Chongqing officials received Academia Sinica’s telegram and informed the team that they
are allowed to leave.140
–10.20 The team left Chongqing and headed to Chengdu.141
135 Kimura, 1948, 5.136 Ibid.137 H-0117, pp. 101-105.138 “Zhi zhujing riben lishiguan jianhan: Wei Anshangboshi fuchuan caiji benyuan zhunbei canjia ruqi qianwang tefu
chazhaoyou???????????????????????????????????.” Guoli
zhongyangyanjiuyuan yuanwu yuebao???????????. 1929, 1(4): 37.139 “Dian Chengdu Liu Zhiqian zhuxi Chongqing Liu Pucheng zongzhihui: Wei riren Anshang Lianji canji dongwu
shijing jieqia yuanman xizhun gaishi deng jinxingyou????????????????????????????
??????????????.” Ibid.140 H-0117, 116.141 H-0117, 119.
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According to the telegrams, Academia Sinica had three major concerns regarding Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition. First, as the central academy of China, it should be informed anytime
there is a foreigner conducting scientific expedition in China. Second, it was Academia Sinica’s
duty to ensure that the foreign researcher only performs the scientific activities as he/she were
given permission and that their scientific activities will not pose any threat to China’s national
interests. In this regard, the institute had to obtain the foreigner’s traveling plan, oversee the
expedition through its representative(s) in the trip, and examine the biological specimens
collected . Third, as the core of Academia Sinica’s requirements, the institute was entitled to
keep one complete duplicate set of the biological specimens the foreign expedition collected in
China. In general, any foreign researcher, whose research might be benefited from his empirical
study on China’s natural resources, should reciprocate part of the benefit to the intellectual body
of China, i.e. Academia Sinica.
Though Academia Sinica requested to confiscate the Japanese team members’ passports
and detain the team within a port city, its intention was not to terminate the expedition but to
force the team to fulfill its requirements. In fact, on October 1st, it turned out that Cai Yuanpei
possessed the authority to directly issue a restraining order to local governors. He could have
done so ten days earlier without consulting with any other forces, but he did not pursue the
option in the first place. He instead chose to consult with the other two Chinese ministries in
order to start a conversation with the Japanese researchers about the institute’s requirements. It
was when Academia Sinnica did not received any reply to its requests for days that Cai finally
issued the restraining order.
It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  what  triggered  Cai  Yuanpei’s  objection  towards  Dr.
84
?
Kishinouye’s trip ten days after he had welcomed his team at Academia Sinica. Cai’s objectives
were clearly expressed in his demands towards the expedition: to have Academia Sinica’s
representatives participate in the trip and to ask for examination and partial ownership of the
collected specimens. Cai had always been a nationalist dedicated to China’s independence from
foreign control, especially in the realms of culture and education.142 Cai regarded Academia
Sinica as an institution that he viewed as not only the national academy of sciences, but also as
China’s administrative center for the conduct of science. All scientific activities conducted in
China would be subject to Academica Sinica’s regulation, and would therefore contribute to
China’s modernization.143
Another source of the conflict between Academia Sinica and the . Kishinouye team lies
in the delayed telegram sent by Kamimura on September 26th but was received two weeks later.
According to Japanese documents, for some unknown reason it took two weeks for the telegram
to reach to Japanese officers in Chongqing when a telegram would normally be received within
two days. There is no explanationas to the “unknown reason” that led to the delay. It could be a
simple mistake of a Japanese junior officer, an equipment malfunction, a lack of efficiency
among Japan’s bureaucratic system, Japan’s indifference to China’s requests, or an
underestimation of the importance of Academia Sinica and its capacity to implement the
restraining order. It also remains unclear whether the Japanese would acknowlege and/or fulfill
Academia Sinica’s demands if the local Chinese authorities had not implemented Cai’s
142 Cai Yuanpei. “Jiaoyu duli yi.” (On the Independence of Education). Gao Pinshu edit., Cai Yuanpei Quanji. Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju. 1984, 178.143 Chen, pp. 40-48.
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restraining order. However, the telegrams listed above reconstruct a process in which a delayed
telegram, amid the hostility and distrust that was jointly shaped by Japanese imperialism and
Chinese  nationalism,  led  to  a  confrontation  between  the  science  communities  of  Japan  and
China.
3.1.3. The Aftermath
Accompanied by a Japanese-Sichuan dialect interpreter sent by the local Chinese governor, Liu
Xiang, the team resumed their expedition on October 20th. After the team arrived in Chengdu,
due to the arduous trip and the accumulated stress, Dr. Kishinouye suffered from acute gastritis.
He decided to return to Shanghai due to this health issue and entrusted the rest of the expedition
to Dr. Kimura. Unfortunately, before his departure, Dr. Kishinoue fainted in a bathroom and
passed away on November 22nd.144
Considering Dr. Kishinoue’s sudden death and their earlier unpleasant interaction with
Academia Sinica, the Japanese side suspected that Dr. Kishinoue was murdered by Chinese
agents and demanded an autopsy. On December 20th, the autopsy conducted in Shanghai proved
that Dr. Kishinouye died from cerebral anemia and did not support Japanese suspicion.145 Dr.
Kishinouye’s body was then transported back to his hometown in Kobe on December 25th. In the
end, after several other small conflicts, Academia Sinica examined the specimens collected
144 Saeki, pp. 73-75.145 Ibid., 75.
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through the trip, deposited the promised set of duplicates in its Museum of Natural History, and
allowed the rest of the specimens to be shipped to Japan.146
Though the expedition encountered numerous unexpected problems, the arduous trip
nonetheless proved to be productive . It included 28 families and 63 genera of fish in the
specimen collection. Among them were two rare species of sturgeon, whose caviar was distinct
from other sturgeon known at that time. As the two species of sturgeon have to perform seasonal
migration from the sea up into river to spawn, they carry less primitive characteristics and can be
mainly captured in low latitude regions like Sichuan province.147  More important, the team
discovered a new subspecies of catfish and named it after the late Dr. Kishinouye (Fig.B.4).
146 Ibid., pp. 76-78.147 Kimura, Shigeru. “Description of the Fished Collected from the Yangtze Kiang, China, by late Dr. K. Kishinouye and his
Party in 1927-1929.” The Journal of the Shanghai Science Institute. 1934 (1), 12.
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Fig. B. 4. Euchiloglanis Kishinouyei.148
Total
Length
Body
Length Head Depth Snout Eye
Interorbital
Space D A
Nasal
Barbel
Width of
mouth
170m
m
143m
m
40mm 23mm 20mm 2mm 11mm 1,6 6 13mm 19mm
TABLE  B. 1. Measurements of Euchilogranis Kishinouyei N. Sp.149
148 Kimura, 1934, PL. VI.149 Ibid., 180.
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3.2. THE BIRTH OF ACADEMIA SINICA’S POLICY ON BIOLOGICAL
EXPEDITIONS
Due to the Unequal treaties, from the 1844 to 1949, foreigners with valid passports were allowed
to live in defined areas of China, such as port cities. They could pursue such daily activities as
education, trading, proselytizing and traveling within and between the confined areas. during this
period, the Chinese material objects, especially antiquities and botanical resources, had been
continuously transported outside of China, displayed in foreign museums, or sold on
international markets through foreign merchants and foreign explorers. 150  As China’s
nationalistic sentiment rose in the early twentieth century, some Chinese literati gradually
associated these material objects with China’s sovereignty and nationhood.151 Hence, Chinese
intellectuals and the government began to stand assertively on the preservation of the nation’s
properties against foreign ownership. However, before Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr.
Kishinouye’s biological expedition, the emphasis of Chinese elites’ efforts to preserve the
nation’s material objects was mainly focused on the protection of China’s cultural artifacts. It
was not until Academia Sinica’s engagement with Dr. Kishinouye, that China began to offer
150 Glover, Denise M., and McKhann, Charles F., eds. Explorers and Scientists in China’s Borderlands, 1880-1950. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1997; Fati Fan. British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter. Harvard University Press, 2004,
Introduction and Chapter 1; Fati Fan."Circulating Material Objects: The International Controversy over Antiquities and Fossils in Twentieth-
Century China." The Circulation of Knowledge Between Britain, India and China : The Early-Modern World to the Twentieth Century, ed.
Bernard Lightman, Gordon McQuat, and Larry Stewart, Brill, 2013, pp. 209-236.151 In the early twentieth century, two groups of Chinese literati successively associated ancient cultural materials of China, such
ancient texts and antiquities, with China’s nationhood and sovereignty. In their interpretations, the cultural materials were
“National essence (guocui)” and “National heritage(guogu)” of China and thus should be properly preserved and thoroughly
studied. For National essence group, see Fan Fati. “Nature and Nation in Chinese Political Thought: the National Essence Circle in Early
Twentieth-Century China.” The Moral Authority of Nature, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2004, 409-437; for National heritage group, see Luo, Zhitian. Inheritance Within Rupture: Culture and Scholarship in Early Twentieth-Century
China. Leiden: BRILL, 2015, Chapter 8 and 9.
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official protection for its natural resources against foreign expeditions. It was the agreement with
Dr. Kishinouye that Academia Sinica based China’s future policy on biological specimens.
Early efforts to preserve China’s material objects, were generallyimplemented by non-
official organizations, such as “the Geological Society of China (Zhongguo dizhi xuehui,
est.1922, hereafter GSC)” and “the National Scientific Union of China (Zhongguo xueshu tuanti
xiehui, est.1927, hereafter NSUC).” The former was the first association of Chinese geologists
while the latter was a semi-official organization that GSC founded with several other academic
associations and the political elites of the Beiyang government. In 1926, the two organizations
signed a contract with the Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin (1865-1952), regarding his excavation
trip towards Northwestern China. The contract turned Hedin’s trip into a cooperative project
between Chinese and Swedish geologists. In this joint expedition, the Chinese geologists were
not only supported with Swedish funding and equipment but also allowed to preserve a set of
antiquities and fossils excavated through the trip.152
After the Nationalist government replaced the Beiyang government as China’s central
regime in 1928, most members of GSC and NSUC were incorporated into a governmental unit of
the Nationalist regime, the Committee for the Preservation of Ancient Objects (Guwu baoguan
weiyuanhui, est., 1928 and 1932, hereafter CPAO). In this regard, through the Committee, the
Chinese elites were empowered to exercise governmental authority over China’s ancient objects
with coercive measures. For instance, as the American Museum of Natural History launched its
sixth Central Asiatic Expedition to Mongolia in 1928, the Committee officially interrupted the
152 Zhonghua Minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Di 5 ji, di 1 bian, Wen hua, Vol.2?????????????????
????(?). Nanjing: Jiangsu gu ji chu ban she, 2000, pp. 857-861.
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trip, while its earlier expeditions during the Beiyang regime met little effective intervention. The
Committee had local governments seize over 80 boxes of fossils collected from the expedition
for one year until the American Museum of Natural History made a satisfactory offer.153 In 1930,
the Committee’s authority over the preservation of China’s material objects was institutionalized
through the promulgation of the Law for the Preservation of Ancient Objects (Guwu baocun fa).
According to the Law, the Committee was entitled to enforce state ownership of all
archaeological artifacts, establish a registration system for the control of private antiquities, and
restrict the circulation of ancient objects within China.154
Articles Selected from the Law for the Preservation of Ancient Objects155
Article 1: The term “Ancient Objects (Guwu)” in this Law refers to the ancient objects related to Archaeology,
History, Paleontology and all ancient objects related to cultural matters. The Central Committee for the
Preservation of Ancient Objects is entitled to define the scope and category of Guwu.
Article 5: The ancient objects that are private properties shall be registered in local government. The local
government shall submit all registration forms to … the Committee for the Preservation of Ancient Objects.
Article 7: All ancient objects underground or exposed on the surface belong to the nation…Discovering
without reporting [to the CPAO], as well as attempting to hide ancient objects, will be treated as thievery.
Article 8: The excavation of ancient objects shall only be conducted by the Nationalist government’s academic
institutions. The excavation project must be submitted to the CPAO for approval … and excavation license…
Article 10: It shall be approved by the CPAO in advance when foreign academic institutions or experts have to
participate in any excavation.
Article 11: Any excavation shall be accompanied with a representative from the CPAO.
Article 13: Ancient objects’ circulation shall be restricted within the border of China. The Nationalist
government’s academic institutions, when deemed necessary, have to obtain approval and …Certificate from
153 Osborn, Henry F. "Interruption of Central Asiatic Exploration by the American Museum of Natural History." Science, vol.
70, no. 1813, 1929, pp. 291-294.154 Lai, Guolong. “The emergence of ‘cultural heritage’ in modern China: a historical and legal perspective.” Matsuda, A and
Mengoni, L. E. eds. Reconsidering Cultural Heritage in East Asia. London: Ubiquity Press. 2016, pp. 70-74.155 Zhonghua Minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Di 5 ji, di 1 bian, Wen hua, Vol.2?????????????????
????(?). Nanjing: Jiangsu gu ji chu ban she, 2000, pp. 609-611.
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the CPAO… to transport ancient objects abroad. The transported ancient objects have to be returned within two
years.
In  general,  China’s  early  efforts  to  preserve  the  material  objects  on  its  territory  mainly
emphasized the protection of ancient objects (guwu), which, according to the Preservation Law,
referred to the objects related to archaeology, history, paleontology and all other cultural matters.
In other words, prior to Academia Sinica’s engagement with Dr. Kishinouye, China’s attention,
both governmental and non-governmental, was placed on such non-replaceable cultural objects
as  ancient  scripts  and  fossils  since  they  were  deemed  as  the  embodiment  of  China’s  culture,
history, and nationhood. In this regard, although the measures Academia Sinica adopted in
regulating Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition bore resemblance to those practiced by GSC, NSUC and
CPAO, Academia Sinica’s involvement with Dr. Kishinouye’s project was the first time that
Chinese government exerted protection on biological resources like fish specimens against
foreign expeditions.156
Based on its agreement with Dr. Kishinouye, Academia Sinica gradually implemented a
set of routine methods for regulating foreign expeditions involving collecting biological
specimens in China. Beginning in  1934, any foreign researcher who planned to conduct an
expedition in China for biological specimens was required to submit their research proposal and
detailed travel itinerary to Academia Sinica for approval and permission. At that point,
156 Before Dr. Kishinouye’s trip in 1929, China set restrictions on the circulation of certain species’ specimens. The specimens
were primarily related to fossil specimens for paleontological study instead of biological study. Moreover, by then, China had not
come up with any systematic policy or method on regulating the circulation of biological specimens in general. According to the
account of Dr. Roy Andrews, leader of the Central Asiatic Expeditions of the American Museum of Natural History, “[by June
1929], Laws already are in force prohibiting the shipping out of China of any bird skins at all, and of more than three specimens
of mammals and reptiles of a single species for museums.” See Osborn, Henry F. "Interruption of Central Asiatic Exploration by
the American Museum of Natural History." Science, vol. 70, no. 1813, 1929, 293.
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Academia Sinica would inform the expedition party with its regulation concerning the
“Conditions under which Foreigners may Collect Biological Specimens in China (Waiguoren lai
hua caiji biaoben tiaoli,  see  below).”  After  the  expedition  party  signed  an  agreement  with
Academia Sinica agreeing to the terms, they would be granted an expedition license . 157
Otherwise, if a foreign researcher conducted his expedition in China without the expedition
license, he might be detained within a port city, like Dr. Kishinouye’s team experienced in 1929,
until the foreign researcher fulfilled Academia Sinica’s requirements.
Conditions under which Foreigners may Collect Biological Specimens in China158
1. Before departure for the field, the Expedition Party shall submit a detailed statement outlining the plans of
the party to Academia Sinica for approval.
2. No antiquities or non-replaceable articles that have historical value shall be collected or shipped abroad.
3. One or more staff members of Academia Sinica may participate in the activities of the Expedition.
4. A report giving the actual route of the Expedition Party and the number of specimens collected shall be
submitted to Academia Sinica before the Party leaves the country.
5. All biological and ethnological specimens or articles that may be collected by the Expedition Party shall
first be submitted to examination by the representatives of Academia Sinica, either in Nanjing or in
Shanghai, prior to shipment abroad.
6. One complete duplicate set of the biological specimens collected by the Expedition Party shall be deposited
in the Academia Sinica as gifts within the shortest possible time after the specimens have been determined.
157 The earliest signed document I found between Academia Sinica and a foreign party concerning collecting biological
specimens in China was in May 1934, in which Academia Sinica granted permission to a Swedish biologist Dr. Harry Smith to
conduct biological expedition in the Sichuan Province. The Second Historical Archives of China, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan dangan
393:631. According to Shiwen Chen, the earliest Academia Sinica’s regulation he found on foreign biological expedition in
China was related to an American botanists H.G. Macmillan for his trip to Xinjiang. Since Chen does not indicate the exact date
of Macmillan’s trip, it is difficult to tell which trip came first, Dr. Harry Smith’s or Macmillan’s. In general, it is safe to say that
Academia Sinica first implemented the regulation concerning biological specimens in 1934. See Shiwen Chen. “Government and
Academy in Republican China: History of Academia Sinica, 1927-1949.” Dissertation, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998,
pp. 117-118.158 The conditions have been revised for several times from 1930 to 1945. The terms might varied according to different
research plans. The conditions outlined here are a synthesis of several versions of regulations in1934. See the Second Historical
Archives of China, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan dangan 393:631 and 633.
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7. All photographs including moving pictures, which intend to portray the life of the Chinese people in the
interior, shall be censored by Academia Sinica, before they are allowed to be shipped abroad or to appear
in any foreign newspapers or magazines.
8. Violation of any of the above stipulations will forfeit the right of the Institution, for which the expedition is
conducted, to undertake further similar work in China.
The main point of Academia Sinica’s requirements, as outlined above, were generally
based on the agreement between Academia Sinica and Dr. Kishinouye in 1929: to submit a
detailed travel itinerary, to have participants from Academia Sinia, to have all specimens
examined before shipment abroad, and to send a complete duplicate of specimens to Academia
Sinica as gifts.
As  it  proved  useful  in  Dr.  Kishinouye’s  case,  after  the  establishment  of  the  Nationalist
regime, the administration of a “research passport” began to be an effective measure for
government departments, like Academia Sinica, to exert control on foreign activities in China. In
this regard, to enforce its regulation on biological specimens with coercive measures, Academia
Sinica began to issue expedition licenses to foreign researchers for their biological expeditions in
China.  Only  with  the  expedition  license,  could  a  foreign  expedition  preempt  interruption  from
Academia Sinica. The earliest record of such license issued to foreign researchers was in May
1934 (Fig. B. 5). Signed by Academia Sinica’s President, Cai Yuanpei, the document was
granted to a Swedish biologist, Dr. Harry Smith, for his biological expedition in the Sichuan
Province.
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Fig. B. 5. A document issued by Academia Sinica to Dr. Harry Smith for his biological expedition to Sichuan
Province in 1934.159
As it was indicated in its lower right column, the document was categorized as “Huzhao
(Passport),” which literally means protection (hu) and notification (zhao) in Chinese. The content
on the left of the document stated as follows:
Dr. Harry Smith is a professor at Uppsala University in Sweden. He will travel to Nanjing, Sichuan Province
and Xikang Province for botanical specimen collection. He carries with him six luggage, three shotguns, one
handgun, 320 bullets, and no illegal items. He shall be allowed to enter the provinces listed above without
being checked. Academia Sinica asks for proper protection and assistance from local governments for Dr.
Smith’s visit in China.
159 Ibid., 393:631.
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Though  the  document  was  labeled  as  a  “Huzhao (passport),”  it  was  different  from  a
standard. According to the content of the passport issued to Dr. Smith in 1934, the document
bore a four-fold function: (1) it granted Dr. Smith permission from the Nationalist government to
conduct biological expedition in China. It establishes that the bearer is a trustworthy researcher
with the Chinese government’s backing and thus his activities in China will not raise
suspicion;(2) It notifies the authority in charging of the place visited by the foreigner of his
identity, carrying items, and purpose and schedule of the visit; (3) It allowed the bearer to pass
checkpoints on the road with handguns and some pieces of scientific equipment, which otherwise
might be suspected, checked and confiscated; (4) It asks for protection of the bearer from local
military forces.
Besides issuing the Passport for Expedition, Academia Sinica also strengthened the
enforcement of its regulation on biological specimens through the institute’s access to another
two types of governmental licenses: the Passport for Inland Travel (Neidi youli huzhao) and the
Passport for Duty-free Exportation (Mianshui chukou huzhao).
Before the abolishment of the Unequal Treaties, Inland China (neidi) referred to the areas
other than port cities and leased territories where foreigners’ activities were subjected to certain
restrictions. According to the Article IX of the Treaty of Tientsin, signed between Britain and the
Qing China in 1858, “British subjects are hereby authorized to travel for their pleasure or for
purposes of trade, to all parts of the interior [of China], under passports which will be issued by
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their Consuls and countersigned by the local [Chinese] authorities.”160  Because of the non-
reciprocal most-favored nation clause, with the countersigned passports, the citizens of all treaty
powers were allowed to travel to inland China. In Republican China, the authority to issue such a
passport was restricted to China’s Foreign Ministry. In this regard, foreigners, who intended to
visit inland China had to obtain the Passport for Inland Travel either from China’s Foreign
Ministry and its deputies in each province, or from China’s provincial governments.161 In Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition, the Japanese team members were travelling with valid Passports for
Inland Travel when they were detained in Chongqing.162 By requiring a Passport for Expedition,
Academia Sinica added an additional layer of restriction upon foreign activities in China. It was
now necessary for foreign researchers to obtain both the Passport for Inland Travel and the
Passport for Expedition in order to launch research trips towards inland China. As Academia
Sinica was entitled to issue the latter and could apply for the former from China’s Foreign
Ministry on behalf of foreign researchers, with the two passports, the institute essentially
oversaw foreign researchers’ access within inland China.
Additionally, foreign researchers had to obtain a third official document if they intended
to have their biological specimens transported abroad: the Passport for Duty-free Exportation
(Mianshui chukou huzhao).  In both Dr.  Kishinouye and Dr.  Smith’s cases,  after examined their
biological specimens, Academia Sinica requested the Exportation Passport from China’s
160 Mayers, William Frederick and China. Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers: Together with
Regulations for the Conduct of Foreign Trade. Taipei: Ch'eng-Wen Pub. Co., 1966, 13.161 For the Passport for Inland Travel(Neidi youli huzhao), see “Yingguo dashi han-suo ‘Waiguoren lai-hua caiji biaoben
tiaoli’??????‘???????????’.” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan dangan 393:633.162 Kimura, 1948, 4.
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Ministry  of  Finance  (Caizheng bu)  on  behalf  of  the  expedition  parties.  With  the  Passport  for
Duty-free Exportation, the foreigners were allowed to transport the Chinese biological specimens
abroad without being checked and taxed by China’s Customs. In other words, if a foreign party
finished its expedition in inland China but refused to send the promised duplicate of specimens
to Academia Sinica, the party would still be unable to ship the specimens out of China. Hence,
Academia Sinica’s access to the Exportation Passport became its ultimate check to regulate
foreign expeditions and the circulation of China’s biological specimens.
Among Academia Sinica’s efforts to regulate foreign biological expeditions in China, the
application of the three types of passports as coercive measures was not exclusively created for
biological specimens. Rather, the three types of passports were measures the Nationalist
government set up for larger projects in its nationalistic agenda, while Academia Sinica adopted
the  measures  to  facilitate  the  nationalization  of  science  in  China  and  establish  its  monopoly  of
power through the process.
To start with, both the Passport for Inland Travel and the Passport for Duty-free
Exportation were among the Nationalist government’s efforts to regain the control over China’s
territory and its Customs authority, which had been jeopardized by foreign encroachment
through Unequal Treaties for decades. As for the Passport for Expedition, before 1934,
Academia Sinica already issued such passport for its own faculty members to launch scientific
expeditions in China.163 Similar  to  the  passport  granted  to  Dr.  Smith,  the  major  function  of
163 “Qing fagei bensuo yanjiu renyuan fu gedi diaocha dizhi kuangchan de huzhao???????????????
??????.” Zhongyang yanjiuyuan dangan 393:48.
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Academia Sinica’s earlier passport was to exempt its bearer from being suspected and examined
at local checkpoints when he carried weapons and scientific equipment in his expedition.
In the Nationalist era, the idea to regulate the circulation of China’s material objects with
official licenses was not initiated by Academia Sinica, but by the Committee for the Preservation
of Ancient Objects. As quoted above, the Law for the Preservation of Ancient Objects in 1930
stated, “the excavation of ancient objects shall only be conducted by the Nationalist
government’s academic institutions. The excavation project must be submitted to the CPAO for
approval … and excavation license. Ancient objects’ circulation shall be restricted within the
border of China. The Nationalist government’s academic institutions, when deemed necessary,
have to obtain approval and …Certificate from the CPAO… to transport ancient objects abroad.
The transported ancient objects have to be returned within two years.”164 Supported by the other
departments of the Nationalist government, the CPAO began in 1928 to regulate the excavation
and circulation of China’s ancient objects, such as ancient scripts and fossils, with exclusive
passports: “the Passport for Excavating Ancient Objects (Caijue guwu huzhao)” and “the
Passport for Exporting Ancient Objects (Guwu chuguo huzhao).”165  Then, the President of
Academia Sinica, Cai Yuanpei, who was also the committee member of the CPAO, adopted the
strategy to enforce Academia Sinica’s regulation on scientific expeditions and biological
resources.
164 Zhonghua Minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Di 5 ji, di 1 bian, Wen hua, Vol.2?????????????????
????(?). Nanjing: Jiangsu gu ji chu ban she, 2000, 610-611.165 Ibid., 625-632.
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3.3. CONCLUSION
Through its engagement with Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition, Academia Sinica, as a governmental
department, paid formal attention to a foreign scientific expedition that related to China’s natural
resources  for  the  first  time.  Based  on  its  agreement  with  Dr.  Kishinouye,  the  Institute  later
stipulated the “Conditions under which Foreigners may Collect Biological Specimens in China.”
According to the regulation, Academia Sinica granted foreigners accesses to China’s natural
resources for their scientific studies in exchange for the institute’s participation in the foreign
expeditions and partial ownership of the specimens collected through their trips. Since then, all
foreign scientific expeditions for China’s natural resources should be subject to Chinese
government’s regulation through Academia Sinica. In this regard, with the policy on biological
specimens, Academia Sinica did not only provide official protection for China’s natural
resources, it also appropriated the achievements that the foreign expeditions yielded with China’
s resources.
The enforcement of Academia Sinica’s policy on biological specimens fundamentally
relied on the Nationalist government’s efforts to exert absolute control over China’s territory,
people, and resources. Immediately after its establishment, the Nationalist government undertook
negotiations over the Unequal Treaties. Among the government’s emphasis on the negotiation
were the abolition of foreigners’ extraterritorial rights and the autonomy of China’s Customs. As
the Nationalist government was engaged in settling new provisions with treaty powers in terms
of foreign presence in China and Sino-foreign trade, the government implemented regulative
measures on foreign activities in China and on the circulation of commodities on China’s border,
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which included issuing the Passport for Inland Travel, the Passport for Exportation, and the
Passport of Duty-free Exportation. Building on the government’s nationalistic efforts, Academia
Sinica was empowered to enforce its policy on foreign biological expeditions with coercive
measures.
Meanwhile, by issuing the Passport for Expedition and securing its access to the other
governmental licenses, Academia Sinica not only exerted its administrative authority over all
foreign biological expeditions in China, but also strengthened its position as a governmental
department to defend the nation’s sovereignty, territory and natural resources. In this regard, the
implementation of the policy essentially consolidated Academia Sinica’s position as the
Nationalist government’s administrative center to facilitate the nationalization of science in
China. In the nationalized community of science, all materials available on China’s territory for
scientific research were under the ownership of the Nationalist government and thus should only
be administered by the government’s representative in the realm of science: Academia Sinica.
Moreover, as Academia Sinica served the government’s nationalistic agenda in the realm
of science, the institute essentially established China’s science community as its sphere of
influence with the application of the governmental passports. As the institute already issued such
passports for its own faculty members to launch scientific expeditions in China before 1934, by
granting the passport to foreign researchers, Academia Sinica actually categorized its foreign
collaborators as the insiders of the nationalized science community of China. In this regard, the
Passport for Expedition issued by Academia Sinica was more than a coercive method for
regulating foreigner’s biological expedition in China. With the Passport, Academia Sinica shared
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governmental protection and the access to China’s natural resources with those foreigners who
complied with its rules and paid their tributes to the institute.
Hence, as Academia Sinica fulfilled its governmental duty to defend the nation’s
sovereignty and natural resources against foreign expeditions, it was also empowered through the
process of nationalizing science in the Republican China. As it suggests by Dr. Kishinouye’s
case and the policy on foreign biological expeditions in China, it was the obedience to Academia
Sinica’s rules, rather than a simple binary between the Chinese and the foreigners, that
demarcated the nationalized community of science in the Republican China. In this regard, as
Academia Sinica was nationalizing the Chinese science community for the Nationalist
government, it was not only the government’s representative but also the embodiment of nation
in the scientific realm of China who possessed the ultimate right to define science and nation.
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4. THE EMPOWERMENT OF ACADEMIA SINICA IN A NATIONALISTIC ERA
Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition paved the way for its future
policies on foreign biological expeditions. Through this process, both scientific resources and
scientific activities were incorporated as a part of the nation. Science deserved the government’s
protection and patronage. Due to its leading role in the nationalization of science, Academia
Sinica established its authority in the realms of both science and politics. The institute was no
longer a national research center that exclusively engaged with the sciences and arts;it was also a
governmental agency with practical utility in matters of science administration.
In 1928, the Nationalist government underwent a structural re-organization. On October
10th, a refurbished administration was inaugurated at Nanjing. Under the Central Executive
Committee (Zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui), five separate boards, or Yuan, constituted the main
body of the government—the Executive Yuan (Xingzheng Yuan), the Legislative Yuan (Lifa
Yuan),  the  Judicial  Yuan  (Sifa Yuan), the Examination Yuan (Kaoshi Yuan) and the Control
Yuan (Jiancha Yuan).166 Though Academia Sinica held an equal position in official ranking with
the five boards,  it  did not have the same administrative power corresponding to its  position.  In
166 Fairbank JK, Twitchett D. The Cambridge History of China. Vol.12, Pt. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983,
pp.716-717.
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1928, it was two departments within the Executive Yuan—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Education—that had the authority to issue governmental license to regulate
foreign activities, and to formulate cultural policies for China. Academia Sinica’s battle with Dr.
Kishinouye’s  expedition,  however,  allowed  the  institute  to  establish  its  political  authority  over
the administration of science. After it institutionalized its authority biological expeditions, any
international research party that intended to perform fieldwork in China had to comply with
Academia Sinica’s oversight. In this regard, the institute became more than a national research
center which exclusively engaged with the studies of sciences and arts, but a body that oversaw
scientific activity in China.
The process of the nationalization of science and Academia Sinica’s capacity building
was a temporal creation of three interrelated factors that were embedded in the context of the
nationalist China. Namely, China’s political instability and its troubled relations with Japan in
the late 1920s, the necessity of the Nationalist government to assert its legitimacy and authority
in its founding years, and the utility of Academia Sinica in connecting science and politics.
4.1. NATIONALISM IN A TRANSITIONAL ERA
Prior to Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition in 1929, he had led two prior trips along the Yangzi River
for fish specimens. These earlier expeditions encountered little effective intervention or
regulation from Chinese authorities. In this regard, it was certainly the tension between the newly
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established Nationalist regime and a foreign-funded expedition that primarily necessitated
Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s third expedition. Unlike his earlier trips, Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition in 1929 was conducted amid China’s political instability. Hence, in the
transitional year of 1929, Dr. Kishinoye’s third expedition offered the newly founded
government an opportunity to test its ability and enforce its rules upon the foreign activities in
China.
In the 1920s, the Nationalist Party led a nationwide revolution to replace the Beiyang
government as the central regime of China. Through the Party’s revolutionary propaganda, the
Beiyang government was denounced for its incompetence in abolishing the Unequal Treaties that
foreign imperialism forced upon China. The era’s nationalistic propaganda not only mobilized
massive support for the GMD’s military expedition, but also led to a new height of nationalism
in China, which including labor strikes, xenophobic attacks on foreign residents, and an anti-
Christian movement.167
As the Nationalist Party ascended to central power, amid the nationwide nationalistic
sentiment unleashed through its military expedition, the new regime was obliged to fulfill its
patriotic commitments, among which the issue of the Unequal Treaties was the government’s
primary concern. Though some of the Western treaty powers began to sign new agreements with
the Nationalists in 1928, the scope of the treaties were quite limited—they only contained one or
two  provisions.  The  only  equal  right  acquired  by  the  Nationalists  was  the  treaty  powers’
recognition of China’s tariff autonomy. Hence, in 1929, one of the government’s major goals
167 Hodous, Lewis. “The Anti-Christian movement in China.” The Journal of Religion, 1930, 10 (4): 487.
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was the termination of extraterritoriality, bringing all foreigners in China under Chinese
jurisdiction.168
On June 15, 1928, the Nationalist government announced its intention to begin the
nation’s reconstruction by negotiating China’s new international treaties on the basis of equality
and mutual respect. 169  As a consequence, in 1929 all unequal-treaties-based Sino-foreign
relations prior to the reign of the Nationalist government were invalidated. At the same time,
however, the Nationalist government’s new equal-treaties-based diplomatic relations had not
been fully established.170 As the Nationalist government was formulating its foreign policies, it
was not until May 1930 that Japan finally signed a new treaty with the Nationalists and thus de
jure acknowledged the legitimacy of the Nationalist regime in governing China.171
Hence, it was amid China’s rising nationalism and political instability that Dr.
Kishinouye launched his third biological expedition in China. In this transitional period, no
Nationalist-Japanese agreement had been reached on Japanese citizens’ activities in China,
neither was there any interim policy regarding foreign academic expeditions. Therefore, it was
the Nationalist government’s judgment as to whether to interrupt the expedition or not. It is
important to note that whatever the decision, it would create a precedent for China’s formal
regulation on foreign expeditions. At that moment, the new regime was obliged to fulfill its
nationalistic commitments on which its legitimacy rested. As a part of this nationalistic impulse,
Academia Sinica had to fulfill its duty as the protector of the nation by taking an assertive stance
168 Wang, 2005, 89.169 Wang, Dong. China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History. Lanham: Lexington, 2005, 88.170 Fairbank JK, Twitchett D. The Cambridge History of China. Vol.12, Pt. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 716.171 Wang, 2005, 89.
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against the Japanese biologists who traveled towards inland China without their permission. Its
intervention paved the way for China’s future policy on international biological expeditions.
More importantly, by claiming the Japanese expedition was a violation to China’s
sovereignty and then interrupting the trip, Academia Sinica was delivering a message to both
domestic and international societies that the Beiyang governance was destroyed, and now it was
the  Nationalist  government’s  duty  to  defend  the  nation.  Academia  Sinica’s  action  was  an
announcement that, from now on, any foreign activities conducted in China would be subjected
to the Nationalist’s rules, and thus any and all foreign research in China should be supervised by
Academia Sinica.
Outside of highlighting the Nationalist government’s new authority and legitimacy, the
engagement with the Japanese and its policy on biological specimens, Academia Sinica also
justified  the  competence  of  China  to  participate  in  global  conversations  on  science  and  on
politics. On the one hand, with its regulation of foreign biological expeditions, Academia Sinica
represented the scientific competitiveness of the nation by proving that Chinese professionals
were capable of speaking the standard language of science and thus qualified to hold
conversations with foreign scientists. With the establishment of Academia Sinica, China was
able to represent and voice itself in the realm of science.
On the other hand, to settle the issue of foreign expeditions, Academia Sinica adopted the
form of the international treaty as a formal way to conclude and ratify agreements between
countries. To be more specific, Academia Sinica, to a certain extent, applied the essential spirit
of the unequal treaty in engaging with the scientists of the treaty powers. As treaty powers
obtained unilateral privileges in China with their military, their scientists gained access to
107
?
China’s natural environment and resources, and thus acquired knowledge in China that might not
be found anywhere else. Academia Sinica adopted the protocol and reversed the roles played by
China and the treaty powers. Academia Sinica forced the acceptance of the treaty, which
stipulated “Conditions under which Foreigners may Collect Biological Specimens in China,”
upon the treaty powers’ scientists via the Nationalist government’s coercive measures (Fig. C.
1.). After all, based on the passport-system, the Nationalist government had the ultimate
authority to regulate international visitors’ activities. Any international explorer, who was
unwilling to sign the academic contract, would be denied the access to inland China, or be
detained in a port city as Dr. Kishinouye experienced. According the treaty, the institute was
allowed to participate in and benefit from foreign expeditions as much as it desired. In this way,
supported by the government’s police and coercive measures,, Academia Sinica secured its
privilege over the foreign scientists.
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Fig. C. 1. A Treaty Signed by Dr. Harry Smith .for his biological expedition to Sichuan Province in 1934.172
172 The Second Historical Archives of China, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan dangan 393:631.
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Amid the political instability of China during the transition from the Beiyang government
to the Nationalist government at Nanjing, Dr. Kishinouye was not the only foreign scholar who
had led field surveys in China. From 1921 through 1928, the American Museum of Natural
History organized six Asiatic Explorations to the north and northwest China for geological
fossils. In August 1928, when the Asiatic Exploration team launched its sixth expedition in
Mongolia,  local  Chinese  government  seized  the  team’s  fossil  collections  at  the  request  of  the
National  Scientific  Union  of  China  (Zhongguo xueshu tuanti xiehui, est.1927, hereafter
NSUC).173 As a semi-governmental organization, the NSUC also imposed cooperation upon a
Swedish explorer Sven Hedin (1865-1952) in order to conduct a joint excavation trip in central
Asia one year earlier. Though both the Swedish and the American expeditions were asked to
fulfill similar demands as those proposed by Academia Sinica to Dr. Kishinouye, unlike the
Japanese expedition, none of the scholars in these two Western expeditions had been detained in
a port city by the government’s restraining order.
In this regard, distinguished from its Western peers, the Japanese team’s experience in
China  could  not  be  explained  solely  by  China’s  nationalistic  or  anti-foreign  sentiments  .  Apart
from China’s rising anti-foreignism and the Chinese elites’ growing concerns regarding
sovereignty issues, Academia Sinica’s engagement with the Japanese expedition was also driven
by the troubled Sino-Japanese relations in the late 1920s.
173 Osborn, Henry F. “Interruption of Central Asiatic Exploration by the American Museum of Natural History.” Science, vol.
70, no. 1813, 1929, pp. 291-294.
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4.2. CHINA’S TROUBLED RELATIONS WITH JAPAN
After the Qing Empire lost the first Sino-Japanese War and was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan,
the relations between China and Japan moved into a very troubled era. On the one hand, after the
defeat in 1895, Chinese elites began to reevaluate the competitiveness of its Japanese neighbor
and attempted to modernize Chinese society, partly after the model set up in Meiji Japan. In the
first decade of the 20th century, there certainly were constructive interactions between China and
Japan  in  which  Japan  played  an  auxiliary  role  in  China’s  social  reforms,  .174  For example,
Chinese students left in droves for Japan to pursue higher education. Among the Chinese
students, were several future leaders of the Nationalist Party, including Chiang Kai-shek, Wang
Jingwei, and Hu Hanmin.
On the other hand, however, after World War I, Sino-Japanese relations were jeopardized
by the rise of Japanese colonialism, and Japan’s influence on Chinese society was gradually
replaced by America. Japan took over German concessions in Shandong, forced another unequal
treaty—the Twenty-one demands—upon the Beiyang government, militarily confronted the
Nationalist troops at Jinan, and actively interfered in China’s domestic politics in Manchuria. As
a consequence, Chinese elites protested for the return of the Shandong peninsular and the
termination of the Twenty-one demands. The CCP and the GMD jointly led labor strikes against
Japanese corporations in Shanghai and Hong Kong. After the Jinan Incident, the Nationalist
government at Nanjing officially dropped its plan on improving Sino-Japanese relations, listed
174 Reynolds, Douglas R. China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan. Vol. 160, Council on East Asian Studies,
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993, chapter 1.
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Japan as the nation’s primary threat, and turned to the United States for unprecedented
cooperation. 175  Through this series of unpleasant encounters, Japan not only proclaimed its
colonial ambition in China, but also effectively pre-empted any possibility to cooperate with the
Nationalist government. In fact, by 1928, when Great Britain and America were moving towards
negotiating the return of China’s ‘lost rights’ , Japan was acting forcefully to protect and enhance
its economic dominance of Manchuria, and did not officially recognize the legitimacy of the
Nationalist government at Nanjing until 1930.176
Outside of the political tension between Japan and the Nationalist government, Academia
Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition was also driven by the disputes between
China and Japan regarding fishing resources and the colonial implication of “scientific
expedition” in the era of global imperialism. In the 1920s, a series of violent competitions over
fishing resources between Japan and China were taking place in China’s coastal waters. From the
East  China  Sea  to  the  Zhoushan  Archipelagos  (located  in  the  delta  of  the  Yangzi  River)  (Zhou
shan qun dao),  Japan’s  mechanized  trawlers  severely  depleted  the  Yellow  Croakers  of  the
region. The Japanese incursion into China’s waters rapidly reduced the catches of the local
Chinese fishermen, who were less equipped with mechanized fishing technology.177 The Chinese
fishermen at the time were already organized into a quasi-guild network—fishing lodges—which
was regarded as an influential social force in the coastal areas of China. Meanwhile, China’s
fishing activities not only constituted the major source of local governments’ revenue, but also
175 Luo, Zhitian. “Jinan shijian yu zhongmei guanxi de zhuanzhe,” Lishi yanjiu, Vol.2, 1996, pp. 72-89.
176 Fairbank JK, Twitchett D. The Cambridge History of China. Vol.12, Pt. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 719.
177 Micah S. Muscolino. Fishing Wars and Environmental Change in Late Imperial and Modern China. Cambridge: Harvard
University, 2010, Chapter 4.
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directly funded Academia Sinica. Immediately after the establishment of Academia Sinica, the
Nationalist government had drawn up a 100,000 yuan monthly budget for the institute, and the
responsibility was mainly fulfilled by the Fishing Industrial Bureau of Jiangsu and Zhejiang.178
In this regard, the Chinese fishermen’s loss and suffering in the Sino-Japanese fishing wars soon
caught attention from the public, the Nationalist government, and Academia Sinica.
When the news was released to the public that Dr. Kishinouye would lead a research trip
along the Yangzi River, the trip immediately raised suspicion among the Chinese society as it
was related to the ongoing Sino-Japanese fishing wars. Considering Dr. Kishinouye’s previous
service at the Aquacultural Bureau of Japan, the GMD’s Shanghai division publicly denounced
Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition as another Japanese invasion of China’s fishing resources with the
aid of modern science and technology.179
In addition to the fishing conflicts, the Chinese distrust of Dr. Kishinouye’s team also lay
in the disputes between China and Japan regarding the colonial implication of “scientific
expedition” in an era of global imperialism. As a typical biological expedition, in order to study
the habitat of freshwater fish, it was necessary for the team to acquire information on the
topography of the Yangzi River. Considering there were precedents for such “expeditions” in
which Japanese soldiers based in Manchuria stepped out of Japan’s leased territory and
conducted “expeditions” in the Northern China, the Chinese had a valid reason to suspect that
Dr. Kishinouye’s “expedition” was also collecting China’s topographic information to serve
178 Chen, 1998, 97.179 T??? Bunka Jigy??????? (Oriental Cultural Work). Series H: Oriental Cultural Programs, call number: H-0117. Japan Center
for Asian Historical Record, pp. 98-100.
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Japan’s military purpose.180 As Dr. Kimura recalls it, Chinese newspapers denounced his team as
Japanese agents who worked for an exiled Japanese general.181
Apart from the popular suspicions held by the Chinese towards Dr. Kishinouye’s field
research, Academia Sinica had another concern . In Cai Yuanpei’s telegrams, he repeatedly
associated the expedition with “a matter of sovereignty (shi-guan zhuquan).” As mentioned
earlier, amid the growing nationalism in China, anything related to foreign people and their
activities in China could be associated with the issues of China’s sovereignty. In a nationalistic
discourse, the foreign presence in China was not only yielded by the Unequal Treaties which the
Chinese government signed under duress, it also kept reminding the Chinese nationalists of their
failures to liberate China from foreign privileges.
In addition to its unpleasant light on China’s nationalist politics, the Japanese expedition
was also negatively perceived by the Chinese due to the fact that “expeditions”, or
“explorations,” are practices that have been deeply embedded in the tradition of imperial
expansion. In general, governance always requires the knowledge of natural and social
conditions of its domain. The process of modernization marked a government’s increasing ability
to  increase  the  visibility  and  control  of  their  societies,  with  the  assistance  of  science  and
technology.182 This  was  also  true  with  the  establishment  of  colonial  governance.  At  least  since
the age of discovery, “expedition” was accompanied by explorers’ claims to the territory,
resources, and people on the discovered land. More importantly, the very idea of “discover” in
180 “Riren celiang Yalujiang jiaoshe (?????????).” Dongfang zazhi, Shanghai, 1921(18): 137.181 Kimura, 1948, 5182 Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2005, pp. 225-247.
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the process of an expedition suggested that it was because of the imperial power that humanity
that is lying outside the unmarked category of Western civilization, could finally be known to the
world.  It  also  bespoke  a  cultural  hierarchy  in  that  because  of  the  foreign  explorers,  who  were
masters  of  science,  that  the  indigenous  species  in  the  new  land  could  be  discovered,  properly
named, and studied for the production of the universal knowledge of nature.183
From Dr. Kishinouye’s perspective, as he clarified on various occasions, “...the biological
expedition along the Yangzi River had no intention other than pure scientific study.”184 He might
not have intended to deploy the study for Japan’s economic and military purposes. He might not
have intended to name a China indigenous species after himself.  He probably had not conducted
any crime at all.. Nonetheless, he cannot deny the direct connection between his pure scientific
studies and Japan’s colonial enterprise. Since his research was funded bythe Boxer Indemnity,
funds that were extracted from the Chinese customs and railway revenues, his expedition was a
colonial enterprise. His access to inland China was opened by the imperial power built by Japan
on the deaths of the Chinese soldiers and commoners who participated in the first Sino-Japanese
War. Additionally the area of his field research, ranging from the Sakhalin Island to Indonesia,
from the port city in western China to Korea, coincided with the expansion of Japan’s colonial
map. 185  Though he might regard his expedition as a pure scientific study, for the Chinese
intelligentsia, however, Dr. Kishinouye’s “pure study” marked China as an unknown land in
international academy, and presented the Chinese biologists’ incapacity to study, preserve and
183?Kimura,?Shigeru.?“Description?of?the?Fished?Collected?from?the?Yangtze?Kiang,?China,?by?late?Dr.?K.?Kishinouye?and?his?Party?in?1927-1929.”?The?Journal?of?the?Shanghai?Science?Institute??1934?(1):?12.?184 Saeki, pp. 56-57.185 Kimura, 1948, 37.
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display its own nation’s natural resources. Therefore, regardless of the purpose of the Japanese
expedition, for the Chinese intellectuals the very image that Japanese scholars leading an
expedition towards inland China to “discover” and study the freshwater fish in China’s territory
was a violation of the nation’s sovereignty and a humiliation for China’s national pride.186
All of the reasons listed above offered Academia Sinica cause to intervene in Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition. Nevertheless, did Academia Sinica and its director, Cai Yuanpei, agree
with all of these suspicions? If Cai was convinced of the connection between the Japanese trip
and Japan’s military agenda, and accordingly categorized the research as an urgent threat to
China’s sovereignty, he could have requested to permanently terminate the expedition just like
he did during Aurel Stein’s field research in western China on May 1930.187. Rather than directly
issuing a restraining order, Cai chose to contact China’s education and foreign offices first in
order to start a conversation with the Japanese through the intermediates. In its negotiation with
the Japanese, Academia Sinica’s primary concern was not about the termination of the
expedition, but about specimen collections and participation of Academia Sinica’s
representatives.
Moreover, after Academia Sinica reached an agreement with the Japanese team, instead
of dispatching its own specimen technicians, the institute invited Bing Zhi, a biologist who had
graduated from Cornell University, to participate in the Japanese expedition on the institute’s
186????? Bunka Jigy??????? (Oriental Cultural Work). Series H: Oriental Cultural Programs, call number: H-0117. Japan Center
for Asian Historical Record, pp. 98-100; “Guoji tongxun: riren diaocha Changjiang yuye.”????:????????. Xinghua, vol.26
no. 37, 1929, pp. 40-41.?187?“Zhi?Waijiaobu?gonghan:?hanqing?chaoshi?Sitanyin?wang?Xinjiang?kaogu?wei-jing?benyuan?shenhe?yiqian?fu-fa? huzhao.”??????:?????????????????????????????? Guoli zhongyang
yanjiuyuan yuanwu yuebao, vol.1 no,11, 1930, pp. 42-43.?
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behalf.188 As trained biologists, Academica Sinica’s specimen technicians could perform in the
same professional capacity as Bing Zhi as to evaluating whether the Japanese scientists collected
specimens and other information beyond its permitted research. By considering Bing Zhi as the
primary candidate for this mission, however, what Academia Sinica demanded was more than
just dispatching a representative to oversee the Japanese expedition, and proving the existence of
the Chinese scholars who were capable of science. Academia Sinica also intended to highlight
the fact that there were Chinese scientists, like Bing Zhi, whose professionalism were recognized
by the international academy and were qualified to engage as equals in scientific cooperation
with an eminent Japanese scientist like Dr. Kishinouye.
In all, Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishiouye’s trip and its capacity building
afterwards were largely facilitated by the context of Chinese politicsin this transitional era
between the Beiyang and Nationalist governments. First, growing Chinese nationalism in the
1920s required the central government to implement a proper policy on foreign activities in
China, particularly when the foreign activities were related to Japan. Second, when the Japanese
team launched its third expedition, Academia Sinica was not only a part of the newly established
Nanjing government, but also a recently founded intellectual body of China, awaiting domestic
and international recognition. Through its engagement with the Japanese expedition, Academia
Sinica tested its authority as the central manager of scientific research in China, both
internationally with foreign research institutes and domestically with provincial governors. It
intended to demonstrate that a new generation of Chinese scholars were capable of scientific
188 “Dian Beiping Bing Nongshan zhuren: wei-qing shuailing caijituan jiandu riren qing fuyun shifu you.”??????
??:??????????????????. Guoli zhongyang yanjiuyuan yuanwu yuebao, vol.1 no. 4, 1929, 37.
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research in a manner as professional as any scientist with international reputation. More
importantly,  it  set  its  engagement  with  Dr.  Kishinouye  as  a  precedent  for  further  international
cooperation in the realm of natural science. It announced to the world the legitimacy of both the
Nationalist government and itself, whose power everyone in China would haveto comply  from
then on.
4.3. THE DUAL-IDENTITY OF ACADEMIA SINICA
Besides being facilitated by the political context of China in the late 1920s, the process of
Academia Sinica’s capacity-building was driven by the unique role of the organization itself,
both as the head of China’s intellectual body and a research division within the Nationalist
government.  Upon  its  establishment,  modeled  after  the  Soviet  National  Academy  of  Sciences,
Academia Sinica was designed to serve the nation’s industrial construction with scientific studies
under the government’s control and support.189  Nonetheless, as indicated through Academia
Sinica’s engagement with Dr. Kishinouye, the institute not only served the government with
scientific studies, but also secured governmental support for the Chinese academic community in
its nascent stage.
By the 1920s, most treaty powers had engaged in scientific expeditions like Dr.
189 Chen, 1998, pp. 77-85.
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Kishinouye’s biological trip in China, and utilized Chinese resources for their commercial and
academic interests. 190 Prior to Academia Sinica, several Chinese academic associations
attempted to contain the rampant circulation of Chinese material objects. Some of their efforts
were endorsed by the Chinese government. For example, the National Scientific Union of China
imposed a cooperative project on the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin and conducted a joint
excavation trip in central Asia in 1927.191 However, due to a lack of institutional communication
between the Beiyang government and the Chinese academic associations, it was impossible for
any organization to implement consistent and effective measures towards foreign academic
expeditions in China.
After the establishment of the Nationalist government, the new administration
implemented a passport-based policy on regulating the mobility of people and resources within
and across China’s borders. These regulationsincluded the application of the Passport for Inland
Travel, Passport for Exportation, and so forth. It was through this passport system that Academia
Sinica could enforce its policy on biological specimens. Hence, unlike any previous academic
associations,  as  a  division  of  the  Nationalist  government,  Academia  Sinica  was  able  to
institutionalize its efforts to defend the biological resources for China’s scientific research with
governmental authority.
Though multiple divisions within the Nationalist government were entitled to participate
in the administration of foreign activities in China, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
190 Fati Fan. British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter. Harvard University Press, 2004; Glover, Denise M.,
and McKhann, Charles F., eds. Explorers and Scientists in China’s Borderlands, 1880-1950. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.191 Grace Shen. Unearthing the Nation: Modern Geology and Nationalism in Republican China, 1911-1949. London: University of Chicago
Press, 2014, Chapter 4.
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Ministry  of  Education,  and  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Commerce,  few  officers  in  these
departments were qualified to settle disputes over scientific studies. In the realm of science,
professional training was required to understand the difference between disciplines . For
example, a trained biologist could perform a better job than a law student in judging whether a
piece  of  rock  was  a  reptile  fossil  for  biological  studies,  or  a  rare  mineral  specimen  with  a
potential application in industry. Hence, as science rose to a disciplined enterprise, it required a
new division in the government, like Academia Sinica, whose officers were capable of speaking
the standard language of science to administrate scientific activities in China. In this regard,
though there were overlaps among the responsibilities of these ministries regarding foreign
administration, Academia Sinica’s monopoly on scientific knowledge enabled the institute to be
the only governmental authority that was suitable for the negotiation with Dr. Kishinouye’s
team. In this way, with its duel identity, Academia Sinica connected the realms of science and
politics in China. By institutionalizing the connection between science and governmental
authority, Academia Sinica was the place where science and politics could mutually authorize
each other.
This mutual authorization could not be attributed to the context of 1920s China and the
qualification of Academia Sinica alone. From the institute’s establishment, to its intervention in
Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and its policy on biological specimens afterwards, Academia
Sinica’s capacity building was driven by the sense of mission established by the institute’s
founding members to modernize the nation with science. Led by Cai Yuanpei, Zhang Jingjiang
(1877-1950), Wu Zhihui (1865-1953), and Li Shizeng (1881-1973), four elder statesmen who
had great prestige and influence in the Nationalist Party, Academia Sinica gradually secured
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governmental support for China’s academic community.
In the case of Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition, as a research institute, it was not Academia
Sinica’s duty to intervene in the Japanese trip. It was rather the responsibility for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Education to ensure the Japanese team’s obedience to China’s
new policies. In this regard, prior to Cai Yuanpei issueing the restraining order, he first wrote to
these two Chinese ministries to request their opinion towards the matter. Though the two
ministries reached out to Japanese diplomats to express their concerns, they were not inclined to
take any coercive measures as Cai requested because these two ministries were also preoccupied
with their own governmental duties. The Foreign Affairs office was engaged with the negotiation
over international treaties, and the Education office was preoccupied with theprotests regarding
the Movement for the Independence of China’s Education. As the tasks required the two
ministries to cautiously handle China’s relations with Japan, if they assertively intervened in Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition, it might jeopardize the delicate balance they themselves were
attempting to maintain between China and Japan. Despite of the two ministries’ unwillingness to
be involved in the Japanese expedition, was it necessary for Academia Sinica to be in charge?
From raising government’s concerns about Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition to promulgating
the specimen law, what primarily motivated Academia Sinica’s engagement through the whole
process was not its governmental duty, but its founding members’ belief in the connection
between preserving China’s material objects and defending the nation’s sovereignty and pride.
Consistent among all of the associations mentioned , which had attempted to regulate foreign
expeditions in China, such as the National Scientific Union of China and the Committee for the
Preservation of Ancient Objects, was the participation of Academia Sinica’s founding members,
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particularly Cai Yuanpei. From the early age of their adult lives, the four founding members of
Academia Sinica had been dedicated to the independence and modernization of China’s
education. They helped to promote the Movement for the Independence of China’s Education,
attempted to reform China’s educational system, lent support and resources to the establishment
of the most influential scientific organizationin China—the Science Society of China (Zhongguo
kexue she, est. 1914), and proposed to found the museums for cultural and natural histories in
China.192  They regarded Western science and education as an effective means for China to
achieve independence, prosperity and modernization. Hence, when they founded Academia
Sinica, regardless of the Nationalist government’s expectation for the institute, it was very much
a Promised Land for these nationalist intellectuals to institutionalize government’s support for
their decade-long pursuit of modern science and education in China.
Nonetheless, good intention alone could not lead to Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition and the promulgation of its specimen law . Academia Sinica required
political power to facilitate its capacity building. In the beginning years of the Nationalist
government, no such policy or precedent that granted Academia Sinica the right to detain a
foreign team, which was clearly beyond the institute’s authority at the time. Academia Sinica’s
effective intervention in the Japanese expedition, which initiated the institute’s capacity building,
fundamentally depended on the political influence of its founding members, especially its
president, Cai Yuanpei.
Besides his efforts to modernize China’s education, Cai had served as the President of a
192 Chen, 1998, pp.40-49; Sheng, Jia. “The Origins of the Science Society of China, 1914-1937,” Dissertation, Ithaca: Cornell
University, 1995, pp. 54-56.
122
?
prestigious university, Peking University, and the head of the Ministry of Education in both the
Beiyang and the Nationalist governments. He was thus one of the most respected intellectual
leaders in the Republican China. More importantly, as Chiang Kai-shek rapidly rose to power
after  the  Northern  Expedition,  he  split  from  the  Nationalist  government  at  Wuhan,  which  was
mainly dominated by leftists, and helped Chiang reestablish another Nationalist government at
Nanjing. Cai and the other three founders of Academia Sinica were among the first group of
Nationalists who chose to stand with Chiang in this factionalism.193 Their participation in the
Nanjing regime at that decisive moment did not only consolidated Chiang’s position in the party,
but also rendered themselves important allies for the President of the Nanjing regime. Hence,
Cai,  as  well  as  the  other  founders,  was  not  only  an  intellectual  leader  who  accumulated  social
reputation and political capital in Nationalist movements, but also a founding father and
Chiang’s close ally in the Nationalist government at Nanjing. In this regard, it was not just
Academia Sinica’s authority, which Cai relied on to issue the restraining order for the Japanese
team. Therefore, it was because of Cai’s political influence, rather than Academia Sinica’s
authority, that the restraining order could be effectively executed by the provincial governors.
In all, facilitated by the nationalistic context of China in a transitional era and the
unpleasant Sino-Japanese relations in the late 1920s, Academia Sinica’s engagement with Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition and its later capacity building were fundamentally motivated by the
institute’s founders’ intention and political authority to institutionalize governmental
administration for scientific activities in China. They deemed it a matter of national pride to
193 Chen, 1998, pp. 44-49.
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prove Chinese scientists’ competitiveness and a matter of sovereignty to preserve China’s
scientific resources from foreign encroachment. Standing between the realms of academia and
politics, Cai Yuanpei, as well as the other founding members, utilized their own political
influence to mobilize governmental support for Academia Sinica’s intervention in Dr.
Kishinouye’s expedition. By setting the engagement as a precedent for Academia Sinica’s policy
on foreign biological expeditions, the research institute empowered itself as the administrative
center for science for China. With its dual-identity, Academia Sinica institutionalized the
connection between science and politics. Academia Sinica became a place where science and
politics could mutually authorize each other: the newly established Nationalist government could
seek support from the authority of science to consolidate its position by proving its intention and
ability to defend and modernize China, while the Chinese scientific community at its nascent
stage was able to secure its access to scientific resources with government’s protection.
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5. CONCLUSION: SCIENCE, NATION, AND MODERNITY
In China, 1929 was a pivotal year. The Nationalist government at Nanjing had not yet fully
entrenched itself into Chinese society, while the Beiyang government had already collapsed. In
this transitional year, political instability and inconsistency between the two governments’
policies generated both crisis and opportunity. This point is exemplified in Academia Sinica’s
engagement with Dr. Kishinouye. For Dr. Kishinouye, his scientific research in China, which
was based on the agreement between the Japanese and the Beiyang governments, was suddenly
invalidated by the Nationalist government. For Academia Sinica, as the Nanjing regime had no
regulation on foreign expeditions in China, any decision and measures the institute adopted
towards Dr. Kisninouye’s expedition at the time had the potential to become institutionalized as
the government’s policy. Joined by rising nationalism in China and an escalated hostility
between China and Japan, this pivotal year also marked the end of foreign scholars’ unlimited
access to China’s natural resources and the beginning of the nationalization of science by
Academia Sinica. As Academia Sinica institutionalized the connection between science and
nationalism, some new features developed in the relationship between science and nation.
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5.1. REDEFINING NATION AND SCIENCE
Prior to Dr. Kishinouye’s third expedition in 1929, the discourses of both Chinese nationhood
and science were mainly related to Chinese language, literature, and history, or, in general,
cultural materials that embodied China’s glamorous past. Since 1928, the Nanjing Regime had
already founded the Central Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities to regulate the
circulation  of  China’s  artifacts  with  coercive  measures.  In  contrast,  it  was  not  until  Academia
Sinica’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s trip that China’s government first granted protection
over  its  biological  resources.  This  essentially  extended  the  connection  between  science  and
nation in the 1920s from antiquities bound to China’s past to more tangible entities, such as fish,
related to China’s natural environment, and the nation’s present
At the turn of the 20th century, due to unequal treaties, the increasing foreign presence in
China in the realms of commerce, politics and culture led Chinese intellectuals to reconsider the
issues related to Chinese nationhood and westernization. Among their various pursuits, two
terms successively constituted influential strands of the discourses around Chinese nationhood:
“National Essence” (guocui) and a more neutral term “National Heritage” (guogu). Regardless of
their differences, the two terms and their attendant discourses fundamentally tied the concepts of
nation and science to cultural studies and written materials.
The National Essence group claimed that the essential nature of Chinese nationhood was
preserved in pre-Qin Studies (zhuzi-xue), which flourished in the late Zhou dynasty (480 BCE-
220 BCE), but perished with the bibliocaust of the Qin (221 BCE-206 BCE) and was suppressed
by the state-sponsored monopoly of Confucianism during the succeeding dynasties. To revive
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this genuine Chineseness, the National Essence scholars attempted to retrieve Chinese language,
culture and history through pre-Qin texts.194 Two major points were embedded in the scholars’
pursuit of Chinese nationhood. First, their understanding of Chinese nationhood was based on an
ethno-nationalism. The standards they used to distinguish the Han race from the others were not
based on any physical differences or various biological types. Instead, in the National Essence
scholars’ terms, the Chinese nation was a kinship-based ethnic community that was demarcated
by surnames and social customs.195 In other words, it was the common culture rather than natural
or physical features that shaped the Chinese into a historical nation (lishi minzu).
Moreover, though the National Essence scholars pursued the study of nature, their
scholarship was neither about gaining more knowledge about nature nor discovering Nature’s
laws. Instead, by studying the natural history of China, the scholars attempted to compare the
living creatures with ones recorded in ancient texts, and thus to revive the lost knowledge about
the ancient world. Meanwhile, the study of plants served as a part of their pursuit of local history
since plants were symbols of the land.196 Thus, the aim of their research on nature was not about
gaining knowledge about present or future ecosystem, but to summon the collective memory of
the people and thus foster a sense of belonging among the Chinese to their land and their past.
At the turn of the 1920s, the movement to Reorganize National Heritage (zhengli guogu)
turned the discourse of Chinese nationhood toward a new trend. Similar to the National Essence
scholars, the supporters of the movement also attempted to recover the lost knowledge of ancient
194?Fan?Fati.?“Nature?and?Nation?in?Chinese?Political?Thought:?the?National?Essence?Circle?in?Early?Twentieth-Century?China.”?The?Moral?
Authority?of?Nature??ed.?Lorraine?Daston?and?Fernando?Vidal.?Chicago:?University?of?Chicago?Press,?2004,?409-437.?195?Ibid??196?Ibid??
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China through rigorous scholarship. Hence, except for adopting a more neutral term—National
Heritage—to refer to the materials and objects related to ancient China, the National Heritage
scholars still associated Chinese nationhood with culture and history.
What distinguished the National Heritage scholars from their predecessors was that they
regarded their study of ancient China as an enterprise of science. Since they thought they were
analyzing ancient China by utilizing a scientific spirit and its methods, their research would be
considered accordingly as scientific as the research in history, philosophy, philology, and
archaeology. The National Heritage scholars’ claim suggested the very vague understanding the
Chinese  elites  held  towards  science  at  that  time.  Though  science  was  the  slogan  of  the  May
Fourth Movement in 1919, which gained increasing attention and popularity in China at the time,
it  nonetheless  remained  an  abstract  and  fragmentary  notion,  which  was  only  loosely  connected
with the natural sciences. For the National Heritage scholars, who were eminent public figures in
China, regardless of the content of study, any research adopting scientific methods, like
observation, investigation, and reasoning, could be categorized as science.197 As the leader of the
National Heritage movement, Hu Shi (1891-1962), for example argued to recover the ancient
meaning of a Chinese character was no less scientific than discovering a new planet in so far as
both forms of research employed scientific methods.198 In this regard, by the early 1920s, the
concept of science was more associated with cultural studies, such as humanities, than being
associated with the experimentation and numerical calculation in natural sciences.
197?Luo,?Zhitian.?Inheritance?Within?Rupture???Culture?and?Scholarship?in?Early?Twentieth-Century?China??Leiden:?BRILL,?2015,?Chapter???and?9.?198?Ibid.,?247?
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The National Heritage movement faced a downturn by the late 1920s. For one thing, the
National Heritage scholars failed to find for their scientific approach to Chinese ancient
knowledge a place in modern academic system. As they proposed to establish an independent
discipline, the National Learning (guoxue) department in Peking University and Tsinghua
University, they were continuously questioned whether National Learning should be considered
a subject at all.199 Moreover, the National Heritage scholars also failed to prove the utility of
their studies in serving the nation-building agenda of the newly established Nanjing Regime.
Even Hu Shi, the leader of the movement, then abandoned his earlier argument and encouraged
young students to pursue the studies of natural science and technology, which were more urgent
and could better serve the nation.200 He suggested that, rather than digging in ancient texts and
scripts, Chinese youth should achieve something in a science laboratory or on expeditions.201
As the fall of the National Heritage movement suggested a change in Chinese elites’
perceptions of science, Academia Sinica’s engagement with Dr. Kishinouye then marked a new
trend in which both the connotations of science and nation were essentially extended. Before Dr.
Kishinouye’s third trip in 1929, the only governmental effort to protect China’s biological
resources was a restriction on shipping bird feathers abroad. 202  Thus, by institutionalizing
governmental administration on the biological expeditions, Academia Sinica essentially
established the biological resources as China’s national property, and natural sciences as national
199?Ibid.,?pp.?249-255.?200?Ibid.,?247.?201?Ibid.,?pp.?273-274.?202?Osborn,?Henry?F.?“Interruption?of?Central?Asiatic?Exploration?by?the?American?Museum?of?Natural?History.”?Science??vol.?70,?no.?1813,?1929,?pp.?291-294.?
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enterprises.
5.2. SCIENCE AS A NATIONAL ENTERPRISE
Science’s institutional relations with Nationalist politics in Republican China could both be a
blessing and a curse for its development, especially when an authoritarian regime attempted to
assume comprehensive control over science and subject it to the collectivist interest of the
nation.
First, since the Nationalist government’s legitimacy was primarily based on nationalism,
science remained a secondary consideration to politics. According to Academia Sinica’s policy
on foreign biological expeditions, “no antiquities or non-replaceable articles that have historical
value shall be collected or shipped abroad.” In contrast, after a routine inspection, biological
specimens were allowed to be transported abroad.203 The government offered an explanation for
its different levels of concern by pointing out the irreplaceability of the antiquities. After all, in
terms of quantity, the biological resources in China were not as exhaustible as the nation’s
antiquities. Nonetheless, as suggested by the catfish which was indigenous to China but named
after  Dr.  Kishinouye,  the  opportunity  to  discover  unspecified  creatures,  name  them,  and
categorize them into taxonomy was certainly no less irreplaceable than the Chinese antiquities.
In this regard, rather than the irreplaceability of the antiquities, the government’s emphasis on
203?The?Second?Historical?Archives?of?China,?Zhongyang?yanjiuyuan?dangan?393:631?and?633.?
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the ancient objects were largely motivated by the very idea that the antiquities were the
embodiment of the nation’s history and culture, and proof that China had been a nation.
Therefore, due to their lack of irrelevance in nationalistic discourse, the importance of biological
studies remained a secondary concern to the Nationalist government.
Second, due to the nationalization of science through Academia Sinica, the development
of science became dependent on the preference and the capacity of the Nationalist government.
Since applied science could directly serve the government’s agenda for industrialization, it
received more governmental support. 204  Moreover, despite the uneven distribution of the
government’s resources, the political and financial impotence of the Nationalist government also
limited the development of science in this national scientific center of China.
On the one hand, since Academia Sinica suffered from the government’s perennial
shortage of funds, Chinese scientists had been maximizing any opportunities that came their way
by piggybacking on foreign expeditions and strove to appropriate foreign cultural imperialism.205
On the other hand, in addition to its financial limitations, the Nationalist government’s political
impotence also set a limit on Academia Sinica’s scientific activities. In Dr. Kishinouye’s
expedition, Academia Sinica’s intervention was fundamentally facilitated by the government’s
authority over the governor of Sichuan Province. In turn, the Nanjing regime’s inability to
influence some provincial leaders negatively affected Academia Sinica’s ability to regulate the
scientific activities in those areas. For instance, in 1933, Sheng Shicai (1897-1970) established a
204?Chen,?1998,?pp.?129-170.?205?Grace?Shen.?Unearthing?the?Nation:?Modern?Geology?and?Nationalism?in?Republican?China,?1911-1949??London:?University?of?Chicago?Press,?2014,?Chapter?4.?
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relatively autonomous authority in Xinjiang with a pro-Soviet policy. Prior to Sheng’s reign, the
Xinjiang provincial government followed most of Academia Sinica’s requests to regulate the
foreign expeditions in the area.206 In contrast, during Sheng’s reign, between 1934 and 1942, 20
separate Soviet geological expeditions were operated in Xinjiang for industrial minerals, while
none stated that Academia Sinica had been informed with and granted permission to any of the
20 Soviet expeditions.207
Third, in the marriage between science and Nationalistic politics, a group of Chinese
scientists were also severely suffered when science became a collectivist interest of the nation. In
accordance with the Chinese archival materials, this paper refers the expedition along the Yangzi
River in 1929 as Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition or the Japanese expedition. Nonetheless, the very
presences of the three Chinese assistants in the trip and the fact that the expedition was a
cooperative project between the Beiyang government and the Japanese government were entirely
ignored by Academia Sinica and Chinese newspapers. By so doing, it was more effective for
Academia Sinica to denounce the expedition as a violation to China’s sovereignty, which in turn
helped to mobilize the support of the public and the government, and ultimately justify the
institute’s intervention.
As Academia Sinica detained the team in Chongqing and sent its own representatives to
monitor the expedition, the three Chinese team members were not only detained by their
206?Jin?Shuren,?as?Sheng’s?predecessor,?had?closely?worked?with?Academia?Sinica?on?regulating?the?foreign?trips?in?Xinjiang,?which?were?led?by?British?archeologist?Aurel?Stein,?Dutch?geographer?Philips?Christiaan?Visser?(1882?–1955),?and?French?explorer?Georges-Marie?Haardt?(1889-1932).?The?telegrams?between?the?Xinjiang?provincial?government?and?Academia?Sinica?regarding?the?trips?were?available?at?Academia?Sinica’s?Monthly?Journals?in?1929?and?1930.?See?Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan?yuanwu?yuebao??vol.1?no.?1,?1929,?pp.?38-39;?vol.1,?no.3,?1929,?pp.?52-54;vol.1,?no.4,?1929,?46;?and?vol.2?no.5,?1930,?pp.?44-45.?207?Kinzley,?Judd?C.?"the?Spatial?Legacy?of?Informal?Empire:?Oil,?the?Soviet?Union,?and?the?Contours?of?Economic?Development?in?China's?Far?West."?Twentieth-Century?China??vol.?40,?no.?3,?2015,?pp.?224-225.?
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government on their homeland, but were also categorized as the untrustworthy. Nonetheless, all
three Chinese researchers had dedicated themselves to the development of China’s biological
study.208 In contrast, the two representatives of Academia Sinica—Fang Bingwen and Chang
Linding—were not only keeping an eye on the Japanese activities and collecting the resources
for their own research, but were also entrusted with the task of collecting the specimens of
freshwater  sponges  along  the  Yangzi  River  for  an  American  biologist,  Gist  Gee,  who  was  a
committee member of Academia Sinica’s long-term sponsor, the Rockefeller Foundation.209
The  disenfranchised  Chinese  scientists  were  also  a  reflection  of  a  group  of  Chinese
scholars  who  were  marginalized  in  the  scientific  community  after  it  had  been  nationalized  by
Academia Sinica. The nationalization of science, in turn, escalated factionalism within the
Chinese academic community. At that time, Chinese students overseas generally formed
associations with regional bases, like a group of Chinese students in America founded the
Science Society of China at Cornell University in 1914 and another group in Japan founded
Bingchen Association (Bingchen xueshe) in Tokyo in 1916. 210  Based on their educational
backgrounds and social network, there was a division among the students who were trained in
Japan, Europe, and America. In the late 1920s, the Jinan Incident marked China’s growing
hostility toward Japan and the beginning of the Nanjing Regime’s pro-America policy. In such
context, the patronage from the American funds, together with American-trained Chinese
208?When?they?participated?in?the?trip,?Dr.?Wei?was?already???faculty?member?at?Peking?University?while?Dong?and?Jin?were?employed?by?the?Zhejiang?Xihu?Museum?and?Shandong?Aquaculture?Bureau?soon?after?the?expedition.?209?“Ziran?lishi?bowuguan?shiyuefen?gongzuo?baogao ??????????????,”?Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan?yuanwu?yuebao??vol.1,?no.4,?1929,?pp.20-22.?210?Fan,?Tiequan.?Jin?dai?Zhongguo?ke?xue?she?tuan?yan?jiu??Beijing:?Renming?chubanshe.?2011,?pp.?41-47.??
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scholars, jointly led Academia Sinica towards a pro-America trajectory. In contrast, the Chinese
scholars who were exclusively trained in Japan were largely marginalized in the Academia
Sinica-centered scientific community. In fact, according to Academia Sinica’s faculty list in
1929, the institute was composed of 200 Chinese researchers and 2 scholars from America and
France. Among the 200 Chinese faulty members, only 8 individuals received their professional
training in Japan while 55 pursued their degrees in the West, such as America, France, Britain
and Belgium, in which 32 American graduates accounted for the largest proportion.211 Therefore,
the unfair treatment of the Chinese scientists on the Kishinouye was irrelevant to their behavior,
activities, or professionalism, but resulted from their Japanese educational backgrounds and the
very fact that they were not insiders of the Chinese scientific community that was being
monopolized by a pro-American Academia Sinica.
In Republican China, 1929 was a pivotal year when the Nationalist government at
Nanjing had not yet fully entrenched itself while the Beiyang government had already collapsed.
In this transitional year, the political instability and the inconsistency between the two
governments’ policies generated both crisis and opportunities. For Dr. Kishinouye, his scientific
research in China, which was based on the agreement between the Japanese and the Beiyang
governments, was suddenly invalidated by the Nationalist government. For Academia Sinica, as
the Nanjing regime had no policy yet to regulate the foreign expeditions in China, any decision
and measures the institute adopted towards Dr. Kisninouye’s expedition at the moment had the
211?“Guoli?zhongyang?yanjiuyuan?zhiyuanlu?1929?(??????????),”?Guojia?tushuguan?cang?guoli?zhongyang?
yanjiuyuan?shiliao?congbin? ??????????????????Beijing:?guojia?tushuguan?chubanshe,Vol.7,?2008,?pp.?501-534.?
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potential to be institutionalized into the government’s policy upon the matter. Joined by rising
nationalism in China and an escalating hostility between China and Japan, this pivotal year
marked the end of foreign scholars’ unlimited accesses towards China’s natural resources and the
start of the nationalization of science by Academia Sinica.
Academia Sinica was founded to serve the Nanjing regime’s nation-building agenda with
scientific research, policy-making, and technocratic education. Through its efforts to nationalize
science, Academia Sinica became the place where science and nationalistic politics could
mutually empower each other. For the newly-founded Nationalist regime, science both served as
an instrument in its nation-building agenda and a modern discourse with which it could represent
and voice itself in the international community. Meanwhile, as Academia Sinica served the
government with science, it also secured governmental patronage and protection for the nascent
Chinese scientific community. In the institute’s intervention in Dr. Kishinouye’s expedition and
its policy on foreign biological expeditions, it essentially denied foreign scholars’ unlimited
accesses to China’s biological resources. The efforts, to a certain degree, placed the Chinese
scientific community in a less disadvantaged position in the global competition of science.
Moreover, by limiting foreign scholars’ accesses towards biological resources in China with
governmental authority, Academia Sinica nevertheless incorporated biological resources into
China’s national property. It accordingly extended the connotation of nation in 1920s China,
which was once only tied to China’s culture, history, and antiquities.
Through the mutual empowerment of science and nationalist politics, Academia Sinica
also established its authority in both realms . As the representative of science in the government,
it gradually built up its political capacity with its monopoly on knowledge of science. As the
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governmental authority in the realm of science, it also exerted authoritarian control over the
Chinese science community.
The nationalization of science seemed to be a win for science, for the government, and
for Academia Sinica, but not for the individuals previously discussed. The death of Dr.
Kishinouye  certainly  marked  the  Yangzi  River  expedition  with  a  tragic  end.  In  the
nationalization of science, both the Japanese and the Chinese scientists held responsibility for
each other’s sufferings, while they also paid the price for their intellectual pursuits. For Dr.
Kishinouye, his biological career was facilitated by Japan’s colonial expansion. After he had
retired from all the duties in Japan and dedicated his retirement to an arduous expedition in
China, he was detained and died in the semi-colony he helped Japan to conquer. For Cai
Yuanpei, his entire adult life was spent working for the independence and modernization of
China’s education. For this purpose, he utilized coercive measures against the unarmed colonial
scientists, which partly led to the death of the latter. Regardless of his efforts to protect the
scientific enterprise in China, he finally lost the autonomy of science to the party-state
government. For the marginalized scientists, they followed China’s social trend to pursue
professional training in Japan during a time when Japan and China had a very close and positive
relationship. When they returned to China, expecting to serve the nation with their knowledge,
they were instead detained, distrusted and marginalized by the scientific center in their own
nation. As science became a collectivist interest of nation-state, institutions rose from the
suffering of these individuals.
While I am writing the history of the nationalization of science in  Republican China, the
Nationalist government had been replaced by another anti-hegemonic party-state regime for
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decades. The Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences took
the place after Academia Sinica relocated itself in Taiwan. The Passport for Expedition, which
put a tragic end to Dr. Kishinouye and his Chinese assistants’ research in China, was renamed as
Introducing Letter (Jieshaoxin) in the People’s Republic of China. As I, a Chinese student
studying history in America, intend to trace the history of the Passport for Expedition in China’s
National Archives, my access was denied unless I obtained its modern reincarnation, an
Introducing Letter, from Chinese authorities. Then, it occurs to me that the marriage between
nation and science, however, has never ceased.
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APPENDIX A
[GLOSSARY]
Beifa??
Beiyang jun???
Beiyang junfa????
Beiyang zhengfu????
Bencao gangmu????
Bingchen xueshe????
Bing Zhi??
bugong??
bupingdeng tiaoyue?????
bupingdeng zhi tiaoyue??????
Caijue guwu huzhao??????
Cai Yuanpei???
Chang Linding???
Chiang Kai-shek???
Chubanpin guoji jiaohuanchu ?????
???
dangguo??
danghua jiaoyu????
dadao lieqiang chu junfa???????
??bun d?shu????
??jinkai ???
Dong Yumao???
Fang Bingwen???
gaiding tongshang tiaoyue??????
gaizheng tiaoyue????
Gengzi peikuan????
Guo cui??
Guo gu??
Guoli dongnan daxue??????
Guomindang???
guo xue??
Guozijian???
Guwu baocunfa?????
Hanlinyuan???
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Hu Hanming???
Hu Shi??
Huzhao??
Irisawa Tatsukichi????
Jiancha Yuan???
Jianguo fanglue????
Jin Zhaohua???
Kamimura Shinichi????
Kaoshi Yuan???
Ke xue??
Kimura Shigeru? ???
Kishinouye Kamakichi????
Lifa Yuan???
lishi minzu????
Li Shizeng???
Mao Zedong???
Mianshui chukou huzhao??????
Minamimansh? tetsud? kaisha ?????
????
neidi  ??
Neidi youli huzhao??????
Nikka gakkai????
Nishi bunka teikei??????
Okabe Nagakage????
Osaka Mainichi shinbun??????
pianmian zuihuiguo daiyu???????
Shanghai ziran kexue yanjiusuo?????
????
Sheng Shicai???
Shina hozen????
Sifa Yuan???
Sun Yat-sen???
Taishi bunka jigy? hiseishiki bib?roku??
??????????
Taishi bunka jigy? tokubetsu kaikei h???
?????????
Taishi bunka jimukyoku???????
Taiwan Sh?tokufu?????
Tai xue??
??-A d?bunkai ?????
??-A d?bun shoin??????
Tokyo Nichi nichi shinbun??????
???? bunka jigy???????
Tsinghua xuetang????
Wei Hongmo? ???
Wu Zhihui???
Xiandaihua???
Xiangdaixing???
Xianzheng??
Xiehe yiyuan????
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Xinghua??
Xingzheng Yuan???
Xunzheng??
Yanjing daxue????
Yanque yu???
Yokote Chiyonosuke??????
??suk? gyorui no seibutsugakuteki kenky?
????????????
Yuan Shikai???
Zhang Jingjiang???
zhengli guogu????
Zhongguo dizhi xuehui??????
Zhongyang guwu baoguan weiyuanhui??
???????
Zhongyang xuehuifa?????
Zhongguo kexueshe?????
Zhongguo xueshu tuanti xiehui ?????
???
Zhongguoren bu da zhongguoren????
????
Zhonghua jiaoyu wenhua jijinhui????
?????
Zhongyang ribao????
Zhongyang yanjiuyuan?????
Zhongyang yanjiuyuan pingyihui ????
????
Zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui?????
??
Zhou Longguang???
Zhoushan qundao????
zhuquan??
zhuzi xue???
Ziyuan weiyuanhui?????
Zujie??
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